Mission Housing v. City & County

• Decision Date: 11 May 2000
• Citation: 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 8,81 Cal.App.4th 522
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 2000) MISSION HOUSING DEVELOPMENT COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Defendant and Appellant. A085462 Filed

97 Cal.Rptr.2d 8 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 2000)

MISSION HOUSING DEVELOPMENT COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Defendant and Appellant.

A085462

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION FIVE

Filed 5/11/00

Part. Pub. Order 6/9/00

(San Francisco Super. Co. No. 920940)

Trial Judge: Hon. William Cahill

Counsel for plaintiffs and appellants: Robert Owen Divelbiss, Divelbiss, Divelbiss & Bonzell, Robert Sheldon Beach

Counsel for defendant and appellant: Louise H. Renne, City Attorney, Jeffrey Ira Margolis, Patrick John Mahoney, Deputy City Attorneys

Jones, P.J.

This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a judgment in an action seeking a refund of property taxes. Mission Housing Development Company et al. (hereafter Taxpayers) contend the trial court erred when it (1) refused to order the City and County of San Francisco to value their property at certain levels for certain tax years, and (2) declined to award them attorney fees. The City and County of San Francisco contends the trial court erred when it determined the amount that it must refund to Taxpayers.

We will conclude on the appeal that (1) the trial court correctly declined to order San Francisco to value Taxpayers' property as requested, and (2) Taxpayers have not timely challenged the court's decision to deny their request for attorney fees. On the cross-appeal, we agree the court erred when determining the amount that San Francisco must refund to Taxpayers and will reverse that portion of the judgment.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We have dealt with this case before (see Mission Housing Development Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 55, [hereafter Mission Housing]) so only a brief statement of facts is necessary.

Taxpayers are 11 corporations and limited partnerships that own low income housing projects located in San Francisco. In June 1990, they filed a complaint against San Francisco seeking a partial refund of the property taxes they had paid for the 1982-1983 through 1987-1988 tax years. The case was tried by a judge who ruled Taxpayers were not entitled to any refund. Taxpayers then filed an appeal to this court.

Taxpayers raised several issues on appeal only two of which are relevant at this point. First, they argued San Francisco was required, under Revenue and Taxation Code¹ section 1604, subdivision (c),² to place on the assessment rolls for tax purposes, the property values Taxpayers had submitted to the assessment appeals board in their application for a reduced assessment. (Mission Housing, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d at pp. 73-74.) We agreed and held that Taxpayers were "entitled to have their opinions of value, as stated in their applications for reduction in assessment, inserted on the assessment [rolls] . . . ." (Id. at pp. 62-63.) However we ruled Taxpayers were entitled to that remedy "only with respect to tax years 1985-1986 and 1986-1987." (Id. at p. 63.)

Second, Taxpayers claimed they were entitled to an award of attorney fees under Government Code section 800. (Mission Housing, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d at p. 87.) We declined to decide that issue and instead, remanded in light of our partial reversal to the trial court so it could determine, in the first instance, whether an award of fees under that section was appropriate. (Id. at pp. 87-88.)

On remand, the trial court bifurcated the valuation issues from the issue of whether Taxpayers were entitled to an award of attorney fees. On the valuation question, the court ruled Taxpayers were entitled to have their opinions of value, as stated in their application for reduction in assessment, inserted on the assessment rolls for the 1985-1986 and 1986-1987 tax years. The court declined Taxpayers' request to have their opinions of value inserted on the assessment rolls for years other than 1985-1986 or 1986-1987. The court also determined the amount that San Francisco must refund to Taxpayers.

This appeal and cross-appeal followed.

Subsequently, the trial court ruled Taxpayers were not entitled to an award of attorney fees under Government Code section 800.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Taxpayers' Appeal

1. Valuation Issues

Taxpayers contend the trial court erred when it refused to order that their opinions of value, as stated in their applications for reduction in assessment, be inserted on the assessment rolls for tax years other than 1985-1986 or 1986-1987. We are unpersuaded.

Our prior opinion could not have been more clear. We ruled Taxpayers were entitled to have their opinions of value inserted on the tax rolls "only with respect to tax years 1985-1986 and 1986-1987." (Mission Housing, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 63.) The trial court was obligated to follow our direction and lacked jurisdiction to do otherwise. (See Hampton v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 652, 655-656.)

Taxpayers contend the trial court should have ordered their opinions of value inserted on the tax rolls for additional years because the reasoning we used in our prior opinion when holding that Taxpayers were entitled to have their opinions of value inserted for the 1985-1986 and 1986-1987 tax years, applied equally to other tax years. However if Taxpayers believed that argument had merit, they should have asserted it in the prior appeal. "A trial court may not exceed the specific directions of a court of review in remanding a cause after a reversal of the judgment on appeal and add thereto conditions which it assumes the reviewing court should have included." (English v. Olympic Auditorium, Inc. (1935) 10 Cal.App.2d 196, 201.)

The court in Skaggs v. City of Los Angeles (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 269 (Skaggs), applied this principle when faced with facts similar to those presented here. In Skaggs, a policeman who had been discharged, sued the City of Los Angeles to recover pension benefits. The trial court ruled the policeman was entitled to benefits for a portion of the period requested, and ordered Los Angeles to pay interest on those benefits. The policeman filed an appeal claiming the trial court erred when it failed to award him benefits for the entire period in question. The Supreme Court agreed and it reversed that portion of the judgment. The court did not express any view on the propriety of the interest award. (Id. at pp. 270-271.) On remand, the trial court granted the policeman benefits for the entire period at issue, but declined to award him any interest. (Id. at pp. 271-272.) The policeman appealed again claiming the trial court erred when it failed to award him interest. The appellate court agreed that interest was not legally authorized, but ruled the trial court was required to award interest for the period covered by the first judgment because that judgment had been partially affirmed on appeal. As the court explained, the first judgment "insofar as it awarded plaintiff pensions . . . together with interest thereon . . . was affirmed by the Supreme Court, and the trial court was reinvested with jurisdiction not to determine any of those matters . . . . Its jurisdiction was defined by the terms of the remittitur and it was only empowered to act in accordance with the directions of the Supreme Court, as set forth in the remittitur. Any action beyond that was void. . . . The fact that the Supreme Court did not expressly pass upon the interest feature of the judgment does not affect this matter. . . . If, due to the city's neglect to direct its attention to this phase of the judgment of the lower court, the Supreme Court failed to pass upon this question, the city's remedy was to petition for a rehearing, and it was not for the trial court, on the second trial, to attempt to change the specific directions contained in the remittitur. [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 272-273.)

Here, as in Skaggs, even if we were to assume that the reasoning we used in our prior opinion when holding that Taxpayers were entitled to have their opinions of value inserted for the 1985-1986 and 1986-1987 tax years, applied equally to other tax years, the time to make that argument was in the prior appeal. Counsel for taxpayers acknowledged at oral argument that taxpayers did not advance this argument in Mission Housing. Taxpayers may not do so in this proceeding.

We conclude the trial court correctly followed our direction in our prior opinion and ruled Taxpayers were entitled to have their opinions of value placed on the tax rolls "only with respect to tax years 1985-1986 and 1986-1987." (Mission Housing, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 63.)

2. Attorney Fees

The trial court issued three different judgments on the valuation issues. In each, the court stated that it was bifurcating the valuation issues from the issue of whether Taxpayers were entitled to an award of attorney fees. The first judgment, filed August 20, 1998, states that Taxpayers' entitlement to attorney fees would "be determined in a subsequent hearing." The second, a modification of the August 20 judgment that was filed on October 19, 1998, states that Taxpayers "shall be awarded . . . attorneys fees in a subsequent hearing to be scheduled [by the] court." The third and final judgment (modifying the October 19 judgment) was filed on December 17, 1998. It too states that the Taxpayers "shall be awarded . . . attorneys fees in a subsequent hearing to be scheduled before [the] court."

A hearing on the attorney fee issue was finally held on February 9, 1999. On February 23, 1999, the court filed an order stating Taxpayers were not entitled to fees under Government Code section 800 because there was "no evidence of . . . arbitrary or capricious actions by the Defendants."

Taxpayers now contend the trial court erred when it ruled they were not entitled to an award of attorney fees. We need not address this argument because Taxpayers have not filed an appeal from the court's decision to deny their request for fees.

Taxpayers filed a notice of appeal on ...