Miranda J. v.

• Decision Date: 20 June 2014
• Citation: 988 N.Y.S.2d 379,118 A.D.3d 1469,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 04645
• Parties: In the Matter of MIRANDA J., Trevor J. and Dominick J. Wayne County Department of Social Services, Petitioner–Respondent; Jeromy J., Respondent–Appellant. (Appeal No. 1.).
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

118 A.D.3d 1469

988 N.Y.S.2d 379

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 04645

In the Matter of MIRANDA J., Trevor J. and Dominick J. Wayne County Department of Social Services, Petitioner–Respondent; Jeromy J., Respondent–Appellant. (Appeal No. 1.).

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

June 20, 2014.

Elizabeth A. Sammons, Williamson, for Respondent–Appellant.

Gary Lee Bennett, Lyons, for Petitioner–Respondent.

Sean D. Lair, Attorney for the Children, Sodus.

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., LINDLEY, SCONIERS, VALENTINO, and DeJOSEPH, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

In appeal No. 1, respondent father appeals from an order that granted two abandonment petitions, the first filed on April 12, 2011 and the second filed on June 22, 2011, and thereby terminated the father's parental rights on the ground of abandonment. In appeal No. 2, respondent mother appeals from an order that likewise granted two abandonment petitions, also filed on those dates, and thereby terminated her parental rights on the ground of abandonment. The respective abandonment petitions against the father and the mother (collectively, respondents) were considered by Family Court during a single consolidated hearing.

In both appeals, we conclude that the court properly granted the two June 22, 2011 petitions and terminated the parental rights of respondents upon determining that petitioner established by clear and convincing evidence that respondents abandoned their children. Social Services Law § 384–b (5)(a) provides that “a child is ‘abandoned’ by his parent if such parent evinces an intent to forego his or her parental rights and obligations as manifested by his or her failure to visit the child and communicate with the child or [petitioner], although able to do so and not prevented or discouraged from doing so by [petitioner].” Although respondents were prohibited from contacting their children during the six months prior to the filing of the June 22, 2011 abandonment petitions based on an order of protection, it is well settled that “[t]he parent who has been prohibited from direct contact with the child, in the child's best interest[s], continues to have an obligation to maintain contact with the person having legal custody of the child” (Matter of Gabrielle HH., 306 A.D.2d 571, 573, 760 N.Y.S.2d 269,affd.1 N.Y.3d 549, 772 N.Y.S.2d 643, 804 N.E.2d 964;see Matter of Lucas B., 60 A.D.3d 1352, 1352, 876 N.Y.S.2d 255). During the six-month period prior to the June 22, 2011 petitions, respondents' sole contact with petitioner was at a uniform case review meeting that had been arranged by petitioner. Contrary to respondents' contentions, that “ ‘insubstantial contact[ ]’ with petitioner ... [is] insufficient to preclude a finding of abandonment” (Matter of Christina W., 273 A.D.2d 918, 918, 710 N.Y.S.2d 280;see Matter of Jasmine J., 43 A.D.3d 1444, 1445, 844 N.Y.S.2d 533;Matter of Loretta Lynn W., 149 A.D.2d 928, 928, 540 N.Y.S.2d 62). Contrary to their further contentions, respondents failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that “there were circumstances rendering contact with [petitioner] infeasible,” or that petitioner discouraged them from having contact (Matter of Regina A., 43 A.D.3d 725, 725, 843 N.Y.S.2d 207;see Matter of Drevonne G. [Darrell G.], 96 A.D.3d 1348, 1349, 945 N.Y.S.2d 888).

We further...