Miss. Cnty. v. City of Blytheville, CV–17–472

Decision Date22 February 2018
Docket NumberNo. CV–17–472,CV–17–472
Citation538 S.W.3d 822
Parties MISSISSIPPI COUNTY, Arkansas, Appellant v. CITY OF BLYTHEVILLE, Arkansas ; City of Dell, Arkansas; City of Manila, Arkansas ; and City of Leachville, Arkansas, Appellees
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Rainwater, Holt & Sexton, by: Jason E. Owens, for appellant.

Michael Mosley, for appellee.

COURTNEY HUDSON GOODSON, Associate Justice

Appellant Mississippi County, Arkansas ("the County"), appeals from the Mississippi County Circuit Court's order granting appellee City of Blytheville's ("the City") motion for summary judgment.1 For reversal, the County argues that the circuit court erred (1) by defining the phrase "prisoners of municipalities," for whom the City would owe a daily fee for housing in the County jail pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 12–41–506 (Repl. 2016), as only those detainees charged with violation of a city ordinance; and (2) by applying an offset in the amount of taxes paid under an exclusive jail tax by residents of the City to the calculation of "reasonable expenses" under section 12–41–506. We reverse and remand.

The statute at issue in this appeal, Arkansas Code Annotated section 12–41–506, which is entitled "Municipal Prisoners—Expenses," provides as follows:

(a)(1) In the absence of an agreement on jail costs between a county and all municipalities having law enforcement agencies in the county, the quorum court in a county in this state may by ordinance establish a daily fee to be charged municipalities for keeping prisoners of municipalities in the county jail.
(2) The fee shall be based upon the reasonable expenses which the county incurs in keeping such prisoners in the county jail.
(b)(1) Municipalities whose prisoners are maintained in the county jail shall be responsible for paying the fee established by the quorum court in the county.
(2) When a person is sentenced to a county jail for violating a municipal ordinance, the municipality shall be responsible for paying the fee established by an agreement or ordinance of the quorum court in the county.
(3) Municipalities may appropriate funds to assist the county in the maintenance and operation of the county jail.
(c)(1) Each county sheriff shall bill each municipality monthly for the cost of keeping prisoners in the county jail.
(2) Each county sheriff shall remit to the county treasurer monthly the fees collected under this section, and such fees shall be credited to the county general fund.
(d) Counties shall give priority to in-county municipalities over contracts for out-of-county prisoners.

A brief overview of the relevant history between the parties regarding the payment of jail fees for municipal prisoners pursuant to this statute is necessary to understand the issues presented. In 2001, the Mississippi County Quorum Court enacted ordinance number 0–2001–18, "An Ordinance Establishing Fees for Municipal Prisoners Held in the Mississippi County Jail and For Other Purposes." The Ordinance became effective on February 1, 2002, and stated that, in the absence of a written agreement with a municipality for an appropriation of funds to assist the County in the maintenance and operation of the County jail, a fee of $35 per prisoner shall be charged for any prisoner arrested by any state or municipal law enforcement officer within the geographic boundaries of any city or incorporated town in the County for a violation of any state law or municipal ordinance and presented to the County jail for incarceration. In 2008, Ordinance number 0–2008–13 was passed, increasing the daily fee for municipal prisoners to $55 per day, effective January 1, 2009.

Prior to 2003, the City of Blytheville operated its own municipal jail. After that jail closed in January 2003, the County brought a declaratory-judgment action against the cities of Blytheville, Dell, Gosnell, and Manila seeking to have the circuit court define the term, "prisoners of municipalities," as found in section 12–41–506(a)(1). An order was entered in December 2003 granting the County's petition to define the term to "include persons housed in the county jail by virtue of a pending misdemeanor charge that is pending on a city docket or municipal docket of any court, whereby the fine revenue that would be owed by the prisoner, if convicted, would be paid to the city or the municipality and not to the county." The City of Blytheville dismissed its appeal of this order following the entry of a consent order in a collection action filed by the County against the City for unpaid jail fees. This consent order, which was filed on August 26, 2004, indicated that the parties had agreed to a daily rate of $15 per day for each municipal prisoner, as defined in the 2003 declaratory-judgment action, for a total of $44,805 for the months of November 2003 through June 2004. The order further stated that the parties would renegotiate future daily jail fees in September of each year following the expiration of the current agreement on December 31, 2005.

Subsequent written agreements between the City and the County raised the daily rate for the City's municipal prisoners to $20 for 2006; $30 for 20072008; $40 for 20092010; $45 for 2011; and $50 for 2012. There were no further written agreements between these parties regarding jail fees after 2012.

In January 2014, the County filed a complaint against the City, alleging that it had not paid a daily fee for its municipal prisoners since January 2013. The County sought judgment for these fees from February 2013 through December 2013, at either the $50 rate previously agreed to by the parties for a total of $275,350, or the $55 rate required by the 2008 Ordinance for a total of $305,090, in addition to amounts for subsequent months and prejudgment interest.

The City filed an answer and a counterclaim in February 2014. The City denied that any prior orders or agreements between the parties defining the term "municipal prisoners" were controlling; instead, the City argued that the prior orders were void or voidable because all necessary or interested parties were not joined. In its counterclaim, the City sought a declaratory judgment that "prisoners of municipalities" and "municipal prisoner" as referenced in section 12–41–506 means "a person arrested and jailed by a municipal officer on a municipal ordinance violation." In addition, the City requested an injunction preventing the County from charging it for the incarceration of persons other than municipal prisoners as defined above. The County answered the counterclaim and affirmatively argued that the City's claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.

On April 4, 2014, the City filed a motion to join the cities of Dell, Manila, and Leachville, all of whom it alleged had utilized the County jail.2 The motion was granted by the circuit court, and an amended counterclaim was filed on April 24, 2014, adding these cities as involuntary counterplaintiffs.

The City filed a motion for summary judgment on July 7, 2014. In its motion, the City argued that Arkansas Code Annotated section 12–41–506 defines "prisoners of municipalities" in a way that is inconsistent with the County's application of the definition; that the County had also charged the City in excess of its actual costs for housing municipal prisoners in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 12–41–503(d)(f) ; and that the County's actions in charging varying amounts of jail fees to different entities violated the equal-protection clause of the Arkansas Constitution.

The County filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asserting that the City was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel from relitigating the previous definition of "prisoners of municipalities," at least as it relates to misdemeanor prisoners, that was memorialized in the 2003 lawsuit and the 2004 consent order involving both parties. The County also argued that, consistent with this prior definition, with the Attorney General's interpretation of the term, and with the payment of jail fees by other cities in the County, the City should be required to pay, prospectively, jail fees for all prisoners that the City arrests and delivers to the County jail for incarceration from the point of arrest or intake until (1) charging on a felony, (2) sentencing on a misdemeanor, and (3) release on a municipal-ordinance violation. In addition, the County contended that the City had presented no proof to show that the $55 daily fee set by the quorum court was not based on "reasonable expenses" as required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 12–41–506(a)(2). The County attached numerous exhibits to its motion, including an affidavit from the Mississippi County Sheriff that indicated that all cities in the County, with the exception of Blytheville subsequent to February 2013, had paid jail fees in accordance with the County's proposed definition of municipal prisoners. The County also attached a listing, by county, of the State Inmate Cost Per Day reported by the Association of Arkansas Counties and verified by the Division of Legislative Audit. This report indicated that Mississippi County had a verified cost per day for each inmate of $78.67.

In its reply to the County's response, the City continued to argue that there was no rational basis for the disparate treatment between the municipalities in the County and the State, which pays only $28 per day for its prisoners housed in the County jail. The City contended that even if the fees charged by the County's ordinance did not violate the equal-protection clause, the formula for calculating jail fees was unreasonable. The City claimed that by dividing the total jail costs by the number of prisoners, the cities were unfairly required to pay a greater share of prisoner medical costs than the municipal prisoners actually incurred because they spend less overall time in the jail. While the City admitted that there were numerous Attorney General opinions that had...

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