Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Brazil

• Decision Date: 07 December 1888
• Citation: 10 S.W. 403
• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Parties: MISSOURI PAC. RY. CO. <I>v.</I> BRAZIL.

10 S.W. 403

MISSOURI PAC. RY. CO.v.

BRAZIL.

Supreme Court of Texas.

December 7, 1888.

Appeal from district court, Smith county; FELIX J. McCORD, Judge.

Action by W. N. Brazil against the Missouri Pacific Railway Company to recover for injuries received by defendant's alleged negligence. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

J. R. Burnett, for appellant. John M. Duncan, I. J. Rice, T. N. Jones, and Robertson & Robertson, for appellee.

STAYTON, C. J.

This is an action by appellee to recover damages, actual and exemplary, on account of an injury alleged to have been received by him while a passenger on appellant's road. On December 26, 1887, he was injured by the derailment of the car in which he was riding, and on January 6th following, in consideration of $500, then paid to him, he executed a release, which was pleaded in bar of this action. The plaintiff in his petition, anticipating this defense, alleged the circumstances under which the release was executed, but these did not tend to show that the release was procured through fraud or undue influence. The petition, however, did allege the plaintiff's want of sufficient mental capacity to contract at the time the release was executed. The charge correctly stated to the jury the substance of the averments of the petition and answer, which involved a statement that appellee alleged the release was executed over the protest of plaintiff's wife, and on the importunities of appellant's agent; and it is urged that the court, in the charge given, gave the jury to understand that there were issues to be tried involving such matters. This seems to be true, but there was no other intimation to the jury in the body of the charge that they were at liberty to find the release invalid on any ground, if they believed that appellee had sufficient mental capacity to contract at the time he executed it. To avoid, however, the possibility of any misconception on this point, the following charge was requested: "No. 1. Under the pleadings and evidence in this cause, the jury will find for defendants unless the release read in evidence is invalid by reason of plaintiff's insanity, under the rules of law given you in charge by the court. The release cannot be avoided by reason of any supposed fraud in its procurement." This charge was refused, and we are of the opinion, under the pleadings and evidence, that the charge might with propriety have been given; and in view of the evidence bearing on the question of appellee's mental condition, it was important that the very issue on which the validity or invalidity of the release depended should be clearly understood by the jury. The evidence of two witnesses was introduced, showing fully what they remembered as the conversation between appellee and appellant's agent at the time the latter visited the house where appellee was, for the purpose of making the settlement evidenced by the release; and it is urged that the agent's statements made at that time should not have been received, because they neither tended to show fraud nor undue influence. We are of opinion that all that passed between the agent and appellee was properly admitted; for it tended to show the negotiation between them, and would serve to illustrate appellee's mental condition, and capacity to understand the nature of the transaction which he did consummate, through the release and its effect upon his right. While this evidence was admissible, the jury may have understood, under the statement of the issues made by the court, that it was their duty to inquire whether the contract was made against the protest of appellee's wife, and through importunities of the agent, and if they found either of these to be true that the release would be invalid. When a charge was asked that would have relieved the jury of all doubts or ground for misconception as to the fact that would invalidate the release, it ought to have been given.

The court instructed the jury that "the burden is on the plaintiff to show by a preponderance of testimony the facts that would set aside such a release." It is urged that this was error, and that the following requested charge should have been given: "No. 9. The presumption of law is that the release set up by defendants is valid and binding, the plaintiff having admitted that he signed it; and in order for the jury to find it invalid, under the rules of law given you in charge, the burden of proof is on plaintiff to satisfactorily establish the invalidity of said release, and, if he has not done so, you will find for defendant." When it is shown that an instrument was signed and delivered by the party whose contract it is made to evidence, in the absence of proof of some fact that will invalidate it, the capacity of its maker to contract, and all other facts necessary to the validity of the contract, are sufficiently established to entitle the person claiming rights under the instrument to recover. Sanity is presumed, but this presumption is one of fact, and not of law; and when there is an issue made as to sanity, and evidence introduced under it tending to show insanity, it would be error for a court to instruct a jury that the law creates a presumption the one way or the other. In such a case sanity or insanity is a question of fact to be determined by the jury, if one has been called, uninfluenced by a charge as to the presumption that will be indulged when there is no issue and evidence as to the sanity of the person whose act is in question. In this case the burden of proof to show insanity rested upon appellee, and the court so charged, but it is insisted that this was a fact that could not be established by a mere preponderance of evidence. In civil cases, whatever may be the issue involved, it is not requisite that the person on whom rests the burden of proof shall establish his cause by a greater weight of evidence than a fair preponderance. We understand this to be the rule established in this state, in criminal cases, on an issue of insanity raised by a defendant. The charge asked required appellee to establish his incapacity to contract by a greater weight or intensity of evidence.

Appellant in its answer denied appellee's want of capacity at the time the release was executed; and alleged, further, that if such was then his condition he was subsequently restored to sound mind; and that while in this condition, with full knowledge that he had executed the release and of its terms, he retained and used the money, and before this action was brought acquiesced in and ratified the settlement and release. Appellant asked the following charges: "No. 4. If you find from the evidence that plaintiff was insane when he signed the release, or that the release was invalid under the rules of law given you by the court, but further find from the evidence that plaintiff, after he became conscious and was informed of the release, and that he had released defendant from all claims of damages for $500 paid to him, continued to use the money, or if he had used it in the payment of debts, and did not promptly, or within a reasonable time after he became conscious, repudiate or disaffirm the contract, then you will find for defendants." "No. 6. If you find from the evidence that plaintiff was, at the time he signed the release and received the money, incapable of understanding the nature and effect of the compromise, but you find that he apparently understood the nature and effect of the transaction, and no fraud or undue advantage is shown to have been taken of him in obtaining the release, and he afterwards used the money in payment of his debts or otherwise, and, after he became conscious of the compromise he had made, did not promptly disaffirm it, but acquiesced in it, then you will find for defendant." These charges were refused on the ground that they had been substantially given in the main charge, but an inspection of that charge shows that no charge whatever was given on the matters to which the refused charges relate. The evidence does not tend to show that appellee, at the time the release was...