Miss. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, Inc. v. Hattiesburg High Sch.

• Decision Date: 15 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2013–CA–01214–SCT.,2013–CA–01214–SCT.
• Citation: 178 So.3d 1208
• Parties: MISSISSIPPI HIGH SCHOOL ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION, INC., Gregg Freeman, In his Official Capacity and Don Hinton, In his Official Capacity. v. HATTIESBURG HIGH SCHOOL.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

178 So.3d 1208

MISSISSIPPI HIGH SCHOOL ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION, INC., Gregg Freeman, In his Official Capacity and Don Hinton, In his Official Capacity.

v.HATTIESBURG HIGH SCHOOL.

No. 2013–CA–01214–SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Oct. 15, 2015.

James A. Keith, Holmes S. Adams, Ridgeland, Richard Jarred Garner, Bernard Hess Booth, IV, Benjamin Blue Morgan, Ridgeland, attorney for appellants.

Percy W. Watson, Norman William Pauli, Jr., Hattiesburg, attorneys for appellee.

EN BANC.

LAMAR, Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. Hattiesburg High School ("HHS") filed a complaint for injunctive relief against the Mississippi High School Activities Association ("MHSAA"), alleging that its decision to declare one of HHS's students ineligible to participate in athletics was arbitrary and capricious. The Forrest County Chancery Court agreed, and it vacated the penalties that MHSAA had imposed against HHS. MHSAA appealed to this Court. Because we find that HHS failed to state a legally cognizable claim or cause of action, we vacate the decisions of the Forrest County Chancery Court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. Tiaria Griffin was a star basketball player at Lawrence County High School. At the beginning of her senior year, Tiaria and her brother Steven transferred to HHS. After MHSAA declared Tiaria and Steven ineligible to participate in athletics at HHS for the 2011–2012 season, Tiaria, Steven, and their mother filed a complaint for injunctive relief in the Forrest County Chancery Court on September 30, 2011. They alleged, among other things, that MHSAA's "actions in denying the minor plaintiffs eligibility for competition in athletic activities were arbitrary and capricious," and that MHSAA "did not have any substantial basis to deny the minor plaintiffs eligibility for athletic activities."

¶ 3. Also on September 30, 2011, Tiaria, Steven and their mother filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), asking the chancellor to enjoin MHSAA from "ruling and removing the minor plaintiffs from participation in competition as eligible student athletes at [HHS], until a full hearing is had on [plaintiffs'] application for a permanent injunction." On that same day, the chancellor issued the TRO, enjoining MHSAA from "ruling the minor Plaintiffs ineligible for competition in scholastic sport activities." The TRO was set to expire after ten days, unless extended. Also on that same day, MHSAA filed a notice of removal to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.¹

¶ 4. On October 7, 2011, the chancellor held a hearing on the TRO and decided that, in spite of the removal to federal court, the state court proceedings were "frozen," and the TRO therefore would remain in effect.² The parties subsequently filed several motions in the district court. MHSAA filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs "seek to appeal the decision rendered by [MHSAA] relative to Minor Plaintiffs' eligibility to participate in athletics," and that the Plaintiffs "lack standing to maintain such an appeal." HHS filed a motion to intervene as a plaintiff, arguing that it "clearly claims an interest in the decision of [MHSAA] in declaring [Tiaria and Steven] ineligible and should be represented in the instant action."

¶ 5. On November 22, 2011, the district court entered an order finding that the chancellor "did not have jurisdiction to conduct [the October 7th hearing] or make any ruling regarding the extension of the [TRO]" and that the chancellor's actions on that day were "null and void as a matter of law." The district court further found that the TRO had expired on October 10, 2011. The district court then remanded the case to state court on December 9, 2011, finding that there was no "legitimate assertion of a violation of federal constitutional rights or statutes" in the complaint. The district judge did not rule on MHSAA's motion to dismiss or HHS's motion to intervene before remand.

¶ 6. On December 12, 2011, the chancellor held a hearing to dispose of several matters that were still outstanding following remand. The chancellor granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction against MHSAA. The terms of the injunction prohibited MHSAA from suspending the HHS lady basketball team through January 9, 2012. The injunction also prohibited Tiaria from participating in basketball games on December 13, 2011, and December 16, 2011, but allowed her to participate in the remaining games through January 9, 2012. The chancellor set a hearing for January 9, 2012, to determine "why this preliminary injunction should not continue ... pending final determination of the merits [of] this case."³

¶ 7. The chancellor also granted HHS's motion to intervene, stating that HHS was "granted permission and authority to become a plaintiff" in the action. Finally, the chancellor partially granted MHSAA's motion to dismiss—she granted its motion to dismiss as to Steven's claims,⁴ but she "reserve [d] a ruling" on the dismissal of Tiaria's claims.

¶ 8. MHSAA filed a petition for an interlocutory appeal from the denial of its motion to dismiss Tiaria and her mother. This Court granted the petition and dismissed their complaint, stating in its order that "the trial court erred in failing to grant MHSAA's motion to dismiss ... where the [complaint] ... failed to state a cause of action." This left HHS as the sole plaintiff. HHS filed its complaint for injunctive relief on January 30, 2012. HHS's complaint is virtually identical to Tiaria and Steven's complaint, including the damages alleged (part of which was that Tiaria would not be named to the "Dandy Dozen"). HHS alleged that "MHSAA's actions in denying the minor Plaintiffs eligibility for competition in athletic activities were arbitrary and capricious," and that it did "not have any substantial basis to deny the minor Plaintiffs eligibility for athletic activities."

¶ 9. The chancellor held a five-day trial on HHS's complaint in September 2012. She issued a detailed opinion and final judgment, in which she summarized all the trial testimony. Ultimately, she affirmed the issuance of the various preliminary injunctions and vacated the penalties MHSAA had levied against HHS during the litigation.

¶ 10. MHSAA appealed to this Court, arguing that HHS's complaint was an appeal of its eligibility decision and that it was entitled to an agency-like standard of review. As such, MHSAA argued, the chancellor could review her eligibility decision only to determine whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence, was arbitrary or capricious, was beyond its power to make, or violated some statutory or constitutional right of the affected party. MHSAA argued that the chancellor erroneously had conducted a de novo review of its administrative decision and had substituted her judgment in place of its own, in violation of the standard set forth above. HHS responded and argued that it was not appealing MHSAA's decision, that MHSAA was not a state agency entitled to deference, and that the chancellor's actions and ultimate conclusions were correct.

¶ 11. After reviewing the parties' initial briefs, this Court decided that supplemental briefing was necessary. We directed the parties to address the following question:

If the Court finds that the Mississippi High School Activities Association is not an administrative body and cannot be treated as an administrative agency, does the chancery court have jurisdiction over a suit challenging the decision of a private, voluntary association?

¶ 12. After careful consideration, we find this issue dispositive, and we hold that HHS failed to state a legally cognizable claim or cause of action. As such, we vacate the decisions of the Forrest County Chancery Court.⁵

ANALYSIS

I. MHSAA is not a state agency entitled to deference.

¶ 13. MHSAA argued in its initial brief that its "eligibility decisions are entitled to the substantial evidence standard of review given to its member school boards. At the beginning of this case, [MHSAA] filed a motion in limine requesting the chancery court to adopt this appellate standard and exclude evidence not considered by [MHSAA]." (Emphasis added.) HHS countered that MHSAA was not a state agency and that the proceeding in chancery court "was not an appeal of a decision following a proper administrative hearing conducted by a legislatively created state agency." (Emphasis added.)

HHS also argued that the only way it could "get a review of the MHSAA proceedings was to file an independent action against the Association for injunctive or equitable relief."

¶ 14. We agree with HHS that MHSAA is not a state agency. We also find that there is no right of appeal from MHSAA's decisions. Because these issues are so closely intertwined, we discuss them together.

¶ 15. First, simply put, there is no authority—statutory or otherwise—that authorizes an appeal of right from the decisions of a voluntary, private organization. And while it is true that one may pursue an appeal in chancery court when there is no adequate remedy at law, that avenue is available only when appealing a state board or agency decision. See, e.g., Prisock v. Perkins, 735 So.2d 440, 443 (Miss.1999) ("where there is no statutory scheme for appeal from a decision of a state board or agency and the injured party does not have a full, plain, complete and adequate remedy at law, the chancery court has jurisdiction for judicial review of the board or agency decision.") (Emphasis added.)

¶ 16. We disagree with MHSAA's argument that it is similar to an administrative agency—specifically, a school board—and is therefore entitled to deferential treatment on appeal. First, school boards were specifically created by the Mississippi Legislature, and their functions are strictly regulated by statutory law. In other words, as HHS argues, state statutory law "provide[s] due process and legal protection for students, parents, employees, staff, the administration and the public...