Missouri Pacific Railway Company v. Bradley
| Citation | 71 N.W. 283,51 Neb. 596 |
| Decision Date | 18 May 1897 |
| Docket Number | 7148 |
| Parties | MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY v. THOMAS K. BRADLEY, ADMINISTRATOR |
| Court | Supreme Court of Nebraska |
ERROR from the district court of Otoe county. Tried below before CHAPMAN, J. Affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
E. F Warren, C. W. Seymour, James W. Orr, and B. P. Waggener, for plaintiff in error.
John C Watson, Wash Adams, and Numa F. Heitman, contra.
On the 9th day of January, 1894, a petition was presented to the county court of Otoe county for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of Charles L. Myers, deceased, alleging, inter alia, that Myers, a resident of Jackson county, Missouri, died intestate in Otoe county, this state, on the 22d day of April, 1892, leaving an estate to be administered, consisting of personal property situated and having its situs in said county of Otoe. The prayer of the petition was granted, and Thomas K. Bradley was appointed administrator, who duly qualified as such. Afterwards, on January 30, 1894, the Missouri Pacific Railway Company filed a petition in said county court, setting forth that Bradley, as administrator of the estate of said Myers, deceased, had instituted an action against it in the district court of Otoe county to recover damages resulting from the death of Myers, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the railroad company; that the appointment of Bradley was fraudulent and collusive, and made for the sole purpose of prosecuting said action; that at the date of the death of Myers he was a resident of the state of Missouri, and left no estate to be administered in the state of Nebraska, and praying that the letters of administration granted to Bradley might be revoked and set aside. A citation was thereupon issued by the county court to Bradley, fixing the date for him to show cause why his appointment as administrator of said estate should not be revoked and annulled, which was duly served. An answer was filed by the administrator denying the allegations contained in the petition of the railroad company, and alleging that it has no interest in the estate of said Myers, as creditor, heir, or distributee of said estate, and that said corporation has no right or authority to file said petition or to be heard to raise objections to the appointment of said administrator. Upon the hearing, on April 2, 1894, the county court refused to revoke and cancel the letters of administration, finding specially that Myers died intestate in Otoe county; that he resided in Jackson county, Missouri, at the time of his death; that he left as his estate "$ 4 in money and a pocket-book found upon his person at the time of his death, which said $ 4 and purse were sent to the widow of deceased at Kansas City, Missouri, at once; that said money in cash and the said purse were returned to said county of Otoe after the commencement of this proceeding, and came into the hands of the administrator on the 2d day of April, 1894; a claim for $ 25 for money he had on his person at the time he left home, and a claim to right of action for damages against the Missouri Pacific Railway Company for injuries occasioning the death of the said Charles L. Myers." The railroad company excepted, and prosecuted error to the district court, where the decision of the county court was affirmed. The record has been brought to this court for review.
It is argued that the grant of letters of administration to Thomas K. Bradley upon the estate of Charles L. Myers, deceased, by the county court of Otoe county, was coram non judice, because said Myers at the time of his death was a resident of Missouri, and left no estate to be administered in Nebraska. Section 177, chapter 23, Compiled Statutes, 1895, declares: There is no claim that Myers was a resident or inhabitant of this state at the time of his death, so the letters of administration issued to Bradley are invalid unless the decedent left an estate to be administered in Otoe county. That Myers died in that county and was then a resident of the state of Missouri is undisputed; but it is asserted that he left no estate in Otoe county sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the county court of that county to grant administration. The county court found that Myers left in said county, as his estate, a pocket-book, $ 4, a claim for $ 25 for money, and the right of action against the railroad company for injuries causing his death. These constituted an estate to be administered. It is true, exclusive of the claim against the company, they were not of great value, but that is wholly an immaterial consideration, so far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned. The statute has not fixed any limitation upon the value of the estate to be administered, and the courts have no right to do so. The jurisdiction of the county court to grant administration is not determined by the value of the estate. In the last case the deceased owned property of the value of $ 2.25 at the time of his death, and it was held the estate was sufficient to authorize the granting of letters of administration. Authority is conferred to administer upon the estates of the poor and rich alike. The statute has made no distinction in that regard.
The argument that jurisdiction was lost by the sending of the pocket-book and the $ 4 to the widow in Kansas City, Missouri, prior to the filing of the petition for administration in the county court of Otoe county is without merit. Myers' property vested in the administrator when appointed by relation from the death of decedent. (Bullock v. Rogers, 16 Vt. 294; Valentine v. Jackson, 9 Wend. 302; McMillan v. Wacker, 57 Mo.App. 220; Adey v. Adey, 58 Mo.App. 408; 1 Woerner, American Law of Administration, sec. 173.) An estate was left in Otoe county to be administered, and the sending of a part or all of the personal property out of the county could not divest the court of jurisdiction to issue letters of administration. The widow had no right to the pocket-book and money, as they did not belong to her. The fact that they were forwarded to her, presumably for safe-keeping, is entirely immaterial and did not affect the jurisdiction of the county court. The authority of the county court did not rest alone upon the few articles of personal property already mentioned which the deceased had upon his person when he died, since the cause of action against the railroad corporation was sufficient estate to justify the appointment of an administrator, had there been no other estate to be administered. The decisions in the other states upon the question are conflicting, but the decided weight of the authority sustains the doctrine that the cause of action, under Lord Campbell's Act, is an estate sufficient to grant administration thereon. This court so held in Missouri P. R. Co. v. Lewis, 24 Neb. 848, 40 N.W. 401. In that case Joseph B. Lewis died in the state of Kansas, from injuries inflicted there by the railroad company. The sole assets of the estate consisted of the claim against the company. Letters of administration were granted by the county court of Washington county, Nebraska, to the widow, who instituted suit against the company for the death of her husband. The jurisdiction of the county court was sustained, and we think properly so, in the light of chapter 21, Compiled Statutes, which reads as follows:
etc.
Under these provisions the right of action against the railroad company for causing the death of Myers constituted an estate within the meaning of section 177, chapter 23, Compiled Statutes. In the language of Montgomery, J., in Findlay v. Chicago & G. T. R. Co., 106 Mich. 700, 64 N.W. 732 ...
To continue reading
Request your trial