Minor v. Cardwell
| Decision Date | 28 February 1866 |
| Parties | JAMES J. MINOR, et als., Appellants, v. JOHN H. CARDWELL, et als., Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Daviess Circuit Court.
H. M. & A. H. Vories and S. A. Richardson, for appellants.
The statutes of Kentucky, relied on by the plaintiffs, and which were read in evidence, were only intended to cause the slaves of a married woman, owned by her at the time of her marriage, or which came to her by gift, devise, &c., during coverture, to be held and taken to be real estate for certain specific purposes; that is, “that no slave shall be liable to the debts of her husband, or be attached, levied on, or sold for his debts,” &c. It was not intended that the wife should hold the property as separate property, no title vesting in the husband, but merely that the property should not be sold for his debts, and was therefore only an exemption law, and could have no extra-territorial force or effect. Hence when the slaves were brought to Missouri, they were subject to and governed by the laws of Missouri, and were only exempt from levy and sale for the husband's debts contracted before the marriage, or before the wife came into the possession of the slaves. (Johnson et al. v. Jones, 12 B. Mon. 326; Cox v. Coleman's Adm'r, 13 Id. 451; 9 Id. 500.)
The laws of Kentucky clearly recognize a life estate in the husband in the slaves of the wife. This estate is only exempted from levy and sale during the life of the wife. This is clearly an exemption of an acknowledged property in the husband from sale, for and during the life of his wife. This exemption certainly could have no force in Missouri; therefore such life estate might be sold for the husband's debts contracted after the marriage, and after said slaves came to their possession.
It is admitted that the law of the place where a marriage takes place governs the right or title to property coming to the possession of the parties while residing there, and that whatever title is acquired at said place cannot be divested by the parties changing their domicil. But there is a marked difference between a right or the title to property, and the exemption of property from execution for certain purposes. (Sto. Confl. Laws, § 571; Smith v. Healey, 4 Conn. 49; Woodbridge v. Wright, 3 Conn. 523; Smith v. Spinola, 2 Johns. 196; Sicard v. Whale, 11 Johns. 194.)
If the laws of Kentucky fix the character of the property, and the rights thereto, and are not merely laws of exemption, then the slaves in question must be considered as real property in this State, as they are in Kentucky; and it is well settled, that as to real property, the rule as to the law of the domicil does not apply, but that such property is governed by the law of the place where it is situated. (Sto. Confl. Laws, § 436 et seq., § 187 and note 3, §§ 167-8; Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314.)
With this view of the case, the husband's life estate could be sold to satisfy debts by him contracted after the negroes were reduced to possession. (R. C. 754; Cunningham v. Gray, 20 Mo. 170; Harvey v. Wickham, 23 Mo. 112; Barbee v. Wymer, 27 Mo. 140.)
The rule as to the law of the domicil does not prevail wherever the right asserted by said law is prohibited by the law of the place where it is to be enforced, or where it is against the policy of, or indirectly repudiated by, the laws of the place where it is to be enforced.
The statute of Missouri does directly repudiate the law of Kentucky, in declaring that slaves shall be personal property, and, in fixing their course of descent, inconsistent with the provisions of said law.
If the slaves in question were not the separate property of the wife by virtue of the law read in evidence, an interest therein vested in the husband upon the marriage. If so, it was subject to sale by our laws for his debts. (Sallee v. Chandler, 26 Mo. 124.)
To ascertain whether the law of Kentucky makes the slaves the separate property of the wife, we should take the decisions and interpretation given to said law by the courts of Kentucky, by which it will be seen that the property is vested in the husband, subject to the provisions of said law, and was not separate property belonging to the wife. (Charlotte v. Chouteau, 25 Mo. 465; Johnson & w. v. Jones, 12 B. Mon. 326.)
The decision of this case rests on one single point. By the statutes of Kentucky, of 1845-6, entitled “An act to further protect the rights of married women,” it was provided that the slave or slaves of a married woman should, after the passage of the act in that commonwealth, be held and taken to be real estate, in so far that no slave or slaves, or the increase thereof, which such married woman should have at the time of her marriage, or which should come, descend, or be devised to her during her coverture, should be liable for the debts of the husband, or be attached, levied on and sold for his debts or liabilities of any sort or kind, nor should the husband's life estate in the slaves of the wife, the wife living, be levied on and sold to pay such debts and liabilities.
By our law, slaves were personal property, and slaves belonging to the wife became the absolute property of the husband, and were liable to be levied on and sold under execution, in like manner as other personal property, for his debts. The question is, whether slaves which were held by a married woman in Kentucky, under the operation of the law of 1845-6, and which were invested with the character of real estate by local law, and exempt from levy and sale for the husband's debts, are to be considered as held in the same manner, and with like conditions and exemptions, when brought by their owner to this State? In other words, after they are transferred to our jurisdiction by the voluntary act of the owner, is their status to be determined by the laws of Kentucky or Missouri?
It may be stated as a general rule, that laws have no force by their own proper vigor beyond the Territory or State by which they are made excepting, for some purposes, the high seas or lands over which no State slaims jurisdiction. Beyond or outside of this...
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