Missouri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Commission

• Decision Date: 19 December 1977
• Docket Number: No. 59551,59551
• Citation: 560 S.W.2d 837
• Parties: MISSOURI CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE TAX COMMISSION of Missouri, J. E. Riney, Don G. Williams, Robert F. Love, Commissioners of State Tax Commission of Missouri, John K. Travers, Collector of Revenue, City of St. Louis, and Glenn J. McBrady, Assessor, City of St. Louis, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 837

560 S.W.2d 837

MISSOURI CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE TAX COMMISSION of Missouri, J. E. Riney, Don G Williams, Robert F. Love, Commissioners of State Tax Commission of Missouri, John K. Travers, Collector of Revenue, City of St. Louis, and Glenn J. McBrady, Assessor City of St. Louis, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 59551.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

Dec. 19, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 8, 1978.

Alan C. Kohn, Thomas J. Frawley, St. Louis, for plaintiff-appellant.

James J. Wilson, Associate City Counselor, St. Louis, for defendants-respondents.

RENDLEN, Judge.

This proceeding arose with the addition of appellant's tangible personal property to the tax rolls for the year 1974 by the St. Louis City Assessor. Obtaining no relief by successive appeals to the Board of Equalization and the State Tax Commission, appellant sought judicial review claiming exemption from ad valorem taxation under Mo.Const. Art. X, § 6, and § 137.100, ¹ on the ground its property was "used exclusively for religious worship". ² No challenge is made to the assessed valuation of appellant's property but only to the denial of the claimed exemption.

Generally the scope of judicial review for administrative agency decisions is limited to a determination of whether the order is supported by "competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record" as provided in § 536.140-2(3). However, this case does not involve the exercise by the agency of administrative discretion in the light of the facts under § 536.140-2, but only the application by the agency of the law to the facts, accordingly the court may weigh the evidence for itself giving due weight to the opportunity of the agency to observe the witnesses and to the expertise and experience of the Commission, § 536.140-3. It is by this standard we examine appellant's contentions of error.

In the hearing before the Commission twenty-two proposed exhibits had been marked and identified during testimony of the appellant's sole witness though they were neither offered nor accepted as evidence by the Commission. ³ Urging their consideration by this court, appellant cites Hilke v. Firemen's Retirement System of St. Louis, 441 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Mo.App.1969) as authority for such consideration, however, we perceive factual differences distinguishing Hilke from the case at bar. There, in a claim for disability benefits, certain medical reports had not been properly offered before the Firemen's Retirement System Board. On appeal the court stated: "Although the record does not show the reports were offered in evidence in ritualistic language, we hold that the method of putting them before the Board for its consideration fully met the less formal procedural requirements of an administrative hearing." (l.c. 733) The items so considered, despite lack of formal offer, were medical reports prepared pursuant to the provisions of § 87.160.2, for the express purpose of informing the Board of the facts and the conclusions and recommendations of the medical examiners. It is clear the statute requiring the examining physicians to "report in writing to the board," contemplated that the reports be available to assist the Board in its deliberation and equally important the Board and the parties intended the use of those reports as evidence. ⁴ Those facts, not present here, were determinative of the issue. Though counsel for the Tax Commission stated to the trial court and to this court in oral argument he would not have objected to the introduction of the exhibits had they been offered, the fact remains they were not and no stipulation waiving objection to their consideration has been presented. The Commission had before it no offer of evidence nor objections thereto on which to rule, neither was the Commission apprised of counsel's later announced attitude on the matter. Although technical rules of evidence are not controlling in administrative hearings, fundamental rules of evidence are applicable. State ex rel. Bond v. Simmons, 299 S.W.2d 540 (Mo.App.1957). Consistent with these holdings, § 536.070 provides in subsection 2 that "each party" in an administrative hearing "shall have the right . . . to introduce exhibits." (Emphasis ours.) No mention is made of other procedures for admission of exhibits as a part of the record in such proceedings except subsection 5 which provides that "Records and documents of the agency (which also must be offered in evidence) . . . may be considered as a part of the record by reference thereto when so offered," (Emphasis ours). No provision is made that records of any other type may be received in this manner. While we do not suggest that parties may not stipulate for the admission of such proposed evidence and waive objection thereto, no authority appears for the course contended by appellant. The exhibits will not be considered a part of the record for review.

The Commission (whose extensive findings and conclusions are set out in the attached appendix) properly found the office equipment and furniture in question were "used in the promotion of the organization including such purposes as record keeping and providing mailings to the membership." As to the religious nature of appellant, the Commission concluded that "while the appellant has some of the trappings and accouterments of an organized religion, it appears to be more an applied philosophy which has a certain religious connotation, but which falls short of being devoted to the worship of the Supreme Being, which this Commission concludes is necessary for the property owner to have its property considered exclusively for religious worship." (Emphasis ours.) Further that "an applied religious philosophy" is not identical for purposes of exemption "with an organized religion devoted to religious worship." The Commission then held: "The personal property of the appellant has not, therefore been shown to be used exclusively for religious or charitable purposes and therefore cannot be exempted from ad valorem taxation." Considering the findings and conclusions in their entirety and particularly those immediately above cited, it appears the order rests not on the lack of exclusivity or extent of use, but on the failure to show the character of the use as "for religious worship." The Commission determined the statutory and constitutional phrases "used exclusively for religious worship" postulate more than an "applied philosophy which has a certain religious connotation". It found the statute and constitution instead require a belief in and devotion to a Supreme Being. For reasons hereinafter discussed we affirm.

The term religious worship in the commonly accepted sense includes as a necessary minimum a belief in the Supreme Being of the universe. Generally religious worship is expressed by prayers, reverence, homage and adoration paid to a deity and include the seeking out by prayer and otherwise the will of the deity for divine guidance. Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, Second College Edition, copyrighted in 1974, defines religion as "belief in a divine or superhuman power or powers to be obeyed and worshiped as the creator(s) and ruler(s) of the universe; b) expression of such a belief in conduct and ritual." "Worship" is defined as "reverence or devotion for a deity; religious homage or veneration; b) a church service or other right showing this." In Webster's Third New International Dictionary, copyrighted 1976, religion is defined as "the personal commitment to and serving of God or a God with worshipful devotion, conduct in accord with divine commands esp. as found in accepted sacred writings or declared by authoritative teachers, a way of life recognized as incumbent upon true believers, and typically the relating of oneself to an organized body of believers." Another definition suggested is "a personal awareness or conviction of the existence of a supreme being or supernatural powers or influences controlling one's own, humanity's, or all nature's destiny." In this authority worship is defined as "the reverence or veneration tendered a divine being or supernatural power; also: an act, process, or instance of expressing such veneration by performing or taking part in religious exercises or ritual." Other dictionaries consulted provide similar definitions.

In 1890 the United States Supreme Court stated "The term 'religion' has references to one's view of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will." Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342, 10 S.Ct. 299, 300, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890). Similarly the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in McMasters v. State, 21 Okl.Cr. 318, 207 P. 566 (1922) defined religion as "all forms of belief in the existence of superior beings, exercising power over human beings by volition, imposing rules of conduct with future rewards and punishments." Justice Hammer in Nikulnikoff v. Archbishop and Consistory of Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church, et al., 142 Misc. 894, 255 N.Y.S. 653 (1962) described the term as "a bond uniting man to God and a virtue whose purpose is to render God the worship due him as the source of all being and the principle of all government of things." Mr. Justice Hughes in his dissent in United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633, 51 S.Ct. 570, 578, 75 L.Ed. 1302 (1931) (the dissent involved another issue) stated: "The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation." Joining in this dissent were Holmes, Stone and Brandeis. Hughes' isolation and identification of the indispensable ingredient of religion remains a basic guide in this area of the law. When considering the exemption provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 for those conscientiously opposed to participation in war "by reason of religious training and belief"...