Delaware, L.&W.R. Co. v. Slocum

• Decision Date: 19 July 1949
• Citation: 299 N.Y. 496,87 N.E.2d 532
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: DELAWARE, L. & W. R. CO. v. SLOCUM et al.

299 N.Y. 496

87 N.E.2d 532

DELAWARE, L. & W. R. CO.

v.SLOCUM et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Decided July 19, 1949.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

Action for a declaratory judgment by the Delaware, Lackawana & Western Railroad Company, against Marion J. Slocum, as general chairman of Lackawana Division No. 30 of the Order of Railroad Telegraphers and others, for a declaration that crew callers in the Elmira yard office of plaintiff and the position held by them and the work assigned to them by plaintiff were within plaintiff's agreement with a clerk's union and not within plaintiff's agreement with defendant telegraphers' union, and that the telegraphers' union and its general foreman and members were estopped by their acts and conduct as well as by their agreement from claiming such positions or any part of the work assigned to the crew callers. From a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Third Judicial Department, entered November 30, 1948, 274 App.Div. 950, 83 N.Y.S.2d 513, unanimously affirming a judgment of the Supreme Court for the plaintiff, entered in Chemung County on a decision of the court at a trial at special term, Newman, J., in favor of the plaintiff, the named defendant appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

DESMOND and FULD, JJ., dissenting

Manly Fleischmann, John F. Dwyer, Buffalo, Leo J. Hassenauer, Chicago, Ill., and James W. Sack, Buffalo, for appellants. at Pierre W. Evans, Elmira, and Rowland L. Davis, Jr., New York City, for respondent.

CONWAY, Judge.

Defendant Marion J. Slocum appeals by our permission from a unanimous judgment of the Appellate Division, Third Department, affirming a declaratory judgment of the Supreme Court, Chemung County, which declared that three ‘crew-callers' in the Elmira yard office of the plaintiff railroad ‘and the positions held by them and the work assigned to them’ are within plaintiff's agreement with the above-named clerks' union. The Supreme Court also held that the telegraphers' union and its members were estopped by their acts and conduct as well as by their agreements from claiming the ‘crew-callers' positions or any of the work assigned to those positions.

While the telegraphers' union (which is the only appellant) does not concede that the decision below was correct ‘on the merits', it has admittedly only asked for a review of two of its contentions below, viz.:

1. That the ‘National Railroad Adjustment Board’ (hereinafter called the Board) has exclusive jurisdiction under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A., s 151 et seq., to determine this controversy, so that the Supreme Court was without power to do so, and

2. Assuming the Supreme Court has jurisdiction, its exercise of that jurisdiction was an abuse of judicial discretion as a matter of law.

The facts which have been affirmed by the Appellate Division are as follows:

Defendants are the principal officers of the local units of the above-name unions which are the collective bargaining agents for certain employees in the Elmira yard of the railroad. Each union has a written agreement with the railroad. Each contract contains a general provision, known as a ‘Scope Rule’, which defines those kinds of work to be performed by members of the union, and a provision listing those positions in the Elmira yard which are to be held by employees represented by the union.

This controversy arose over the work performed by three crew callers in the Elmira yard office. Those employees were members of the clerk's union and their positions were listed in the contract between that union and the railroad. The telegraphers' union contended that some work performed by the crew callers was covered by the scope rule of the telegraphers' contract, and on June 4, 1942, the telegraphers' chairman requested that the work in question be reassigned to members of the telegraphers' union and that retroactive pay for past work be paid to men on the telegraphers' extra-list. The railroad has maintained that none of the work performed by the crew callers was covered by the scope rule of the telegraphers' contract. The chairman of the clerks' union has consistently maintained that the work of the crew callers was covered by the clerks' contract, and that any telegraphers' duties which they might be performing should be reassigned.

The chairman of the telegraphers' union had pressed its claim in conferences and correspondence with various officials of the railroad, including the general superintendent and the general manager. At this point, on March 3, 1944, the railroad commenced this action against the general chairmen of the two unions for a judgment declaring the respective rights and obligations of the railroad and the unions under the collective bargaining agreements. The complaint alleged that a controversy existed between the telegraphers' union and the clerks' union as to whether the work of the crew callers was covered by the railroad's contract with the telegraphers or by the contract with the clerks, and the railroad believed that all work performed by the crew callers was covered by the contract with the clerks.

It may be pointed out that after the commencement of this action the defendant telegraphers' union made an application at Special Term for an order approving a bond and directig the removal of the action to the United States District Court. The application was denied. 183 Misc. 454, 50 N.Y.S.2d 313.

Thereafter a bond was submitted to a Judge of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York and approved by him. The railroad appeared specially and moved to remand the case to our Supreme Court, and the telegraphers' union moved to dismiss the action. The motion to dismiss was denied and the railroad's motion to remand the case to our State court was granted. 56 F.Supp. 634.

On February 5, 1945, the telegraphers' union made a motion at Special Term to dismiss the complaint which was denied in an unreported memorandum. On appeal to the Appellate Division the order was unanimously affirmed in an opinion rported in 269 App.Div. 467, 57 N.Y.S2d 65.

As already noted, the action was tried before a Justice of the Supreme Court without a jury, and upon his findings and conclusions a judgment was entered which sustained the railroad's construction of the contracts and held that the telegraphers' union was estopped from claiming the positions in controversy. The Appellate Division has affirmed in a Per Curiam opinion. 274 App.Div. 950, 83 N.Y.S.2d 513.

In each of the above five instances, the telegraphers' union urged that the State Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the action and that plaintiff's only recourse was to pursue its administrative remedy under the Railway Labor Act. Thus, that contention has been rejected on five occasions and by all the judges who have examined it.

As was pointed out in several of the above-mentioned opinions, plaintiff seeks no rights under the Railway Labor Act, but brings this action only for a construction or interpretation of the contracts between the parties. 183 Misc. 454, 50 N.Y.S.2d 313;D.C., 56 F.Supp. 634, 637; 274 App.Div. 950, 83 N.Y.S.2d 513.

The Railway Labor Act provides that among its ‘General purposes' is the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes between railroads and their employees. It divides disputes into two classifications as follows: (1) those ‘concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions' and (2) those ‘growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.’ 45 U.S.C.A. s 151a, cls. (4), (5). (Emphasis supplied.)

The parties to all disputes are initially required to attempt to negotiate their differences by conferences between their respective representatives. 45 U.S.C.A. s 152, subds. First, Second.

Beyond the initial stage of negotiation and conference the act provides for different methods of settlement for the two classes of disputes. As pointed out in Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 1290, 89 L.Ed. 1886, the first type ‘relates to disputes over the formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them. They arise where there is no such agreement or where it is sought to change the terms of one, and therefore the issue is not whether an existing agreement controls the controversy. They look to the acquisition of rights for the future, not to assertion of rights claimed to have vested in the past.’ Concerning that class of disputes the act provides first for mediation before the National Mediation Board, if that fails, then voluntary arbitration; and if that fails, conciliation by Presidential intervention. 45 U.S.C.A. ss 155, 157, 160; see Burley case, supra, 325 U.S. page 725, 65 S.Ct. page 1290.

The second class of disputes ‘contemplates the existence of a collective agreement already concluded or, at any rate, a situation in which no effort is made to bring about a formal change in terms or to create a new one.’ Burley case, supra, 325 U.S. page 723, 65 S.Ct. page 1290. All parties and the courts below agree that the instant case is within the second classification, and that the course prescribed by the act for the settlement of this type of dispute is submission to the Railroad Adjustment Board. The language of the act is as follows, 45 U.S.C.A. s 153, subd. First, par. (1): ‘(i) The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, including cases pending and unadjusted on June 21, 1934 shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes; but, failing to reach an adjustment in this manner, the disputes may be referred by petition of the parties or by...