Mita v. Guardsmark, LLC

• Decision Date: 24 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 31457–0–III.,31457–0–III.
• Citation: 328 P.3d 962,182 Wash.App. 76
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: Shizuko MITA, surviving spouse of Kay K. Mita; and Floyd Mita, individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Kay K. Mita, Appellants, v. GUARDSMARK, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; and Spokane County, a municipal corporation of the State of Washington, Respondents.

182 Wash.App. 76

328 P.3d 962

Shizuko MITA, surviving spouse of Kay K. Mita; and Floyd Mita, individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Kay K. Mita, Appellants,

v.GUARDSMARK, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; and Spokane County, a municipal corporation of the State of Washington, Respondents.

No. 31457–0–III.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3.

June 24, 2014.

Richard Charles Eymann, Eymann Allison et al, Spokane, WA, Benjamin Peter Compton, Vreeland Law, Bellevue, WA, for Appellant.

William Fredrick Etter, Courtney Anne Garcea, Etter McMahon Lamberson Clary & Oreskovi, Hugh T. Lackie, Markus William Louvier, Evans Craven & Lackie PS, Heather Yakely, Attorney at Law, Spokane, WA, for Respondent.

BROWN, A.C.J.

¶ 1 The estate of Kay Mita, along with Shizuko Mita and Floyd Mita individually, appeal the summary judgment dismissal of their negligence suit against Spokane County (County) and Guardsmark, LLC, arising from the tragic death of Kay.¹ The Mitas contend the trial court erred in ruling the County and Guardsmark owed Kay no duty of care. We agree with the Mitas. Thus, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

¶ 2 Because we are reviewing summary judgment, we present the facts in the light most favorable to the Mitas as the nonmoving party. On the morning of November 26, 2007, 84–year–old Kay reported to the Spokane County Superior Court as a potential juror. When he parked his car and walked to the courthouse, the temperature outside was about 23 degrees with a wind chill of 17 degrees Fahrenheit. The temperature remained in the 20s all day while snow accumulated.

¶ 3 Around 12:00 p.m., the trial judge dismissed the jury panel with instructions to return by 2:00 p.m. Kay did not return to the jury room. A jury manager soon called Shizuko, Kay's 82–year–old wife, and asked about Kay's location. Shizuko answered she did not know, then recounted the conversation to Floyd, her adult son.

¶ 4 Around 5:00 p.m., the trial judge's court clerk left the courthouse and saw Kay in the parking lot as she walked to her car. When the clerk asked Kay why he did not return to the jury room, he answered he had been searching for his car all afternoon but could not find it. He declined her offers of assistance and repeated he could not find his car. Upon her suggestion, he started back to the courthouse to seek help from security personnel. In an interview with the Mitas' expert witness, the clerk said Kay “seemed confused and bewildered.” Clerk's Papers (CP) at 389, 402. But in her later affidavit supporting the County's summary judgment motion, the clerk said Kay “was coherent and interacted appropriately.” CP at 250.

¶ 5 A Guardsmark security officer saw Kay enter the courthouse and sit down on a bench next to a heater at about 5:10 p.m. At 5:30 p.m., the officer ushered Kay out the main door and locked the courthouse.

¶ 6 Floyd and Shizuko became very concerned when Kay did not return home from the courthouse between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m. Around 6:50 p.m., Floyd called the Spokane Crime Reporting Center (SCRC), a service provided by the County for nonemergencies, including missing person reports. Floyd told the call receiver Kay was missing. SCRC instructed Floyd to contact the four local hospitals and call the reporting center back if he could not find Kay.

¶ 7 Floyd followed these instructions and called SCRC back at about 7:11 p.m. to officially report Kay as missing. This time, SCRC collected information about Kay, including his name, sex, age, race, weight, height, and other physical descriptors, to assist a law enforcement officer in searching for him. Floyd narrated for SCRC how Kay did not return to the jury room that afternoon and did not return home from the courthouse that evening, which was unusual because he was a very responsible person. SCRC asked Floyd if Kay had parked his car in a jury lot. Floyd answered affirmatively and described the car. Floyd told SCRC he had not searched for Kay because Shizuko was very worried and he was afraid to leave her at home alone.

¶ 8 Then, Floyd told SCRC he was “ ‘very concerned’ about the fact it was snowing and very cold outside.” CP at 665. “[T]he call receiver replied, with concern and urgency in her voice, ... ‘we will send out a policeman to immediately search for your father.’ ” Id. The call receiver soon repeated SCRC would immediately send a law enforcement officer to search for Kay and contact Floyd when the officer found Kay. Trusting these statements, Floyd forwent his own search efforts and waited for an officer to contact him about Kay. However, SCRC never transmitted the missing person report to dispatch and no law enforcement officer searched for Kay.

¶ 9 Meanwhile, at 6:00 p.m., local law students began using the courthouse to conduct mock trials. Guardsmark assigned two security officers to facilitate the event while the courthouse remained locked. Around 7:00 p.m., the officers saw Kay pacing outside the main door, stopping periodically to peer inside. The officers noted Kay was cold, sluggish, and shivering because he was underdressed for the ongoing snowstorm and subfreezing temperatures. The temperature outside was then about 26 degrees with a wind chill of 19 degrees Fahrenheit. Kay was thin, weighing just 146 pounds, and was wearing only corduroy slacks and a light jacket. Thinking Kay was homeless or transient, the officers brought him inside the locked courthouse and seated him next to the heater. As they did so, the officers saw Kay was very cold, shaking, and unable to communicate intelligibly.

¶ 10 Around 8:45 p.m., the officers unlocked the main door for the law students to exit. Then, at 9:00 p.m., the officers ushered Kay back outside the courthouse and locked the main door. It was still snowing and the temperature outside was about 27 degrees with a wind chill of 21 degrees Fahrenheit. That night, Kay died of hypothermia, slumped against a garbage container near the front steps of the courthouse. By the time someone found him, he was covered in about two inches of snow. Investigators found his car in the juror parking area covered with snow.

¶ 11 The Mitas sued the County and Guardsmark for wrongful death based on negligence. Both the County and Guardsmark moved successfully for summary judgment, arguing they owed Kay no duty of care. The Mitas appealed.

ANALYSIS

¶ 12 The issue is whether the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the Mitas' negligence suit. The Mitas contend the County and Guardsmark owed Kay a duty of care imposed by common law, specifically the voluntary rescue doctrine and a special relationship.

¶ 13 We review summary judgment de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court. Highline Sch. Dist. No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 87 Wash.2d 6, 15, 548 P.2d 1085 (1976); Mahoney v. Shinpoch, 107 Wash.2d 679, 683, 732 P.2d 510 (1987). Summary judgment is proper if the records on file with the trial court show “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR 56(c). A genuine issue is one upon which reasonable people may disagree; a material fact is one controlling the litigation's outcome. Morris v. McNicol, 83 Wash.2d 491, 494, 519 P.2d 7 (1974); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Pierce County, 164 Wash.2d 545, 552, 192 P.3d 886 (2008). We construe all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Barber v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 81 Wash.2d 140, 142, 500 P.2d 88 (1972); Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). We limit our review to evidence and issues the parties called to the trial court's attention. RAP 9.12.

¶ 14 The threshold issue in a negligence suit is whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, a legal question for the court. Pedroza v. Bryant, 101 Wash.2d 226, 228, 677 P.2d 166 (1984); Bernethy v. Walt Failor's, Inc., 97 Wash.2d 929, 933, 653 P.2d 280 (1982). However, “summary judgment is inappropriate where the existence of a legal duty depends on disputed material facts” requiring jury resolution. Afoa v. Port of Seattle, 176 Wash.2d 460, 466, 296 P.3d 800 (2013); see Sjogren v. Props. of Pac. Nw., LLC, 118 Wash.App. 144, 148, 75 P.3d 592 (2003). A duty is “ ‘an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.’ ” Transam. Title Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Wash.2d 409, 413, 693 P.2d 697 (1985) (quoting William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 53, at 331 (3d ed.1964)). Whether a duty exists depends on “mixed considerations of ‘logic, common sense, justice, policy, and precedent.’ ” Snyder v. Med. Serv. Corp. of E. Wash., 145 Wash.2d 233, 243, 35 P.3d 1158 (2001) (quoting Lords v. N. Auto. Corp., 75 Wash.App. 589, 596, 881 P.2d 256 (1994)).

¶ 15 We begin with whether the County owed Kay a duty of care. A local government is liable in tort “to the same extent as if [it] were a private person or corporation.” RCW 4.96.010(1). Applying this liability can be problematic because statutes, ordinances, and administrative rules mandate that public entities perform many functions private entities do not. Munich v. Skagit Emergency Commc'ns Ctr., 175 Wash.2d 871, 887, 288 P.3d 328 (2012) (Chambers, J., concurring).² Thus, where a plaintiff alleges the public entity breached a duty imposed by statute, ordinance, or administrative rule, we must employ the public duty doctrine as a tool analyzing whether the legislative body intended the duty to extend to the general public or a particular class of individuals. Id. at 888, 288 P.3d 328. If the public entity owes this legislatively mandated duty to the general public, it does not owe the duty to any particular person harmed by its breach. See id. at 888–90, 288 P.3d 328. This limitation ensures the public entity has no greater liability than private entities. See id. at 886, 894, 288 P.3d...