Minors v. Tyler
| Decision Date | 04 November 1987 |
| Citation | 521 N.Y.S.2d 380,137 Misc.2d 505 |
| Parties | Anstey MINORS, Petitioner, v. Vera TYLER, Respondent. |
| Court | New York City Court |
Allison, Kaufman & Greenberg (Stephen C. Shulman, of counsel), Bronx, for petitioner.
Robin J. Suttenberg, New York City, for respondent.
This is a holdover proceeding between two individuals who have resided and co-habited together for a number of years without having had the benefit of marriage. The petitioner is the title owner of the one family dwelling and now seeks to evict the respondent, asserting a claim that she is a licensee whose license has been revoked. The matter is before the court on petitioner's motion to strike a number of the affirmati defenses and counterclaims set forth in the answer of the respondent and for summary judgment.
Respondent's answer and opposition to the motion is based upon a claim of constructive trust whereby respondent is entitled to an equitable interest in the premises, and as such, respondent is not a licensee. Thus, an issue has been presented with respect to the court having subject matter jurisdiction of this proceeding.
Despite protracted research by the court, the precise issue, that is, the legal status of a paramour with respect to her continued occupancy in the apartment after love's ardor has cooled, does not appear to have been the subject of any prior decisions. There have been several cases involving husbands and wives where the courts were required to decide whether summary proceedings were available to a spouse who sought to remove the other spouse from the marital home.
In the oft cited case of Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 20 A.D.2d 71, 245 N.Y.S.2d 395, the Appellate Division, 1st Dept., the court held that the wife was not a licensee of her husband and that as long as the marriage relationship is unabridged by a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction or by a valid agreement, the husband cannot employ summary proceedings to evict the wife.
In Tausik v. Tausik, 9 N.Y.2d 664, 212 N.Y.S.2d 76, 173 N.E.2d 51, summary proceedings were authorized because the husband and wife had voluntarily separated and had executed a written agreement signed by the wife which was held to constitute a "license to use the husband's property". It was not necessary to make a determination AS TO THE WIFE'S STATUS.
Where the wife's right to support has already been determined by an order of the Family Court, summary proceedings were maintainable against her by the husband to recover possession of his premises under RPAPL 713(7). Halaby v. Halaby, 44 A.D.2d 495, 355 N.Y.S.2d 671.
The case of Matter of Brennecke v. Smith, 42 Misc.2d 935, 249 N.Y.S.2d 602, is further evidence of a disinclination by the courts to treat a spouse as a mere licensee, but, instead, require an independent determination of status that is the result of a court decree or agreement of the parties. In the Brennecke case, the respondent husband had purchased the house while married and thereafter conveyed the same to his wife. The wife left the home and subsequently conveyed the premises to the petitioner, who then commenced a summary proceeding to oust respondent. Citing the Rosenstiel case, supra, the court declared that the occupancy of the husband was not that of a mere licensee. Apparently, the court imputed to the petitioner the knowledge of the nature of respondent's occupancy vis-a-vis his wife.
Of course, in Rosenstiel, it was not necessary for the court to ascribe a particular status to the respondent. She was the "wife" of the petitioner, endowed with all of the matrimonial and legal rights incidental to such position. Admittedly, the respondent in the case at bar may not be cloaked with such status. However, to relegate her to a classification of a mere licensee is quite untenable. "As generally understood in the law of real property, a licensee is...
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Heckman v. Heckman
...some rights with respect to continued occupancy of the apartment they shared not unlike those acquired by a spouse" (Minors v. Tyler, 137 Misc.2d 505, 507, 521 N.Y.S.2d 380 [Civ.Ct., Bronx County 1987] ; but see Young, 89 A.D.2d at 469, 455 N.Y.S.2d 776 ), thus creating what became known as......
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...to be known as the “family exception” as to who may be deemed a licensee for summary eviction purposes was expanded in Minors v. Tyler, 137 Misc.2d 505, 521 N.Y.S.2d 380. In that case, the petitioner was the titled owner of a one-family home in which he lived with the respondent as husband ......
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...other spouse vacated (Matter of Brennecke v. Smith, 42 Misc.2d 935 [1964] ), a partner in a long term romantic relationship (Minors v. Tyler, 137 Misc.2d 505 [1987] ), minor stepchildren (Nagle v. Di Paola, 134 Misc.2d 753 [1987] ), a same-sex couple (Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 74 N.Y.2d ......
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Piotrowski v. Little
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