Miss. Valley Silica Co. v. Eastman
| Decision Date | 19 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 2010–CA–00924–SCT.,2010–CA–00924–SCT. |
| Citation | 92 So.3d 666 |
| Parties | MISSISSIPPI VALLEY SILICA COMPANY, INC. v. Rutha EASTMAN as Administratrix of the Estate of Robert Eastman, II. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Charles G. Copeland, Ridgeland, Laurie R. Williams, Andy Lowry, Ridgeland, John D. Cosmich, Michael D. Simmons, Lakeysha Greer Isaac, Jackson, attorneys for appellant.
John T. Givens, Jackson, Timothy W. Porter, Ridgeland, Patrick C. Malouf, R. Allen Smith, Jr., Ridgeland, attorneys for appellee.
Before DICKINSON, P.J., RANDOLPH and PIERCE, JJ.
¶ 1. In this lawsuit, Robert Eastman claims Mississippi Valley Silica Company, Inc. (“MVS”)—the company that supplied sand to his employer, Marathon LeTourneau—failed to warn him of the dangers posed by sandblasting. At trial, MVS requested a sophisticated-user/learned-intermediary jury instruction. Although the requested instruction was an incomplete statement of the law, the trial judge refused the instruction for an erroneous reason and failed to instruct the jury properly on the submitted defense. The jury returned a verdict for Eastman, and MVS timely appealed, raising eight issues, including the trial judge's refusal to grant the sophisticated-user jury instruction. We find this issue dispositive, and we reverse and remand for a new trial.
¶ 2. For twenty-eight years, Robert Eastman worked as a sandblaster at LeTourneau, a shipbuilder in Vicksburg, Mississippi. LeTourneau supplied silica sand it purchased from MVS to Eastman, who used it daily. Toward the end of his career, Eastman was diagnosed with lung disease and silicosis.
¶ 3. Eastman sued MVS under Mississippi's products-liability statute,1 alleging that MVS' product was defective for failure to contain adequate warnings or instructions.2 MVS answered, asserting many affirmative defenses, including the provisions of Section 11–1–63 and the sophisticated-user doctrine.
¶ 4. At trial, Dr. Edward Karnes testified that in 1938, and again in 1959, national safety standards were published that required sandblasters to wear air-fed hoods. Dr. Ronald Gots testified that the dangers of sandblasting were known and published in the 1920s and 30s, and that legislation was passed in 1959—four years before Eastman began sandblasting—that required sandblasters in certain professions to wear air-fed hoods. Dr. Gots concluded that, given the information provided to Le Tourneau, it “had to know” of the dangers posed by sandblasting. Additionally, LeTourneau's former president testified he had known since 1972 that sandblasting may cause silicosis.
¶ 5. MVS requested a sophisticated-user jury instruction, which the trial judge refused for two reasons. First, he stated the term “sophisticated user” was not defined and would “confuse” the jury. Second, he could recall no direct testimony that Eastman's employer knew or should have known of the dangers associated with sandblasting.
¶ 6. The jury found MVS sixty percent at fault, and awarded Eastman $3 million in punitive damages; $1.6 million in economic damages; and $3 million in noneconomic damages, for a total award of $7.6 million. But because MVS was insolvent, the trial judge reduced the punitive-damages award to zero. Then, after applying Mississippi's statutory damages cap,3 he reduced the noneconomic damages to $1 million. After the jury rendered the verdict, but before the trial judge entered final judgment, Eastman died. Later, the trial judge entered a final judgment for Eastman, the deceased.
¶ 7. On appeal, MVS raises the following eight issues: (1) Eastman's estate was not properly substituted; (2) the trial judge erred by refusing to give MVS' sophisticated-user jury instruction; (3) the verdict form did not allow the jury to allocate fault under Mississippi Code Section 85–5–7; (4) the fault allocated to MVS was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence; (5) because Eastman had died, damages for future medical costs and future pain and suffering should not have been awarded; (6) the trial judge erred by allocating fault to MVS before applying the damages cap; (7) the issues raised amounted to cumulative error; and (8) a remittitur was proper. MVS also moved to strike the brief Eastman (the deceased) filed in this Court, arguing that, because Eastman's estate has not been substituted, the party who had filed the brief did not exist.
¶ 8. We find that the circuit judge abused his discretion by denying, rather than reforming, MVS' proposed “sophisticated-user” instruction. Because we reverse and remand for a new trial, we decline to address the remaining issues.
¶ 9. The issue we find dispositive is the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on the sophisticated-user defense. Because our standard of review of that issue is critical to our decision, we first turn to our considerable precedent that addresses a trial judge's ultimate responsibility to instruct the jury properly.
When a party submits an improperly worded jury instruction that raises a central issue in the case, and that is supported by credible evidence, it is the trial judge's ultimate responsibility to make sure the instruction is reformed properly.
¶ 10. Several of our cases provide familiar principles of law concerning jury instructions. When read together, the instructions must inform the jury sufficiently of the applicable law.4 A party is entitled to have instructions given that are supported by sufficient, credible evidence 5and that accurately state the law of the case. 6 Defendants are entitled to instructions presenting their theory of the case, and we have reversed judgments where circuit judges have “eviscerated the defense ... by denying the defendants' theory instructions ... which compromised the defendants' right to a fair and impartial trial.7
¶ 11. But another principle, ingrained in our law, places upon the trial judge the ultimate duty to instruct the jury properly. Our precedent on the issue was addressed succinctly in Byrd v. McGill, in which the trial judge refused to give a flawed jury instruction on the law of negligence per se.8 This Court reversed, stating:
The result of the refusal of instruction P–6, coupled with the failure of anyone to substitute a more suitable instruction, was that the jury entered their deliberations unaware that there was such a thing as negligence per se. Much less, did they know that it had any bearing on the case.9
¶ 12. In reaching its conclusion, the McGill Court reviewed several prior decisions, including Newell v. State, which stated:
On occasion juries have been left uninstructed due to the oversight, omission or ineptness of attorneys.... Regardless of the reason, the fact remains that juries are at times left groping blindly, though honestly, for the law of the case to aid them in arriving at a verdict.10
¶ 13. The Court then turned to Thomas v. State, in which this Court
emphasized that where an instruction relates to a central feature of the case and where there is no other instruction before the court which treats the matter, it is error to refuse an instruction on the grounds that “it has been inartfully drawn.” 11
¶ 14. Finally, the McGill Court, drawing on the wisdom of Harper v. State, stated “unequivocally” that
where under the evidence a party is entitled to have the jury instructed regarding a particular issue and where the party requests an instruction which for whatever reason is inadequate in form or content, the trial judge has the responsibility either to reform and correct the proffered instruction himself or to advise counsel on the record of the perceived deficiencies therein and to afford counsel a reasonable opportunity to prepare a new corrected instruction. When the trial judge fails in this duty and where the proffered instruction relates to a central issue in the case which is not covered by any other instruction given to the jury, we will reverse.12
¶ 15. The dissent incorrectly concludes that our opinion today “unwisely imposes a duty upon the trial court to reform the jury instruction to make it conform with Mississippi law.” But that duty was imposed long ago by this Court's majorities in McGill,Newell,Thomas, and Harper and applied as recently in 2001 in McKee v. State13—and none of these cases has been overruled, modified, or abrogated. In fairness, the dissent is less about whether we are today imposing a new duty, and more about the dissent's view that we should overrule McGill,Newell, Thomas, Harper and their considerable progeny 14 on this issue. We decline to do so.
¶ 16. We do agree with the dissent that a trial court may—and, in fact, should—refuse to give jury instructions that incorrectly state the law. But that does not diminish the principle that, where the point of law is a central issue not covered elsewhere in the instructions, the ultimate responsibility to instruct the jury properly falls squarely upon the trial judge, who
has the responsibility either to reform and correct the proffered instruction himself or to advise counsel on the record of the perceived deficiencies therein and to afford counsel a reasonable opportunity to prepare a new corrected instruction.15
¶ 17. So, today, we are not imposing a new duty on trial judges, but rather, we are merely following nearly a half-century of precedent that clearly defines the trial judge's duty. And according to that precedent, where a trial judge fails in that duty, “we will reverse.” 16 Indeed, our own Court of Appeals has recognized and applied the rule we follow today. In Cleveland v. State—joined fully by members of the dissent when they served on that court—the Court of Appeals stated that
the law of this State is quite clear that the trial court may not refuse to instruct the jury on a properly raised defense strictly because the requested instruction is not properly drafted. Rather, it is the duty of the court in that situation to amend the instruction to conform...
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