Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. of Tex. v. Thomas
| Decision Date | 23 September 1955 |
| Docket Number | MISSOURI-KANSAS-TEXAS,No. 3201,3201 |
| Citation | 282 S.W.2d 912 |
| Parties | RAILROAD COMPANY OF TEXAS, Petitioner, v. Hon. Owen THOMAS, District Judge, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
O. O. Touchstone, Dallas, Hubert L. Watson, Stamford, Clay Coggins, Roby, G. H. Penland, M. E. Clinton, Dallas, for petitioner.
Scott Snodgrass, San Angelo, Morris G. Watson, Roby, for respondents.
Scott Snodgrass, Jr., sued the Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company of Texas for damages caused by a collision between an automobile in which Snodgrass was riding and said company's train. A jury found for the plaintiff (5) that immediately before the collision the train was traveling at 'an excessive speed under the facts and circumstances then and there existing'; (6) that this was negligence and (7) a proximate cause of the collision. But the jury found for defendant (14) that Snodgrass failed to warn the driver of the automobile of the approach of defendant's train; (15) that this was negligence and (16) a proximate cause of the collision and (7-a) that Snodgrass failed to warn the driver of the automobile that the train was approaching from the north at the time they left a drive-in; (7-b) that such failure was negligence and (7-c) a proximate cause of the collision. However, the jury also found (3) that the failure of the driver of the automobile to stop 15 feet from the nearest rail of the crossing was the sole proximate cause of the collision. The above constituted all of the findings that certain acts were a proximate cause of the collision. The jury found (8) that immediately prior to the collision the train was being operated at a speed in excess of 12 miles per hour and (9) that this was negligence. But the jury failed to find from a preponderance of the evidence (10) that operation of the train at a speed in excess of 12 miles per hour was a proximate cause of the collision.
The court instructed the jury that by sole proximate cause was meant the only proximate cause and that there could be only one sole proximate cause. The court also instructed the jury that 'by the term 'excessive speed' is meant a rate of speed faster than an ordinary prudent person would have used under the same or similar circumstances.'
The railroad company filed a motion for judgment on the verdict. When the court sustained said motion and entered judgment for defendant, he advised both sides that he would thereafter consider whether there was an irreconcilable conflict in the verdict. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial based solely on the contention that the findings that said acts of the plaintiff and defendant were each a proximate cause of the collision and that the failure of the driver of the automobile to stop was the sole cause of the collision could not be true, destroyed each other and could not be the basis for a judgment. After the filing of plaintiff's motion for a new trial, the trial judge advised both sides that the court would pass on said motion at a certain time; that the court did not desire to hear argument on the motion and that counsel need not appear, unless they desired to do so. On that date the court granted plaintiff's motion for a new trial and set its former judgment aside.
The railroad company has filed in this court an original application for a writ of mandamus to compel the trial judge to set aside the order granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial and reinstate the judgment. The railroad contends the verdict, on its face, compels judgment for it and that the sentence of the law follows as a ministerial duty. If there is no irreconcilable conflict in the findings and the railroad company has met the burden the law casts on it to show it is entitled to a mandamus the railroad company's petition should be granted.
Knox v. Craven, Tex.Civ.App., 248 S.W.2d 955, 958.
The company contends (1) there was no material finding which, taken alone, would have entitled Snodgrass to a judgment and, therefore, there could be no material conflict; (2) that there was no conflict which precluded rendition of judgment for the railroad and the refusal to give effect to the verdict, although labeled as a grant of a new trial, was a refusal to proceed to judgment and (3) that, although the action of the court in setting aside the judgment and granting a new trial was based on a claimed irreconcilable conflict, no such conflict existed, as a matter of law, and, therefore, the company is entitled to a writ commanding the court to set aside the order granting a new trial, which it claims was in excess of the court jurisdiction and a refusal to give effect to a valid verdict. In this connection it contends that the only answer which, taken alone, could have supported a judgment for plaintiff is (7) that excessive speed of the train was a proximate cause of the collision, but that it could not be given effect because it conflicted with the 'finding' (10) that speed in excess of 12 miles per hour was not a proximate cause and the answer to (10) was a specific finding with reference to speed while the answer to (7) was general and the specific finding controls. The company specifically contends that the finding on the defensive issues of proximate cause and sole proximate cause do not create a conflict which precludes rendition of judgment for the railroad; that there was no finding that entitled Snodgrass to judgment, and, therefore, there could be no fatal conflict, regardless of the answers to said defensive issues.
The railroad further contends that the answer to issue (22), (that the driver of the automobile in which Snodgrass was riding attempted to beat the train across the crossing), entitled the railroad to judgment, regardless of any finding of proximate cause, because when a person attempts to beat a train across a crossing there can be no recovery, as a matter of law. In support thereof it cites Reedy v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., Tex.Civ.App. 203 S.W.2d 347. It says that it is evident from the answer to issue 22 that the driver knew of the approach of the train, because he was attempting to beat it across the crossing, and, therefore, the failure of Snodgrass to warn the driver could not be a proximate cause; that the answer to issues 22, 28, 29 and 30 rendered the finding relative to Snodgrass' failure to warn the driver immaterial;...
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Waddell v. Williams
...mistrial and rendition of judgment. See also W. T. Rawleigh Company v. Sims, Tex.Civ.App., 108 S.W.2d 332; Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry. Co. v. Thomas, Tex.Civ.App., 282 S.W.2d 912, 914; Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co. v. Davenport, Tex.Civ.App., 159 S.W.2d 913; City of Houston v. Adams, 154......