Misic v. Segars
Decision Date | 15 August 1995 |
Docket Number | No. B080663,B080663 |
Parties | , 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6536, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,022 Sylvia MISIC, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Marlene SEGARS, et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Galindo & Fox and Craig A. Fox, Granada Hills, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Hernandez & Schapiro and David Hernandez, Jr., Diamond Bar, for defendants and respondents.
The question presented is whether an order setting aside a default judgment qualifies as a "new trial" order for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 583.320, which provides a three-year period within which to again bring the matter to trial when a new trial is granted by the trial court or ordered by an appellate court. 1 We conclude it does not.
Plaintiffs/appellants filed their complaint on May 24, 1985, "for cancellation of deed and to [quiet] title to real property; for money, fraud, breach of contract." The clerk's default was entered nearly five years later on April 6, 1990. On the fifth anniversary of the filing of the complaint, May 24, 1990, appellants secured a default judgment granting various forms of relief, including money damages.
On September 27, 1991, the trial court set aside the judgment pursuant to This ruling was affirmed on appeal. On November 3, 1993, the trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to bring the matter to trial within five years from the filing of the complaint. (§ 583.310.)
Appellants contend section 583.320 gave them at least three years from September 27, 1991, to bring the matter to trial. 2
In Briley v. Sukoff (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 405, 159 Cal.Rptr. 452, the defendants answered plaintiff's complaint, but failed to appear for trial. "The cause was assigned and after waiting a reasonable time, Briley put on testimonial and documentary evidence and received judgment." (Id. at p. 407, 159 Cal.Rptr. 452.) Defendants subsequently had the judgment set aside and secured dismissal for failure to get the case to trial within five years. Distinguishing several cases that had held a default prove-up is not a trial, the Briley court held that a trial had been held, entitling plaintiff to the three-year extension provided by section 583.320 for a new trial. Although failing to appear for trial, defendants had joined the action. Plaintiff presented testimony and other evidence. The procedure was conducted under section 594 ( ) rather than section 585 ( ).
Tiholiz v. Superior Court (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 201, 163 Cal.Rptr. 452, disagreed with Briley. In Tiholiz, the plaintiff gave improper notice of a summary judgment motion and defendant failed to appear. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion. Subsequently, the trial court granted defendant's motion to set aside the summary judgment and then denied defendant's motion for a five-year dismissal. The appellate court issued a peremptory writ of mandate compelling the trial court to dismiss. The panel disagreed with Briley "with respect that the principle announced, i.e., nullifying or setting aside a judgment entered by default or as in the case at bench a summary judgment, equates with an order granting a new trial as that phrase is used in section 583, subdivision The primary case Briley analyzed and distinguished was Langan v. McCorkle (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 805, 81 Cal.Rptr. 535, disapproved on other grounds in Brunzell Constr. Co. v. Wagner (1970) 2 Cal.3d 545, 555, fn. 13, 86 Cal.Rptr. 297, 468 P.2d 553, which had concluded that a (Briley v. Sukoff, supra, 98 Cal.App.3d at p. 408, 159 Cal.Rptr. 452, fn. omitted.) Briley noted several other cases had reached the same result as Langan, but did not "involve a judgment taken pursuant to ... section 594 and later set aside." (Id. at p. 409, 159 Cal.Rptr. 452.)
(c)[, now section 583.320]. A default judgment by its very designation expressly states it is the result of a nonadversary proceeding." (Id. at p. 205, 163 Cal.Rptr. 452.)
Langan rejected the argument that a plaintiff's testimony at the prove-up hearing turns the procedure into a trial within the meaning of section 583. (Langan v. McCorkle, supra, 276 Cal.App.2d at p. 807-808, 81 Cal.Rptr. 535; see also Maguire v. Collier (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 309, 312-313, 122 Cal.Rptr. 510; Vanyek v. Heard (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 467, 95 Cal.Rptr. 750; and Reeves v. Hutson (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 445, 453, 301 P.2d 264.)
Other authority, while not dealing specifically with this issue, would seem to give the term "trial" a broader interpretation. "... (City of Pasadena v. Superior Court (1931) 212 Cal. 309, 313, 298 P. 968, italics added.) For example, a trial occurs when a trial court resolves " (7 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Trial, § 3, p. 21, citing Kindt v. Kauffman (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 845, 862, 129 Cal.Rptr. 603, disapproved on other grounds in Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl (1978) 20 Cal.3d 389, 401, fn. 8, 143 Cal.Rptr. 13, 572 P.2d 1155.) (7 Witkin, Cal.Procedure, Trial, supra, at p. 19.) "There may be a trial of issues of fact though no evidence is introduced." (7 Witkin, Cal.Procedure, Trial, supra, § 2, at p. 19.)
"A trial shall be deemed to actually commence at the beginning of the opening statement or argument of any party or his or her counsel, or if there is no opening statement, then at the time of the administering of the oath or affirmation to the first witness, or the introduction of any evidence." (§ 581, subd. (a)(6).) A trial is completed when judgment is entered. (7 Witkin, Cal.Procedure, Trial, supra, § 1, at p. 19.) In the instant matter, the judgment shows that "evidence [was] introduced and ... considered by the court[.]"
(Cal. Practice Guide, Civ.Proc. Before Trial, supra, p 5:272, p. 5- (Weil & Brown, supra, p 5:476, p. 5-88.7.) (Id. at p 5:477.) Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 381, 385-386, 202 Cal.Rptr. 204, with dictum to the contrary, "is unsupported by any recent authority, and is believed to be incorrect." (Weil & Brown, supra, at p 5:479, pp. 5-88.7-5-88.8.)
52.) "Appellate courts are inclined to affirm orders granting relief from default because the law favors trial on the merits, whenever possible." (Id. at p 5:415, p. 5-81.) When a trial court grants a motion to vacate a default, an appeal does not lie in the absence of entry of a default judgment. (Velicescu v. Pauna (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1521, 282 Cal.Rptr. 832.)
Under this rationale, a defaulting defendant could ask the trial court for a new trial, at least under certain circumstances. If granted, section 583.320(a)(2)...
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