Miranda v. Department of Human Resources Dev.

• Decision Date: 06 July 1973
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Alex MIRANDA, Petitioner and Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, Appellant; NORRIS INDUSTRIES, Real Party in Interest. Hector ZORRERO, Petitioner and Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, Appellant; ALPHA BETA ACME MARKETS, INC., Real Party in Interest. Kenneth C. FREEMAN, Petitioner and Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, Appellant. Civ. 40555, 40565, 41781.

Page 35

109 Cal.Rptr. 35

33 Cal.App.3d 314

Alex MIRANDA, Petitioner and Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, Appellant;

NORRIS INDUSTRIES, Real Party in Interest.

Hector ZORRERO, Petitioner and Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, Appellant;

ALPHA BETA ACME MARKETS, INC., Real Party in Interest.

Kenneth C. FREEMAN, Petitioner and Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, Appellant.

Civ. 40555, 40565, 41781.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

July 6, 1973.

Hearing Denied Aug. 29, 1973.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Elizabeth Palmer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward M. Belasco, Jerold A. Prod and Melvin R. Segal, Deputy Attys. Gen., for appellants.

Henry R. Fenton, Sacramento, and Jonathan B. Steiner, Los Angeles, of Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, for respondents Miranda and Zorrero.

James Ebright, El Monte, for Norris Industries, real party in interest.

Delno G. Kanode, La Habra, for Alpha Beta Acme Markets, Inc., real party in interest.

Weltner & Gorenfeld, El Monte and Carol Kridner, Santa Ana, San Gabriel Valley Neighborhood Legal Aid Offices, for Kenneth C. Freeman.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher and Willard Z. Carr, Jr., and Richard Chernick, Los Angeles, for amicus curiae MMA.

Levy & Van Bourg and Abe F. Levy, Jack Levine, Los Angeles, and Matthew B. F. Biren, for amicus curiae UAW.

JEFFERSON, Associate Justice.

Petitioners Miranda, Zorrero and Freeman sought writs of mandate seeking to vacate the decision of the Department of Human Resources Development (as to Miranda) and of the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (as to Zorrero and Freeman), denying to petitioners unemployment insurance benefits. The trial court granted the writs, and the Department and the Board have appealed.

A brief preliminary discussion of the factual and procedural foundation underlying these disputes is necessary. The Department is the statewide agency responsible for the administration of the unemployment insurance program contained in the California Unemployment Insurance Code (Unemp.Ins.Code). The program provides for the payment of economic sustenance to persons unemployed through no fault of their own. (Unemp.Ins.Code § 100.) The Board is the agency within the Department handling appeals concerning the eligibility of applicants for benefits. California's program is certified for federal funding by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to the Federal Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 501--503); it is also funded by California employers. The program's purpose is to protect persons from involuntary unemployment and the suffering caused thereby, and to promote general economic stability. (Unemp.Ins.Code § 100.) The code is regarded as remedial social legislation. (California Department of Human Resources Development v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 91 S.Ct. 1347, 28 L.Ed.2d 666.)

The procedures of the Department for making decisions concerning the eligibility of applicants for benefits and appeals from those decisions to Board referees and to the Appeals Board, are set forth in Unemployment Insurance Code sections 1327--1336. Section 1327 provides:

'A notice of the filing of a new . . . claim shall be given to the employing unit by which the claimant was last employed immediately preceding the filing of such claim, and the employing unit so notified shall submit Within 10 days after the mailing of such notice any facts then known which may affect the claimant's eligibility for benefits.'

Section 1328 declares, in part, that

'The facts submitted by an employer pursuant to Section 1327 shall be considered and a determination made as to the claimant's eligibility for benefits. . . .'

These sections have been contained in the code in their present form since 1951, and the procedures set forth therein have been in the code since 1947.

There is an additional section, 1256, relating to eligibility, over which the present dispute has arisen. It provides:

'An individual is disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits if the director finds that he left his most recent work voluntarily without good cause or that he has been discharged for misconduct connected with his most recent work.

'An individual is presumed to have been discharged for reasons other than misconduct in connection with his work and not to have voluntarily left his work without good cause unless his employer has given written notice to the contrary to the director (of the Department) Within five days after the termination of service, setting forth facts to overcome the presumption. If the employer files such notice, the question shall be immediately determined in the same manner as benefit claims.' (Italics added.)

Petitioner Miranda was terminated by his employer on February 8, 1971. He subsequently filed a claim for unemployment benefits at a Department office. If is departmental procedure to schedule an interview, at which time eligibility is determined, about three weeks after the initial application. Miranda's employer informed the Department on March 12, 1971, that Miranda had been fired for alleged misconduct. Miranda was interviewed by the Department on March 15, 1971, and it was determined that he was eligible for benefits. He received a benefit check of $61. The employer appealed on March 22, 1971. A Department supervisor reviewed the determination of eligibility, deciding that Miranda was guilty of misconduct and was thus ineligible for benefits. The petition for mandate followed. ¹

Petitioner Zorrero left his employment on January 22, 1971, and applied for compensation. His employer did not inform the Department that he had allegedly left his employment without good cause until March 10, 1971. The Department referee's decision denying him benefits was affirmed by the appeals board. His petition followed. Petitioner Freeman last worked on September 9, 1970. The record before us indicates that he filed his application shortly thereafter, but does not tell us when the employer filed the notice that he had voluntarily terminated his employment without good cause. ² In this matter, the appeals board reversed the referee and found Freeman ineligible. The petitioners, therefore, are all persons who left their employments or were terminated, and applied for benefits which were denied, despite the fact that their respective employers had not filed the five-day notice referred to in section 1256 of the code, as set forth above. ³

The trial court construed section 1256 as clearly requiring employers, who wish to challenge an ex-employee's eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits because of misconduct or voluntary termination, to file notice (of facts sufficient to overcome the eligibility presumption) within five days or be precluded forever from raising the eligibility issue on the two grounds named in the section. Accordingly, the trial court ordered issuance of the writs, directing the Department and the Board to vacate their decisions denying these petitioners benefits, because their respective employers had failed to file the required five-day notice. They were further directed to reevaluate the eligibility of the petitioners for benefits without reference to misconduct or voluntary termination allegations, as these avenues of inquiry by the Department had been closed by the employers' default.

The...