Miranda v. City of Casa Grande
| Docket Number | 20-16905 |
| Decision Date | 19 October 2021 |
| Parties | Adrian Miranda, an individual, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. City of Casa Grande, a municipality; Richard Rush, in his individual capacity as an Officer of the Casa Grande Police Department, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Argued and Submitted June 15, 2021 San Francisco, California
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona No. 2:19-cv-04618-JJT-JZB John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding
Joel B. Robbins (argued), Robbins & Curtin PLLC, Phoenix Arizona, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Larry J. Crown (argued) and Elan S. Mizrahi, Titus Brueckner & Levine PLC, Scottsdale, Arizona, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Daniel A. Bress and Patrick J. Bumatay, Circuit Judges.
SUMMARY[*]
The panel affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that a City of Casa Grande police officer lied during an Arizona state administrative proceeding concerning the suspension of plaintiff's driver's license.
The panel first noted that there is no express constitutional guarantee or other federal right to a driver's license so that its deprivation does not violate substantive due process. Plaintiff's claim therefore sounded, if at all, in procedural due process. The panel held that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a procedural due process violation because, even assuming the officer testified falsely at the administrative hearing as to whether plaintiff consented to a blood test following his arrest for driving under the influence, Arizona provided sufficient post-deprivation process to plaintiff. The panel noted that, following the discovery of the officer's alleged unauthorized conduct, plaintiff was granted a second administrative hearing before a new ALJ, who ultimately voided the suspension and reinstated plaintiff's license. Additionally, Arizona also allowed plaintiff to bring a state law claim, which he was pursuing in Arizona state court. The panel held that the post-deprivation procedures were both meaningful and sufficient under the Due Process Clause.
The question in this case is whether the plaintiff can pursue a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a police officer allegedly lying during an Arizona state administrative proceeding concerning the suspension of the plaintiff's driver's license. The answer, we hold, is no. Even assuming the officer testified falsely, Arizona provided sufficient post-deprivation process to the plaintiff. That is enough to foreclose the plaintiff's procedural due process theory, and thus, his § 1983 claim.
On July 6, 2017, Adrian Miranda went out bowling with two neighbors his 14-year-old daughter, and his 17-year-old son Adrian Matthew Miranda (whom the parties refer to as Matthew). Over the course of the night, Miranda drank at least six beers. Miranda was by that point significantly intoxicated, so Matthew drove the group home in Miranda's truck. During the ride, Miranda and his son began to argue. The argument intensified until Matthew stopped the truck in a vehicle lane of traffic several blocks from the family's home. Neighbors heard the commotion and called 911.
Officers Richard Rush and John Campa of the Casa Grande, Arizona Police Department responded to the scene. When they arrived, the truck was still in the vehicle lane of traffic and Miranda was now in the driver's seat. The parties dispute whether the truck was running, whether Miranda had the keys, whether the truck's alarm was going off, and whether the emergency blinkers were flashing.
The officers ordered Miranda out of the truck, but he did not comply. They repeated the command over a loudspeaker for several minutes until Miranda finally exited the vehicle. Miranda emerged with bloodshot eyes, stumbling and swaying, smelling of alcohol, and slurring his speech. Officer Rush's police report described Miranda's behavior that evening as "extremely uncooperative" and "belligerent."
Officer Rush arrested Miranda for failure to comply with law enforcement and had him brought to the Casa Grande police station. At the station, Miranda admitted to having consumed six beers and he performed poorly in response to a field sobriety test. He also submitted to a portable breath test, which revealed a blood alcohol content of 0.137%. Miranda was placed under arrest for driving under the influence (DUI).
Under Arizona's "implied consent" law, "[a] person who operates a motor vehicle in this state gives consent . . . to a test or tests of the person's blood," if arrested on suspicion of a DUI. A.R.S. § 28-1321(A). This applies if "the person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs." Id.
Once arrested, the violator "shall be requested" to submit to a blood test, and, if he refuses, he "shall be informed that [his] license or permit to drive will be suspended or denied for twelve months, . . . unless the violator expressly agrees to submit to and successfully completes the test or tests." Id. § 28-1321(B). "A failure to expressly agree to the test or successfully complete the test is deemed a refusal." Id. At that point, officers generally need a search warrant before they can continue with the blood test. Id. § 28-1321(D)(1).
Officer Rush read to Miranda from a standardized Arizona Department of Transportation "implied consent affidavit" designed to confirm whether an individual is consenting to required tests. The first paragraph of the affidavit asks, "Will you consent to a test or tests of your blood, breath, urine or other bodily substance for the purpose of determining your alcohol concentration or drug content?" Officer Rush read this question verbatim and Miranda responded, "No, I will not."
Following the next prompt on the form, Officer Rush then advised Miranda: Miranda refused again. Officer Rush then read Miranda one last warning from the form affidavit: For the third time, Miranda refused.
Miranda then asked to make a phone call. The officers, unsure if Miranda was requesting a lawyer, allowed him to use a phone. But instead of calling a lawyer, Miranda called his superior at the United States Customs & Border Patrol (CBP), where Miranda worked as a CBP Officer. Miranda told his supervisor that he was intoxicated at the police station and needed to be picked up. After the call, Miranda fell asleep.
Meanwhile, Officers Rush and Campa had begun preparing a search warrant for Miranda's blood draw. During this time, another officer, Officer McKinney, was sitting with Miranda. Video recordings from inside the police station recorded the following exchanges. While they were in the room together, Miranda stated to McKinney, "Can you let them know I'm doing the blood work?" Officer McKinney then found Officer Rush, who had not yet secured the search warrant. McKinney said to Rush, "He says he's doing bloodwork." Rush asked, "He said he's doing bloodwork?" McKinney replied, "Yes." Rush responded, "Oh, no shit." "Yep," said McKinney.
After this exchange, Officer Rush still obtained a telephonic search warrant from a judge on the Casa Grande Justice Court. Rush returned to the room and told Miranda: "So, you refused the blood draw, so your license is suspended for one year from this day forward." Eventually, with the assistance of a phlebotomist (and after some resistance from Miranda), Miranda's blood draw was completed. The test revealed a blood alcohol concentration above the legal limit for driving or physically controlling a motor vehicle in Arizona.
Miranda was charged with a DUI and various other crimes. CBP limited Miranda's duties for a time, both because of Miranda engaging in "conduct unbecoming an officer and misuse of his position" and because Miranda, now lacking a valid driver's license, no longer met a condition of employment. Among other things, CBP suspended Miranda's enforcement authority, ordered him to turn in his firearm and badge, and limited his building access "only to those areas necessary to perform administrative duties." Miranda's pay was reduced, and he allegedly suffered anxiety, shame, and humiliation.
Miranda later pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct and failure to comply with law enforcement in exchange for dismissal of the DUI. His other charges were also ultimately dismissed.
Arizona law afforded Miranda the opportunity to contest his driver's license suspension in a hearing before a state administrative law judge (ALJ) in the Arizona Department of Transportation. See A.R.S. §§ 28-1321(G)-(K); Ariz. Admin. Code § 17-1-502; see generally Tornabene v. Bonine ex rel. Arizona Highway Dep't, 54 P.3d 355, 360-61 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2002). A timely request for a hearing stays the driver's license suspension until the hearing is held. A.R.S. § 28-1321(J).
Miranda sought such a hearing, which took place on September 12 2017. Miranda, represented by counsel, testified that he had no memory of the evening. Miranda at this point did not know he had expressed a willingness to allow a blood draw, nor was he aware of the conversation between Officers McKinney and Rush. At the hearing, Miranda's son, daughter, and stepson testified on his behalf. Officer Rush also testified. The ALJ asked Rush, "At any...
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