Minot v. City of Boston
| Decision Date | 07 January 1909 |
| Citation | 201 Mass. 10,86 N.E. 783 |
| Parties | MINOT et al. v. CITY OF BOSTON. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
H. M. Davis, for petitioners.
Arthur L. Spring, for defendant.
This was a petition for damages on account of the taking of an easement for sewerage purposes in a certain strip of land of the petitioners, under St. 1897, p. 396, c. 426. The taking was made and completed by record on October 12, 1901, and this fact distinctly appeared at the trial. There was a trial by jury and a verdict for the petitioners was rendered on February 17, 1908. The evidence introduced at the trial all related to the value of the land and its adaption for valuable uses at the time of the taking. In the charge to the jury nothing was said either 'in relation to the matter of interest upon whatever amount of damages the jury should find,' or 'as to the date as of which the petitioners were to recover their damages.' In one part of the charge the jury were told that the measure of damages was 'the diminution, if any, in the fair market value of the land owned by the petitioners,' and afterwards that it was 'the fair value of the land taken upon the whole evidence.' There was evidence upon which the jury might properly have found that the diminution in the fair market value of the land--or that the fair value of the land taken--was equal to the amount of their verdict.
No exceptions to the charge were taken by either party, and nothing further is shown by the evidence or record regarding interest. The court heard no evidence after the verdict was rendered. The petitioners did not file any motion for a new trial, nor any bill of exceptions, but on March 5, 1908, they filed a motion for allowance of interest upon the amount of the verdict from the time of the taking. This motion was argued on April 2, and on April 4, 1908, the justice who had presided at the jury trial made the following order: 'It appearing to the court that the verdict of the jury in the above entitled case was for the damages sustained by the plaintiffs as of the date of the taking, completed by public record October 12, 1901, and did not include any interest upon such damages since said date of taking, the clerk is hereby ordered, in entering up judgment upon said verdict, to reckon and include therein interest upon the verdict from the said date of taking.'
The case is before us upon the appeal of the respondent to this order; and the sold question is whether the court had the power to make the order.
It is to be borne in mind that the whole question of the amount of damages was before the jury. They were the tribunal to determine it, and the only tribunal, and hence it was not only in their power, but it was their duty to fix the amount due. Their verdict, therefore, so long as it stands, is the only authoritative announcement of that amount. And that is so, whether or not every element of damage in the way of interest or otherwise was placed before the jury, or whether the instructions to them were right or wrong, complete or defective. The parties have tried the case as they saw fit and they made no objection to the charge nor asked for further instructions.
It is to be further noted that this is the verdict upon which, so long as it stands, judgment is to be entered. No authority is given to add to this verdict a further sum. The assessment of the amount due is not to be made in part by the jury and in part by the court, but wholly by the jury. As an assessment made by the court, therefore, it cannot stand. The only plausible ground upon which the order can stand is not that it is an addition to the assessment made by the jury, but that it may be regarded as an amendment to the verdict, or, in other words, that the verdict actually rendered shall not stand as given but shall be so amended as to stand as the court thinks it ought to have been given.
There is no doubt of the power of the court to amend a verdict after the discharge of the jury, and even after the end of the term at which the case was tried; and, in considering the nature of the amendment to be made, reference may be had to the notes of the judge who presided at the trial, or to any other satisfactory evidence as to the issues actually tried and the actual state of the material evidence. Clarke v. Lamb, 6 Pick. 512; Id., 8 Pick. 415, 19 Am. Dec. 332, and cases cited. Thus a general verdict upon a declaration containing several counts, all for the same cause of action, one of which is fatally defective, may be amended at a subsequent term by an examination of the minutes of the judge, and judgment may be entered only on the good counts. Barnard v. Whiting, 7 Mass. 358; Porter v. Rummery, 10 Mass. 64; Smith v. Cleveland, 6 Metc. 332. See, also, rule 40 of the Superior Court. And generally where the verdict is defective in form it may be put in proper shape. As stated by Lord, J., in Ashton v. Touhey, 131 Mass. 26, 29: 'If the verdict as affirmed and recorded does not state with technical accuracy the finding [of the jury] upon the real issues tried, and the court can see how it should be corrected, it will reject what is surplusage, or in some proper mode make it conform to the real issues tried.' And the same rule applies in criminal cases. Commonwealth v. Stebbins, 8 Gray, 492; Commonwealth v. Lang, 10 Gray, 11. Whether the case be civil or criminal, the verdict which is defective only in form may be worked 'into form' so that 'it may serve.'
But there is one important limitation to this rule, and that...
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