Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Smith

• Decision Date: 19 December 1899
• Citation: 154 Mo. 300,55 S.W. 470
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. CO. v. SMITH et al.

55 S.W. 470

154 Mo. 300

MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. CO. v. SMITH et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

December 19, 1899.

COURTS — JURISDICTION — TRANSFER OF CAUSE — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — FEDERAL QUESTION.

1. In an action on an injunction bond given in an action in a federal court, a defense that plaintiff's claim should be limited to the injunction proceedings, and that, as attorney's fees in such proceedings were not recoverable in the federal court, they could not be allowed in the state court, raises no federal question, within Const. Amend. 1884, § 5, authorizing appeals from the court of appeals to the supreme court in cases where the validity of authority exercised under the United States is involved; since such bond is to be construed according to the laws of the state where given, and not by the laws and rules of practice of the federal court.

2. Under Const. Amend. 1884, § 5, providing that appeal shall lie from the courts of appeal in cases where the validity of authority exercised under the United States is in question, the fact that such a question might have been raised by proper answer in a case is not sufficient to transfer it to the supreme court, when the record shows no such question was raised.

3. Under Const. art. 6, § 2, giving the supreme court general superintending control over the other courts, and under Const. Amend. 1884, § 6, providing that the last previous ruling of the supreme court shall be controlling authority in the courts of appeals, the supreme court has no authority to issue a writ of prohibition to prevent further proceedings in a case

in the court of appeals on the ground that it has been decided in disregard of the last ruling on the question involved; since the court of appeal has the right to determine the law in all cases before it.

In banc. Petition for a writ of prohibition by the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company against Jackson L. Smith and others, judges of the Kansas City court of appeals. Writ denied.

Geo. P. B. Jackson, for plaintiff. W. M. Williams and John Cosgrove, for defendants.

ROBINSON, J.

On the 4th day of February, 1899, the relator presented to this court its petition for a writ of prohibition, to be directed to Jackson L. Smith, James Ellison, and Turner A. Gill, judges of the Kansas City court of appeals, to prevent them from further proceeding in the case of John S. Elliott against the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company, heretofore appealed from the Cooper county circuit court, and to further prohibit the respondent from in any manner or to any extent carrying out the judgment entered in said cause, with the prayer that the writ in this case may be so framed as to command the respondents to certify and transfer to this court the record and proceedings in the case of Elliott against the railway company, pending in the Kansas City court of appeals, of which the relators are the present judges, and to annul any and all prior proceedings of the respondents as judges of said court in said last-named cause, upon which the order was duly made to Jackson Smith, James Ellison, and Turner Gill to appear before the court on the 7th day of March, 1899, and show cause why the writ of prohibition should not issue as prayed for, with the further order that in the meantime all proceedings in the case of Elliott against the railway company, pending therein, be stayed until the further order of this court is made in the premises. This case is presented to the court upon the facts as stated in relator's petition, the sufficiency of which is challenged by demurrer filed on the part of the defendant. Without setting out the petition, it is sufficient to say that the relator contends that for two reasons the writ in this cause should be issued: First, because the court of appeals transcended its constitutional power, and undertook to decide the case of Elliott against the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company in disregard of and contrary to the ruling of this court in the case of Brown v. Baldwin, 121 Mo. 126, 25 S. W. 863, which, it is alleged by the relator, is the last ruling upon the question of law and equity involved in the cause before the court of appeals, and was, therefore, controlling authority in that court; and, second, because a federal question is involved in a proper determination of the case of Elliott against the railway company, appealed from the Cooper county circuit court, and for that reason the court of appeals was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, and that, as the constitutional right guarantied to the relator had been violated by the act of the respondents in the premises, the only relief now open to him is through the exercising control of this court over the courts of appeal, of which respondents are judges.

If relator's second contention is well made, it has an unqualified right to the writ as asked. If in the case of Elliott against the railway company, begun in the Cooper county circuit court, a federal question is involved, the Kansas City court of appeals was and is wanting in authority to try the cause, and the jurisdiction thereof is in this court; and this court has the right, by aid of its writ of prohibition, to prevent that court from proceeding further in the premises, and by its writ of mandamus to compel the cause to be certified to this court for determination. If in that case authority exercised under the United States is drawn in question, then, by sections 4 and 5 of the amendment of our constitution of 1884, express jurisdiction is conferred upon this court to hear and determine the question on appeal, and authority is denied the Kansas City court of appeals. On this proposition, unlike in the first, the question to be considered is not whether the Kansas City court of appeals may have decided properly or not the question presented to it; for, if a federal question is in the case, the Kansas City court of appeals had no jurisdiction in the premises, and was wanting in authority to consider the case at all, as courts at all times are under the imperative duty first to inquire into their authority to try a cause, and then to keep within the proper limits of jurisdiction prescribed by law, that law may be administered from lawful tribunals, and not by usurpations in the name of law. Was there a federal question involved in the case of Elliott against the railway company, as it appeared in the Kansas City court of appeals on appeal from the Cooper county court? That is the question first before us for determination. If a federal question is in the case at all, it is by virtue of what appears in the records, and, if it is there in that way, that fact settles the jurisdiction, and determines the proper court to which the appeal should have gone in the first instance, and the want of authority in the Kansas City court of appeals in all that has been done up to the time of the application for this writ of prohibition is manifest. The petition filed in the Cooper county circuit court set out the fact that on the 29th day of November, 1893, there was pending in the circuit court of the United States for the Central division of the Western district of Missouri a suit by the said Elliott against the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company (the relator herein) to recover from it $37,759.73 for railroad ties furnished the railway company by said Elliott; that the railway company then instituted its suit in equity in said United States court to obtain an injunction against said Elliott to restrain the prosecution of said suit against it; and that such proceedings were had therein that a temporary injunction was granted, upon the execution by the railway company, together with E. C. Simmons and William Nicholl, as its sureties, the bond sued on in the sum of $20,000, conditioned that, if the said railway company will abide the decree which may be made in said cause out of which said injunction was issued, and shall pay all sums of money, damages, and costs that may be adjudged against it if the said temporary injunction shall be dissolved, the bond shall be void; otherwise, to remain in full force and effect. For breach of said bond the petition set out the following assignments: That said temporary injunction was dissolved, and that the plaintiff, in and about procuring the dissolution of said injunction, was put to great trouble and expense, and necessarily laid out and expended large sums of money, and incurred great liabilities; that he was compelled to spend much time in procuring evidence to secure the dissolution of said injunction; and that he employed attorney to represent him in said matter, and incurred large liabilities on account thereof. Then followed a detailed statement of the amount of the different items of expense and liabilities incurred, aggregating the sum of $2,000, closing with a prayer for judgment for the penalty of the bond, and that execution issue for the damages sustained by him in the sum of $2,000, with costs of suit. To plaintiff's petition the defendant railway company filed the following answer (caption and title omitted): "Now comes the above-named defendant, and for answer to the plaintiff's petition herein admits that it was and is a corporation organized according to law; that at the times stated in the petition there was pending in the circuit court of the United States for the Central division of the Western district of Missouri a suit instituted by this plaintiff against this defendant, as alleged in the petition, and that the defendant instituted a suit in equity in said court against the plaintiff, and that in said suit a temporary injunction was granted, and that the defendant, as principal, with E. C. Simmons and William Nicholl as sureties, executed an injunction bond as stated in the petition; but defendant denies that said suit in equity was instituted by this defendant to obtain an injunction against the plaintiff, and defendant alleges that the...