Mirza v. Saul
| Decision Date | 15 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 4:19-cv-00284-P-BP |
| Parties | GHULAMYASIN BAIG MIRZA, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Plaintiff Ghulamyasin Baig Mirza ("Mirza") filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the denial by the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") of his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("SSA"), and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") payments under Title XVI. ECF Nos. 1 and 15. After considering the pleadings, briefs, and the administrative record, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that United States District Judge Mark T. Pittman REVERSE the Commissioner's decision and REMAND this action for further proceedings.
Mirza was born on October 13, 1966, has at least a high school education, and can communicate in English. See SSA Admin. R. (hereinafter, "Tr.") 25, ECF No. 13-1. His employment history includes work as a salesclerk. Tr. 25. Mirza filed applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI payments on May 22, 2016. Tr. 14. In all applications, he alleged that his disability began on May 4, 2016. Id. The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Id. Mirza requested a hearing, which was held on February 15, 2018 in Fort Worth, Texas, with Mirza, his attorney, and a vocational expert ("VE") present. Id. The ALJ issued his decision on July 3, 2018, finding that Mirza was not disabled. Tr. 27.
Specifically, the ALJ employed the statutory five-step analysis and established during step one that Mirza had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 12, 2016, the alleged onset date. Tr. 16. At step two, he determined that Mirza had severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine with dorsalgia and sciatica, obesity, anxiety, depression, and insomnia. Tr. 17. At step three, the ALJ found that Mirza's impairments did not meet or equal in combination one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404(p). Tr. 19.
At step four, the ALJ ruled that Mirza had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except with the following limitations: Mirza could sit for six hours and stand and/or walk, combined, for four hours; he would need to be allowed to alternate between sitting and standing every thirty minutes, if needed; he could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps or stairs, but he could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; he could frequently reach with the bilateral upper extremities; he could understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions and tasks; and he could frequently interact with the public, co-workers, and supervisors. Tr. 21. The ALJ concluded that Mirza was unable to perform his past relevant work. Tr. 25. At step five, he found that considering Mirza's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that he could perform. Id.
The Appeals Council denied review on March 12, 2019. Tr. 1. Therefore, the ALJ's decision is the Commissioner's final decision and is properly before the Court for review. Higginbotham v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 332, 334 (5th Cir. 2005) ().
Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 404 et seq., of the SSA governs the disability insurance program in addition to numerous regulations concerning disability insurance. See 20 C.F.R. § 404 (2020). The SSA defines a disability as an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2020); Crowley v. Apfel, 197 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1999).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled and thus entitled to disability benefits, the Commissioner employs a sequential five-step analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, the claimant must not be engaged in any substantial gainful activity. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). "'Substantial gainful activity' is work activity involving significant physical or mental abilities for pay or profit." Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 271 n.2 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a)-(b)). Second, the claimant must have an impairment or combination of impairments that is severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii); see Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1100-03 (5th Cir. 1985). Third, disability exists if the impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments ("Listing"), 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). Fourth, the impairments must prevent the claimant from returning to past relevant work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). Before this step, the ALJ assesses the claimant's RFC, which is "the most [a claimant] can still do despite [the claimant's] limitations." Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). Fifth, impairments must prevent the claimant from doing any work after considering the claimant'sRFC, age, education, and work experience. Crowley, 197 F.3d at 197-98; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
"A finding that a claimant is disabled or is not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusive and terminates the analysis." Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1987). "The claimant bears the burden of showing [he or] she is disabled through the first four steps of the analysis; on the fifth, the Commissioner must show that there is other substantial work in the national economy that the claimant can perform." Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 2007).
This Court reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the decision. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995); Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1988). Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995)). The Court may neither reweigh the evidence in the record nor substitute its judgment for the Commissioner's, but it will carefully scrutinize the record to determine if substantial evidence is present. Id.; Hollis, 837 F.2d at 1383. "Conflicts in the evidence are for the Commissioner and not the courts to resolve." Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal punctuation omitted) (quoting Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1990)).
Mirza raises two issues on appeal. He argues that (1) the ALJ failed to include in the RFC finding his handling and fingering limitations despite having acknowledged them and that this Court cannot resolve this inconsistency because settled law prohibits the federal courts from affirming based on justifications the Commissioner never offered, and (2) remand is required because the ALJ never asked the VE about the manipulative limitations. ECF No. 15 at 6-11.
Mirza argues that the Commissioner's final decision is internally inconsistent because the RFC finding fails to account for his manipulative limitations the ALJ credited elsewhere in the decision. ECF No. 15 at 10. Specifically, Mirza points out that even though the ALJ acknowledged that Mirza "requires reaching, hand[l]ing, and fingering limitations due to his cervical condition," the RFC finding included only the reaching limitation. Id. He argues that this Court cannot affirm the denial of benefits because the Court cannot know what the ALJ intended from the contradictory remarks in his written decision. Id. at 11-13.
The Commissioner responds that the evidence in the record does not support that handling and fingering limitations were warranted and should have been included in the ALJ's RFC finding. ECF No. 16 at 8. Specifically, the Commissioner points to the treatment records from February 2017 through September 2017, which showed normal or unremarkable musculoskeletal and neurological findings, including normal or unremarkable motor strength and sensation. Id.; Tr. 17, 22, 381, 385, 400, 421, 447. The Commissioner notes that the ALJ also referenced the September 2016 consultative examination that showed unremarkable motor strength and sensation. ECF No. 16 at 8; Tr. 18, 22, 370. Additionally, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ's statement regarding handling and fingering limitations is a harmless scrivener's error and that remanding the case tohave the ALJ omit these statements would serve no practical purpose. ECF No. 16 at 10. Further, the Commissioner contends that because he is merely supporting the ALJ's stated rationale for his RFC finding by providing additional evidentiary detail consistent with the stated rationale, he did not engage in post hoc rationalization to support the ALJ's decision. Id. at 11.
In the Reply, Mirza avers that under Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) and Fifth Circuit case law, an agency's action can only be affirmed on the grounds invoked by the agency. ECF No. 17 at 2-5....
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