Miron v. Town of Stratford
| Decision Date | 30 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:11–CV–446 (VLB). |
| Citation | 976 F.Supp.2d 120 |
| Parties | Christian MIRON, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF STRATFORD, Stratford Police Department, Orlando Soto, Joseph McNeil, and Shawn Farmer, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Todd D. Steigman, William G. Madsen, Madsen, Prestley & Parenteau, LLC, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff.
Clayton J. Quinn, Quinn Law Firm, LLC, Milford, CT, Joseph Patrick Sargent, Fairfield, CT, Thomas E. McCabe, Timothy F. Butler, Tibbetts Keating & Butler, LLC, Darien, CT, for Defendants.
The Plaintiff, Christian Miron (“Miron”), brings this action for alleged federal and state violations of his rights stemming from the public release of a background investigation report prepared for the purposes of assessing Miron's suitability to become a police officer with the Stratford Police Department (“SPD”). At this stage of the litigation, seven broad claims remain against Stratford Police officers Orlando Soto (“Soto”), Joseph McNeil (“McNeil”), and Shawn Farmer (“Farmer”) in their individual capacities only. Miron alleges claims against the Defendants for deprivation of his constitutional privacy rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (counts 1–3); deprivation of his First Amendment right to freedom of association pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (counts 5–7); violations of Connecticut's computer crimes statute as encompassed in Conn. Gen. Stats. §§ 53a–251 (enforced through Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52–570b) and § 53–451 (enforced through Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53–452) (counts 9–14); common law invasion of privacy (counts 15–17); civil conspiracy (counts 18–20); and tortious interference with business relations (counts 21–23). Currently pending before the court is the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Defendants' Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that both the Plaintiff and the Defendants have failed to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for asserting and contesting facts on a motion for summary judgment. The Federal Rules provide that
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). Moreover, “[t]he court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).
Rule 56(a) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the District of Connecticut makes clear the procedure for prosecuting and opposing a motion for summary judgment. A party filing a summary judgment motion must annex a “concise statement of each material fact as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)1. Local Rule 56(a) 2 further makes the opponent's duty abundantly clear by stating that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file an answering document which states “whether each of the facts asserted by the moving party is admitted or denied” and must also include a “list of each issue of material fact as to which it is contended there is a genuine issue to be tried.” D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)2. Each statement of material fact in a Local Rule 56(a) 1 or Local Rule 56(a) 2 statement, as well as each denial in a summary judgment opponent's Local Rule 56(a) 2 statement, “must be followed by a specific citation to (1) the affidavit of a witness competent to testify as to the facts at trial and/or (2) evidence that would be admissible at trial.” D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)3. The Local Rule further clarifies that “[a]ll material facts set forth in [a moving party's 56(a)1] statement and supported by the evidence will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be filed and served by the opposing party.” D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)1. Where a party fails to appropriately deny material facts set forth in the moving party's 56(a)1 statement, and where those facts are supported by evidence in the record, those facts are deemed to be admitted. See SEC v. Global Telecom Servs. L.L.C., 325 F.Supp.2d 94, 109 (D.Conn.2004); Knight v. Hartford Police Dep't, 3:04CV969 (PCD), 2006 WL 1438649 .
The parties here have submitted Local Rule 56 Statements that cite to evidence in the record, but that are incomplete in that they do not provide the Court with a full view of the events forming this action. Both parties have further proffered statements or portions of statements in their 56 Statements and briefs unsupported by the evidence to which they cite. The parties also cite to evidence in the bodies of their briefs that does not appear in their Rule 56 Statements. Moreover, the parties have submitted hundreds of pages of evidence but cite specifically to a mere fraction. Lastly, Defendants have made a number of impermissible legal conclusions in their 56(a)1 Statement and Plaintiff has done the same in his Statement of Disputed Issues of Material Fact. .
Thus, the court will take as true relevant facts that are supported by admissible evidence in the record but will not credit statements or portions of statements that are unsupported by the evidence cited. The court will cite directly to the evidence cited by the parties where appropriate, and will consider evidence cited in the parties' briefs where such evidence assists the court in understanding the facts of this case or where an omission of such fact would materially alter the Court's conclusions. The court will not consider evidence in the record to which the parties have not cited, and will also disregard any legal conclusions in the parties' 56 Statements. The court will note disputes as to facts.
At all times relevant to this action, Defendant Orlando Soto was employed as a Lieutenant in the SPD, Joseph McNeil was a Captain in the SPD and Vice President of the Stratford Police Union Local 407 (the “Union”), and Shawn Farmer was a sergeant in the SPD and the President of the Union. .
In or around October 2007, the Plaintiff, Christian Miron, applied for a position as a police officer with the Stratford Police Department. . At the time the Plaintiff applied for this position with the SPD, his brother, James Miron, was the Mayor of the Town of Stratford. . The Plaintiff has testified and the evidence confirms that in March 2008 the SPD extended Miron a verbal offer of employment which was later confirmed by letter dated April 18, 2008. [Dkt. 203, P's Opp. to Ds' MSJ, pp. 3–4; Dkt. 203–8, Exh. 5, Miron Depo. 254:4–9; Dkt. 203–11, Exh. 8, Offer Letter].
Lieutenant Soto and Captain McNeil both sat on the Chief's oral Interview Panel with Christian Miron. On the attendant “Candidate Interview Sheets” dated February 5, 2008, Soto noted that he recommended Miron for hire by the SPD, and McNeil highly recommended him. . Sergeant Farmer testified that he agreed it would be a good idea to have the Mayor's brother in the SPD. . The record does not indicate that either Soto or McNeil had read Miron's background investigation report (which was finalized on March 21, 2008) at the time they made these recommendations; and the report itself notes that Miron's background investigation commenced on February 10, 2008. [Dkt. 210, Exh. K, Incident Report 08–3321, p. 1 (sealed) ].
As part of the hiring process for a position with the Stratford Police Department, Christian Miron was required to and did sign an Authorization for Release of Personal Information authorizing, in relevant part,
a review of and full disclosure of all records or any part thereof, concerning myself, by and to Lt. Freer, of the Stratford Police Department, whether said records are of a public, private or confidential nature.
. This Authorization further states, in relevant part,
[t]he intent of this authorization is to give my consent for full and complete disclosure of the records of ... medical and psychiatric treatment and/or consultation ... employment and pre-employment records, including background reports.... It is the intent of this authorization to provide full and free access to the background and history of my personal life, for the specific purpose of pursuing a background investigation that may provide pertinent data for the Police Department to consider in determining my suitability for employment by that Department. It is my specific intent to provide access to personal information, however personal or confidential it may appear to be, and the sources of information specifically enumerated above are not intended to deny access to any records not specifically mentioned herein. I hereby release you, your organization or others from liability or damage that may result from furnishing the information requested.
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Jackson v. Reed Smith LLP (In re Jackson)
...by evidence in the record, that fact is deemed admitted for the purposes of this Memorandum of Decision. Miron v. Town of Stratford , 976 F.Supp.2d 120, 127 (D. Conn. 2013). Because the plaintiff failed to establish there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the defendants' allegations......
- Rodriguez-Rivera v. United States
- Campuzano v. United States
-
Doe v. Putnam Cnty.
...one of the "very limited circumstances" in which the Second Circuit has found the right to privacy to exist. Miron v. Town of Stratford , 976 F.Supp.2d 120, 139 (D. Conn. 2013).16 Accordingly, the Court grants the NYAG's Motion To Dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment claim.II. Conclusion For th......