Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. State

• Decision Date: 12 January 1916
• Docket Number: (No. 9049.)
• Citation: 181 S.W. 721
• Parties: MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. CO. OF TEXAS v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 721

181 S.W. 721

MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. CO. OF TEXAS v. STATE.

(No. 9049.)

Supreme Court of Texas.

January 12, 1916.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Third Supreme Judicial District.

Action by the State against the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company of Texas. From a judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals (167 S. W. 822) affirming a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error. Writ denied.

Chas. C. Huff, of Dallas, Fiset, McLendon & Shelley, of Austin, and A. H. McKnight, of Dallas, for plaintiff in error.

PHILLIPS, C. J.

The case involves the validity of what is commonly known as the "Thirty-Minute Order" of the Railroad Commission of Texas as applied to certain trains of the plaintiff in error, which, according to its claim, were interstate in character, and therefore not subject to the regulation. The question presented is a vital one, concerning in a large measure the powers of the Railroad Commission and important also to the railway carriers of the state; and it is preferable for this reason that the views of the court in its action upon the petition be briefly stated. The order of the Railroad Commission was issued under the authority of article 6552, Revised Statutes of 1911, and reads:

"Each and every railroad company operating a railroad in this state shall start its passenger trains from the points of origin in accordance with advertised schedule, and said trains, except from unavoidable accidents thereto en route, shall observe and conform to the published schedule as to arrival and departure at the several stations on the line: Provided, that trains may be held not to exceed thirty (30) minutes at origin or at junction points with other lines to make connection with trains on such other lines. If, at the expiration of said thirty minutes, connecting trains are in sight, ten minutes, in addition to said thirty minutes, will be allowed in which to make the connection. Where connecting trains arrive within the time above allowed a reasonable time, in addition to that provided for, will be allowed for transfer of passengers, mail, express and baggage. Where connections are reliably reported to be more than thirty minutes late, no wait will be made."

For its violation by the plaintiff in error in the operation of the trains in question, the suit was brought by the state for the recovery of penalties, a judgment for the state resulting, affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. 167 S. W. 822. The trains were through passenger trains from St. Louis and Kansas City, Mo., to points in Texas, operated by the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company to Denison, Tex., and from there to destination by the plaintiff in error under a contract with that company; and it appears from the proof that a considerable portion of their passenger traffic was interstate.

Because the trains were operated by the plaintiff in error altogether in Texas, and, as held, its want of authority as a corporation chartered in Texas to operate them beyond the state line, the honorable Court of Civil Appeals concluded in its opinion on rehearing that they were to be treated as purely intrastate trains, and upon that ground rested its decision. But under the proof that the traffic of the trains was largely interstate, we think they must be regarded in the case as instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Being employed in the movement of such traffic, it is difficult to perceive how they can be differently regarded, and we shall so treat them.

There is accordingly presented the simple question as to the power of the Railroad Commission to provide and enforce a regulation of this character as applied to trains employed in interstate commerce by railway companies operating in this state. While by the federal Constitution Congress is empowered to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, there remains in the states the power, distinct from any granted to the federal Government, to prescribe, within constitutional limitations, relative rights and duties of persons and corporations within their jurisdiction in the interest of the public convenience and for the public good. It is a power still valid and effectual, though its exercise may relate to subjects over which Congress possesses, but has not exerted, authority. It cannot be supposed that a sovereign state in the grant of the rights and privileges accorded by its laws to railway carriers is required to wholly surrender its authority over them simply because they may engage in interstate commerce. Nor is it to be assumed that such rights and privileges are extended merely for their benefit...