Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. of Texas v. Jones

• Decision Date: 19 February 1930
• Docket Number: (No. 1116-5431.)
• Parties: MISSOURI-KANSAS-TEXAS R. CO. OF TEXAS v. JONES et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 366

24 S.W.2d 366

MISSOURI-KANSAS-TEXAS R. CO. OF TEXAS v. JONES et al.

(No. 1116-5431.)

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section B.

February 19, 1930.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Fifth Supreme Judicial District.

Suit by the Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company of Texas against B. F. Jones and others. An order granting a temporary injunction was reversed, and the suit dismissed by the Court of Civil Appeals , and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Chas. C. Huff and J. M. Chambers, both of Dallas, and Foree & Rigdell, of Rockwall, for plaintiff in error.

W. P. Dumas and L. S. Stemmons, both of Dallas, for defendants in error.

LEDDY, J.

Plaintiff in error obtained an injunction out of the district court restraining defendant in error from prosecuting a condemnation suit instituted by it in the county court of Rockwall county until it could be determined by the district court whether the right to condemn the property in fact existed.

In the condemnation proceeding in the county court, the railway company filed its pleading, in which it was alleged the building of the proposed levee upon its right of way would cause the expenditure of an enormous sum to rebuild its bridges and tracks, and place a burden upon it far in excess of the benefits conferred upon the levee district; it being averred that the cost to the railway company, in adjusting its tracks to the proposed levee, would amount to more than twice the value of all the land sought to be protected thereby, and that by reason of such conditions the exercise by the levee district of the right of eminent domain would be arbitrary and unreasonable.

The railway company insists that it properly invoked the equitable power of the district court, for the reason that the county court was without jurisdiction to determine the question raised by it; that is, whether the right to condemn its property by the levee district existed under the conditions alleged.

It is defendant in error's view that the county court of Rockwall county, being vested with exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters of eminent domain, was clothed with full power and authority to try and adjudicate the question as to whether its right to condemn, under the conditions alleged by the railway company, in fact existed.

In article 1960, R. S. 1925, concerning the jurisdiction of county courts, it is provided: "Jurisdiction shall obtain in all matters of eminent domain over which the county courts have jurisdiction by the general laws of this State."

The procedure for condemning lands is contained in title 52, R. S. 1925. After setting forth the requisites of the application for condemnation, provision is made for the appointment of commissioners to assess and report the damages due the landowner. The procedure to be followed in case either party is dissatisfied with the award is thus prescribed: "If either party be dissatisfied with the decision, such party may within ten days after the same has been filed with the county judge file his objection thereto in writing, setting forth the grounds of his objection, and thereupon the adverse party shall be cited and the cause shall be tried and determined as in other civil causes in the county court." Rev. St. 1925, art. 3266, subd. 6.

It is a salutary rule of construction that, where jurisdiction is conferred upon a court in certain causes, it carries with it as a necessary incident the right to decide whether that state of facts exists which confers jurisdiction as well as all other matters which arise in a case legitimately before the court. 15 C. J. 725.

Jurisdiction granted to county courts by the law of this state to hear and determine the condemnation suits by necessary implication includes the right...