Missouri And Southwestern Land Co. v. Quinn
Citation | 73 S.W. 184,172 Mo. 563 |
Parties | MISSOURI AND SOUTHWESTERN LAND COMPANY, Appellant, v. QUINN |
Decision Date | 17 March 1903 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Appeal from Butler Circuit Court. -- Hon. J. L. Fort, Judge.
Affirmed.
E. R Lentz for appellant.
(1) When Butler county, by its officers and agents, sold the lots in controversy to Poplin, accepted his notes in payment of the purchase money, caused suit to be brought on said notes obtained a decree foreclosing Poplin's equity of redemption and ordering the lots sold for the payment of the debt, caused a special execution to be levied upon said lots and the lots to be sold thereunder, and appropriated the purchase money thereof, it renounced all claim to said lots, and estopped itself from thereafter claiming any title thereto. Austin v. Loring, 63 Mo. 23; Wilcoxen v. Osborn, 77 Mo. 631; Chouteau v. Goddin, 39 Mo. 250; Pockman v. Meatt, 49 Mo. 398; Chase v. Williams, 74 Mo. 437; Stroble v. Smith, 8 Watts 280; Com. v. Sherman, 6 Har. 343; Smith v. Worden, 7 Ill. 424. (2) By the sale to Poplin, by the decree of foreclosure, and sale thereunder to Bradley, and by the payment by him of the purchase money therefor, Bradley became invested with the full equitable title to the said lots, and the county thereafter held the legal title as trustee for him and those claiming under him. Ten Eyck v. Simpson, 1 Sandf. Ch. 245; Champion v. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch. 400; Goveneur v. Lynch, 2 Paige Ch. 300; Widdicombe v. Childers, 84 Mo. 394; Perry on Trusts (2 Ed.), sec. 231; Ibid, sec. 236. (3) Defendant Quinn admits that he had full knowledge of all these facts before he received his deeds from the county for these lots. He therefore stands precisely in the same relation as Butler county would if it had not conveyed to him. Austin v. Loring, 63 Mo. 22. (4) Quinn was a trustee for the plaintiff, in possession of the trust property -- he must account for all rents and profits coming into his hands. The burden of accounting for the actual profits rests upon him; he has not furnished evidence of them; hence he invites the application of the rule that will most nearly approximate the actual gains. Perry on Trusts (2 Ed.), sec. 471; Cruce v. Cruce, 81 Mo. 684; Pomeroy v. Benton, 77 Mo. 84; Bobb v. Bobb, 89 Mo. 422. (5) The case of Missouri and Southwestern Land Company v. L. F. Quinn and Butler County was begun in 1892, and continued on the docket until July, 1898, when a voluntary nonsuit was suffered. Plaintiff had one year from that time in which to commence another suit. The first suit was begun within ten years, and this suit begun before the other was dismissed; therefore there is nothing in defendant's plea of the statute of limitations. R. S. 1899, sec. 4285.
L. D. Grove for respondent.
(1) Estoppel in pais or by conduct can never be invoked against a county by acts of its officers. Heidelberg v. St. Francois Co., 100 Mo. 76; Johnston v. Dist., 67 Mo. 319; Maupin v. County, 67 Mo. 327; Sturgeon v. Hampton, 88 Mo. 203. (2) By the statute, title can only pass by some act of the county-seat commissioner. His powers under that act can not be delegated to any other officer; yet the matters here claimed to estop by conduct are acts of other officers. State ex rel. v. Murphy, 134 Mo. 575; Mathews v. Alexander, 68 Mo. 119; 15 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 1045. (3) Laches could have been well urged at the commencement of the suit in 1892; it was then seven years stale. (4) The statute of limitation pleaded had barred this case. Plaintiff claims relief from this bar by the provisions of section 4285, Revised Statutes 1899; but this statute does not in terms permit suits to be commenced from time to time, in contemplation of suffering a voluntary nonsuit after the commencement of a new suit. This suit was commenced before dismissal of the first, and plaintiff is not within the saving terms of that statute, either by his pleadings or his proof. The rulings of this court in the cases of Briant v. Fudge, 63 Mo. 489, and Wood v. Nortman, 85 Mo. 298, do not apply in this case, as in those cases the nonsuits were taken after notice given that nonsuits would be taken, and which notices were given before the commencement of the second suit. (5) Green L. Poplin had no title which was liable to sale under execution at which Bradley bought, of all of which Bradley had notice. Block v. Morrison, 112 Mo. 351; McIlvaney v. Smith, 42 Mo. 45.
This suit was commenced by filing petition in the Butler Circuit Court on July 23, 1898. It is necessary to a clear understanding of the questions involved in this case, to quote the pleadings, which is done. Omitting the captions, they are as follows:
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