Mister v. Obadina
| Decision Date | 03 May 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19-cv-00148-NJR |
| Parties | SHARVELT MISTER, Plaintiff, v. OLUKUNLE OBADINA, WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, DR. BARRA, DR. MURPHY, DR. KAYIRA, SUSAN GRIFFIN, DR. SANTOS, MS. LISA KREBS, DR. GARCIA, DR. NAWOOR, MRS. HACKNEY, MS. KATHY GAVIN, and DR. MATTRICKS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Plaintiff Sharvelt Mister, a former inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC"), brings this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which occurred during his time at Pinckneyville Correctional Center ("Pinckneyville").1 Plaintiff claims that he received inadequate medical care in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights; he seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief.
This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 11) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.2 Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff makes the following allegations: Before he entered the custody of IDOC, Plaintiff was diagnosed with a lower back injury, as well as a fractured wrist and neck. (Doc. 11, p. 5). While in custody, Plaintiff was again diagnosed with a fractured neck and wrist, lower back injury, and stomach conditions, and he was told by a specialist that surgery was needed. Id., p. 6. At some point during custody, Plaintiff was ordered a low-bunk permit. Id., p. 7. During his time at Pinckneyville, his low-bunk permit was revoked, and he continued to suffer because of his various injuries. Id. Although Dr. Obadina, who was Plaintiff's treating physician, was aware of his medical history and current condition, Dr. Obadina continued to prescribe treatment that was failing to address Plaintiff's pain and symptoms. Id., pp. 2, 6. Dr. Obadina did not alter Plaintiff's prescription or explore alternative treatment options, despite Plaintiff's complaint of increasing pain and the recommendations of a specialist. Id., p. 11. As a result, Plaintiff has suffered great mental and physical pain, damage to his nervous system, and he has been unable to go about daily activities or seek employment. Id., p. 12. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Obadina acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, specifically regarding his treatment and pain management. Id., p. 13. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.("Wexford"), Dr. Obadina's employer and supervisor, knew of Plaintiff's condition and of Dr. Obadina's failure to treat and manage Plaintiff's pain and failed to ensure that Dr. Obadina provided adequate care. Id., p. 13. Plaintiff also alleges that Wexford operates pursuant to a policy under which it declines to confirm that adequate care is instituted, even after care is deemed or suspected inadequate. Id.
First, Plaintiff cannot maintain his claim against IDOC because it is a state government agency. It is well established that "neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983." Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see also Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2001) (); Billman v. Ind. Dep't of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995) (); Hughes v. Joliet Corr. Ctr., 931 F.2d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 218, 220 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1990) (same). For these reasons, IDOC is dismissed with prejudice from this action.
Plaintiff also includes a list of individuals in the midst of his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 11, p. 3). Unfortunately, however, these individuals are not listed in the caption of the First Amended Complaint. When parties are not listed in the caption, this Court will not treat them as defendants, and any claims against them should be considered dismissed without prejudice. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(a) (); Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551-52 (7th Cir. 2005) (). As such, Defendants Barra, Murphy, Kayira, Griffin, Santos, Krebs, Garcia, Nawoor, Hackney, Gavin, and Mattricks are dismissed without prejudice. If Plaintiff intended to bring claims against these individuals, he must submit an amended complaint.
Finally, Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is rendered moot by his discharge from incarceration. The removal of a prisoner from the institution where he was subject to unconstitutionalbehavior generally renderers a prayer for injunctive relief moot unless he can show "a realistic possibility that he will again be incarcerated in the same state facility and therefore be subject to the actions of which he complains here." Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 716 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2009)). Plaintiff's change of address indicates that not only he is no longer in IDOC custody, but that he has moved to Georgia. (Doc. 9). Further, Plaintiff had already been transferred out of Pinckneyville by the time he filed suit. As such, Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is denied without prejudice.
Based on the allegations in the First Amended Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to divide the pro se action into the following two counts:
The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court.
The Eighth Amendment has been held to prohibit deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical need. In order to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, an inmate must show: (1) that he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition; and (2) that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to a risk of serious harm from that condition. Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 2016). The deliberate indifference element requires proof that the defendant knew of facts from which he could infer that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must actually draw the inference. Zaya v. Sood, 836 F.3d 800, 804 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,837 (1970)). "Delaying treatment may constitute deliberate indifference if such delayexacerbated the injury or unnecessarily prolonged an inmate's pain." Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted). A medical professional's actions may also reflect deliberate indifference if he "chooses an easier and less efficacious treatment without exercising professional judgment or simply continues with a course of treatment that he knows is ineffective in treating the inmate's condition." Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 754 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations and quotations omitted).
Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Dr. Obadina's actions were deliberately indifferent. Plaintiff claims that he was diagnosed while in IDOC custody with the injuries that had also existed and been previously diagnosed prior to his conviction. Plaintiff also states that his condition deteriorated under Dr. Obadina's care and that Dr. Obadina continued to prescribe the same ineffective treatment, despite the recommendations of a specialist. Plaintiff has stated a colorable claim, and therefore Count 1 pertaining to Dr. Obadina survives screening.
Plaintiff alleges that Wexford was also deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Wexford is a corporation that employs Dr. Obadina and provides medical care at the prison, but it cannot be held liable solely on that basis. Normally, a private corporation is shielded from vicarious liability under Section 1983. In the prison context, however, Wexford is presumed to act under color of state law and is thus treated as though it were a municipal entity. Jackson v. Ill. Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 766 n. 6 (7th Cir. 2002). To state a claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the wrongdoers acted pursuant to an unconstitutional policy or custom, Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 664 (7th Cir. 2016); Shields v. Ill Dep't of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 790 (7th Cir. 2014); Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 780 & n. 5 (7th Cir. 2015), and that the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Gable v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). A policy claim can include implicit policies or gaps in explicit policies. Daniel v. Cook County, 833 F.3d 728, 734 (7th Cir. 2016).
Here, Plaintiff has only claimed that Wexford has a policy under which it "declines to confirm that adequate care is instituted even after care is deemed or suspected inadequate." (Doc. 11, p. 13). Plaintiff has not claimed that any act by Wexford led to his alleged deprivation of rights. See Olive...
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