Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Randolph, 13564-13566.

• Citation: 164 F.2d 4
• Decision Date: 17 December 1947
• Docket Number: No. 13564-13566.,13564-13566.
• Parties: MISSOURI-KANSAS-TEXAS R. CO. et al. v. RANDOLPH et al. (two cases). WOOD et al. v. RANDOLPH et al.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

164 F.2d 4 (1947)

MISSOURI-KANSAS-TEXAS R. CO. et al. v. RANDOLPH et al. (two cases). WOOD et al. v. RANDOLPH et al.

Nos. 13564-13566.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

November 5, 1947.

Rehearing Denied December 17, 1947.

M. E. Clinton, of Dallas, Tex.(C. S. Burg and Carl S. Hoffman, both of St. Louis, Mo., G. H. Penland and M. E. Clinton, both of Dallas, Tex., and Ellison A. Neel, of Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), for appellants Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., a Missouri corporation, and Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. of Texas.

John Murphy, of Kansas City, Mo. (W. A. Endle, Gen. Counsel, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, of Cleveland, Ohio, and R. Carter Tucker, William H. Wilson, J. Gordon Siddens, and Tucker, Murphy & Wilson, all of Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), for appellants R. D. Wood et al.

Clyde Taylor, of Kansas City, Mo. (Clif Langsdale, of Kansas City, Mo., on the brief), for appellees.

Before GARDNER, WOODROUGH, and RIDDICK, Circuit Judges.

WOODROUGH, Circuit Judge.

These appeals come before us on one record from an interlocutory order of temporary injunction entered after trial of the issues presented by the application for temporary injunction in a class action presenting diversity of citizenship and requisite amount involved, in which the passenger train porters working on the lines of the two above named railroads through their labor unions and union officials as plaintiffs invoked the jurisdiction of the court to preserve to them by injunction the performance of certain enumerated items of passenger train operating work on the lines of the two railroads, which work they had been doing for a long time and were doing at the time of the order, and which they claimed the right to perform by virtue of their collectively bargained contract with the railroads. The trainmen working for the railroads on the passenger trains on the lines, acting through their labor unions and union officers, were claiming the right to do the work in question by virtue of their collectively bargained contract with the railroads, and were demanding the work from the railroads and filing claims and threatening to file further claims against the railroad for pay for that work when the work is denied them and train porters or others are permitted to do it.¹ The railroads were about to accede to the demands of the trainmen and intended, after due notice and in accord with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 152, Seventh and § 156, to cancel the contract with the train porters on which the train porters based their claim of right to do the specific items of train operating work and to negotiate a new contract excluding such items. The temporary injunction undertakes to maintain the previously existing status of the passenger train porters in their performance of the work in question by declaring that their collectively bargained contract with the railroads of December 3, 1928, "provided for and vouchsafed" the work in question to them; by enjoining the railroads from disturbing the status of the plaintiffs under said contract; and by enjoining the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and all the members thereof working for the two railroads from seeking to enforce their demands by claims and suits against the railroad companies, and by enjoining them from interfering in any manner whatever with the contractual relations (as declared by the court) between the porters and the companies by inducing or coercing the companies to cancel or abrogate them.

The appellant representatives of the railroad trainmen contend in this court, as they did in the court below, that the facts pleaded as well as the facts shown in evidence in this case, disclose that the controversy presented is a jurisdictional labor dispute within the purview of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., and a labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq., and that the District court should not have undertaken to interpret the agreements of the passenger train porters or of the railroad trainmen with the railroads for the purpose of settling by injunctional orders or decree, the dispute as to whether one or both of the two classes of employees, the train porters and the trainmen, should perform the work in question. They contend that the court should have stayed exercise of its power to issue injunctional orders and should have relegated the parties to the tribunals specifically provided by Congress in the Railway Labor Act for mediation and for determining the interpretation and application of collective bargaining contracts such as are shown to be involved in this case, in order to finally settle the labor dispute arising out of them, and that the issuance of the temporary injunction in the first instance was erroneous.

Our study of the record, including the stipulation of facts and the evidence, convinces that these contentions are fully sustained, and that the issuance of the temporary injunction was erroneous in view of the statutes and the decision of the Supreme Court in Order of Railway Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561, 66 S.Ct. 322, 325, 90 L.Ed. 318.

In that case, as in this, it was sought to have the court adjudicate and settle through injunctive process, jurisdictional labor disputes involving the claims of two groups of employees of the railroad, each claiming the right by virtue of its respective collective bargaining agreement with the railroad, to do certain items of railroad work. The court observed that "interpretation of these contracts involves more than the mere construction of a `document' in terms of the ordinary meaning of words and their position. * * * For O. R. C.'s Order of Railroad Conductors agreements with the railroad must be read in the light of others between the railroad and B. R. T. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. And since all parties seek to support their particular interpretation of these agreements by evidence as to usage, practice and custom that too must be taken into account and properly understood. The factual question is intricate and technical. An agency especially competent and specifically designated to deal with it has been created by Congress. Under these circumstances the court should exercise equitable discretion to give that agency the first opportunity to pass on the issue. Certainly the extraordinary relief of an injunction should be withheld, at least, until then. * * * Only after the Adjustment Board acts, but not until then, can it plainly appear that such relief is necessary to insure compliance with the statute. Until such time, O. R. C. can not show irreparable loss and inadequacy of the legal remedy. The court of equity should, therefore, in the exercise of its discretion stay its hand."

So in this case, neither the agreement between the railroad companies and the train porters, nor that between the railroad trainmen and the railroads, states in so many words that the railroads agree to give the work in question to either of the groups or both. Each of the parties resorts to usage, practice, custom and argumentation to support its particular interpretation and claim, and in the several instances in which the real dispute here involved, whether train porters should be permitted to perform the items of work in question or whether railroad trainmen have the exclusive right, has been submitted to the Adjustment Board for determination and award by contesting parties, the reports of the proceedings show the citation and consideration by the Board of scores of prior awards of the Board of asserted relevancy.² The most relied on provision of the train porters' contract is that "train porters when on duty will be under the jurisdiction of the conductor and will perform...