Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Binkley
Decision Date | 11 June 1945 |
Docket Number | No. 4-7670.,4-7670. |
Citation | 188 S.W.2d 291 |
Parties | MISSOURI PAC. R. CO. v. BINKLEY. |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Lawrence County, Eastern District; S. M. Bone, Judge.
Action by Otis Binkley against the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company for damages to plaintiff's automobile which was struck by defendant's train. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Reversed and dismissed.
Thomas B. Pryor, of Fort Smith, and H. L. Ponder and H. L. Ponder, Jr., both of Walnut Ridge, for appellant.
Cunningham & Cunningham, of Walnut Ridge, for appellee.
Appellee, Otis Binkley, sued appellant for damages to his automobile which was struck by one of appellant's trains at about 4 P.M., January 27, 1944, on what is known as Virgil McClain's crossing near Walnut Ridge. The only allegations of negligence relied upon were that appellant "was negligent in covering the approach to said railroad crossing with gumbo, which is commonly known to be slick when wet and would make a slippery and dangerous crossing and in allowing the space between the rails to become hollowed out, making a depression or trap for the wheels of a car," and "because of the slick gumbo and because of the depression between the rails on the track, he was unable to move his car either forward or backward." There were no allegations of failure to give the statutory signals (§ 11135, Pope's Digest) or to maintain a proper lookout (§ 11144, Pope's Digest).
Appellant denied every material allegation in the complaint and further defended on the ground that appellee was guilty of contributory negligence. A trial resulted in a verdict for appellee in the amount of $750, and from the judgment comes this appeal.
For reversal, appellant argues that the evidence was not sufficient to support the verdict. After a careful review of all the testimony, we have reached the conclusion that appellant is correct in this contention.
The evidence, when viewed in its most favorable light to appellee, shows that he, in company with his wife, small daughter and mother-in-law, at about 4 P.M. on January 27, 1944, turned from the highway to drive his automobile over the crossing in question. The approach to the crossing was about 40 feet in length with a gradual elevation of about 4 feet. This approach was constructed of dirt, called "gumbo", mixed with gravel or crushed rock. It had rained that morning and this approach was muddy. On both sides of the rails of the crossing were heavy planks, 10 inches wide, 5 inches thick and 11 feet 4 inches in length (4 in number). There was crushed rock between the rails which was from 2 to 4 inches below the top of the rails. As appellee began the ascent of the approach to the crossing, he shifted his car in low gear, and after looking south for an approaching train, proceeded slowly without stopping until the front wheels of his car had passed over the first rail of the crossing, when he put on his brake and stopped his car. Appellee said he could not see the oncoming train because of the bright sunlight shining in his eyes.
Appellee's theory of the case was that the collision was due to the negligence of appellant in so maintaining the approach to the crossing that it became muddy and slick, slowed down the car, and this, in connection with the depression from 2 to 4 inches between the rails, caused his car to "stall on the track."
Appellant, on the other hand, argues that appellee was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to exercise the proper care and caution required of him, under the law, before driving onto the railroad track, a place of known danger.
As to this contention, appellee says in his brief: "Appellant insists that the plaintiff should have seen the train before he reached the track but anyone who has ever tried driving a car on a gumbo dump when it is wet and slick will understand that it takes all the attention and all the skill of a good driver to keep the car from skidding and going into the ditch, and that he has no time for looking for trains or anything else."
Here, appellee sued for property damage only, and any contributory negligence on his part would preclude recovery under the law at the time this action arose. The comparative negligence rule, under § 11153 of Pope's Digest,...
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