Minor v. Jackson Mun. Airport Auth.
| Decision Date | 13 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15cv936-DPJ-FKB |
| Parties | PATRICK MINOR, DELSIE HARRIS, and ANTONYA COAKLEY PLAINTIFFS v. JACKSON MUNICIPAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, ("JMAA"); DIRK VANDERLEEST, individually and in his official capacity as former CEO of JMAA; RENE WOODWARD, individually and in her official capacity as the CAO of JMAA; and BONNIE WILSON, individually and in her official capacity as COO of JMAA DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
This employment-discrimination case is before the Court on two motions: the Partial Motion to Dismiss [35] filed by Defendant Jackson Municipal Airport Authority ("JMAA"), and the Motion to Dismiss [38] filed by Defendants Dirk Vanderleest, René Woodward, and Bonnie Wilson (collectively, "the Individual Defendants"). For the reasons that follow, the motions are granted.
Plaintiffs Patrick Minor, Delsie Harris, and Antonya Coakley are all African-American employees of JMAA. In December 2012, JMAA advertised a new Aviation Operations Manager position. "[B]ecause the salary advertised was near what they were already making in their current positions," none of the Plaintiffs applied for the job. 2d Revised 2d Am. Compl. [33] ¶ 8. Plaintiffs allege that no qualified individuals applied initially and that, in December 2013, JMAA "deviated from the normal posting practices, and did not repost the Aviations Operations Manager position on its website." Id. ¶ 10. Instead, without advertising the position, JMAA hired Kelly Elliot, a white male, to fill the position. "Plaintiffs later . . . learned that Elliot was paid between $90,000 and $100,000 in this position." Id. Apparently, had they known of the opening and that the salary would exceed $90,000, Plaintiffs would have applied for the position, for which they contend they were more qualified than Elliot. Id. Plaintiffs filed EEOC charges related to JMAA's hiring of Elliot. While the initial EEOC charges were pending, Plaintiff Harris applied for and was denied another position at JMAA.
Believing they had been discriminated against in their employment because of their race and that Harris suffered retaliation for filing an EEOC charge, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against JMAA; Vanderleest, its former Chief Executive Officer; Woodward, its former Chief Accounting Officer; and Wilson, its former Chief Operating Officer.1 In their Second Revised Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs purport to assert racial discrimination and retaliation claims against Defendants under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. JMAA now moves to dismiss all but the Title VII claims asserted against it in the operative pleading [35], and the Individual Defendants seek dismissal of all claims against them [38].
In considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the "court accepts 'all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)). But Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. at 555 (citations and footnote omitted).
JMAA asserts, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that it is a governmental entity created by the City of Jackson, Mississippi, pursuant to the Mississippi Airport Authorities Law, Miss. Code Ann. §§ 61-3-1 et seq. See Ricks v. City of Winona, 858 F. Supp. 2d 682, 686 (N.D. Miss. 2012). As such, JMAA argues that Plaintiffs may not assert a cause of action against it under § 1981; instead, "plaintiffs must assert a cause of action against state actors under § 1983 to remedy violations of civil rights under § 1981." Oden v. Oktibbeha Cty., Miss., 246 F.3d 458, 463 (5th Cir. 2001); see also id. at 464 (). Plaintiffs cite no binding authority to the contrary, and the Court agrees that their claims against JMAA for violations of civil rights under § 1981 must proceed under § 1983.
Political subdivisions of municipalities are subject to § 1983 liability "when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury . . . ." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Rivera v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Thus, a claim of municipal liability requires proof of (1) a policymaker; (2) an official policy; and (3) a violation of constitutional rights whose "moving force" is the policy or custom. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, a plaintiff alleging municipal liability "must plead specific facts with sufficient particularity to meet all the elements of recovery." Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1278 (5th Cir. 1992). JMAA argues that Plaintiffs' Second Revised Second Amended Complaint [33] fails to allege either a specific official policy or that the injury Plaintiffs allegedly suffered was inflicted by this policy.
Turning to the operative pleading, it contains the conclusory allegation that "JMAA has a practice and policy that deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights . . . ." 2d Revised 2d Am. Compl. [33] ¶ 15. This allegation is devoid of any factual underpinning and falls short of identifying a particular policy or custom or "indicat[ing] the manner in which a municipal policy or custom motivated or otherwise resulted in" the discrimination or retaliation Plaintiffsallegedly suffered.2 Taylor v. City of Jackson, Miss., No. 3:07cv76-WHB-LRA, 2007 WL 3407681, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 15, 2007).
In response to JMAA's motion, Plaintiffs point to Brown v. Bryan County, in which the court noted that "a single decision by a policy maker may, under certain circumstances, constitute a policy for which [a municipality] may be liable." 219 F.3d 450, 462 (5th Cir. 2000). "This 'single incident exception' is extremely narrow and gives rise to municipal liability only if the municipal actor is a final policymaker." Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 542 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Bolton v. City of Dallas, 541 F.3d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Woodard v. Andrus, 419 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2005))). Importantly, the actor must "be responsible for establishing final government policy respecting such activity before the municipality can be held liable." Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986); see also Culbertson v. Lykos, 790 F.3d 608, 625 (5th Cir. 2015) ().
Here, Plaintiffs have not pleaded sufficient factual content to make a plausible single-incident-liability claim. To begin, they never state in their complaint which of the three Individual Defendants was the relevant final policymaker. At most, they generically plead that all three "were key persons and decision makers involved in the writing of the job description, advertising and hiring process," 2d Revised 2d Am. Compl. [33] ¶ 8, while also averring thatJMAA runs the airport "[t]hrough its Board of Commissioners," id. ¶ 2. JMAA's motion to dismiss is granted as to the §§ 1981 and 1983 claims. The race claim will, however, proceed under Title VII.
JMAA argues that Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages against it under Title VII should be dismissed because punitive damages are not available against a government entity. See Oden, 246 F.3d at 465-66 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)). Plaintiffs do not address this argument, which appears correct. The Title VII punitive-damages request against JMAA is likewise dismissed.
Plaintiffs concede that the Individual Defendants may not be held liable under Title VII. Pls.' Mem. [48] at 4. The Individual Defendants' motion is therefore granted as to the Title VII claims.
The Fifth Circuit in Oden held that a government official cannot be personally liable under § 1981 for discrimination in the terms and conditions of a government employment contract. Oden, 246 F.3d at 464; see King v. Lawrence Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:12cv86-KS-MTP, 2013 WL 319286, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 28, 2013). Plaintiffs point to an exception adopted by the Fifth Circuit whereby "§ 1981 liability will lie against an individual defendant if that individual is essentially the same as the [government] for the purposes of the complained-ofconduct." Foley v. Univ. of Hous. Sys., 355 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Assuming that exception might apply, the...
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