Mitchell v. Anderson (In re Mitchell), Case No. 13–14494

• Decision Date: 28 January 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 13–14494,Adversary Proceeding No. 15–1006
• Citation: 545 B.R. 209
• Parties: In re: Luann Mitchell, Debtor. Luann Mitchell, Plaintiff, v. Wilfred Louis Anderson, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Ohio

545 B.R. 209

In re: Luann Mitchell, Debtor.Luann Mitchell, Plaintiff,

v.Wilfred Louis Anderson, Defendant.

Case No. 13–14494

Adversary Proceeding No. 15–1006

United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio.

Signed January 28, 2016

Luann Mitchell, Richmond Hts., OH, pro se.

Wilfred Louis Anderson, Cleveland, OH, pro se.

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION¹

ARTHUR I. HARRIS, UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

This adversary proceeding involves a pro se debtor, whose Ohio law license has been suspended, and a pro se creditor, whose Ohio medical license has been revoked. Luann Mitchell, the pro se debtor, seeks damages against Wilfred Anderson, the pro se creditor, for prosecuting multiple lawsuits against her in state courts in violation of the automatic stay and the discharge injunction entered in her bankruptcy case. The Court conducted a trial in this case on October 28, 2015, and gave the debtor until November 30, 2015, to file additional documentation in support of her claim for damages. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Anderson willfully violated the automatic stay but did not knowingly violate the discharge injunction. The Court declines to award damages beyond the $1,137.50 already awarded the debtor in state court for the same conduct, other than $72 in costs incurred in the prosecution of the automatic stay portion of this adversary proceeding.

JURISDICTION

This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (O). This Court has jurisdiction over core proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a)and 1334and Local General Order No.2012–7 entered by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This adversary proceeding is the latest in a series of proceedings and contested matters arising under the debtor's main bankruptcy case. It is also one of many proceedings, most of which have been litigated in state courts, between the debtor and Anderson. To provide context, the Court will briefly describe the other adversary proceedings and contested matter arising under the debtor's bankruptcy case, none of which directly involve the longstanding dispute between the debtor and Anderson.

A. Other Adversary Proceedings and Contested Matters in the Debtor's Bankruptcy Case

1. Debtor's Homestead Exemption and Motion to Avoid Judicial Liens

On July 26, 2013, Mitchell commenced her first adversary proceeding seeking a determination that she had a valid homestead exemption. (Adv.Proc. No. 13–1180). On November 18, 2013, attorney James MacDonald entered an appearance on the debtor's behalf and, two days later, voluntary dismissed Adv. Proc. No. 13–1180. The issue of whether the debtor had a valid homestead exemption and could avoid judicial liens that impaired her homestead exemption was instead litigated as a contested matter within the debtor's main bankruptcy case. On April 30, 2014, the Court determined that the debtor could avoid the judicial liens, even though the debtor had previously made sworn statements disavowing her ownership of the property she now claimed as her homestead, presumably to delay foreclosure efforts. Although the Court noted that "[t]he debtor's behavior may reflect negatively on her overall honesty and credibility," the Court found that, under Law v. Siegel, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 188 L.Ed.2d 146 (2014), the debtor's prior conduct did not prevent her from amending her claim of exemption. (Docket No. 84 in Case No. 13–14494).

2. Dischargeability of Two State Court Judgments

On September 30, 2013, the creditor Western Reserve Area Agency on Agency, which held judgment liens against the debtor, filed an adversary proceeding to determine that its judgments were nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523. (Adv.Proc. No. 13–1222). On November 21, 2014, the Court granted in part the creditor's motion for summary judgment, holding nondischargeable a 2006 state probate court judgment assessing sanctions of $32,154.79 in attorney's fees and expenses against the debtor. The Court held that a separate sanctions judgment entered against the debtor by the Ohio Court of Appeals was dischargeable. (Docket No. 47 in Adv. Proc. No. 13–1222).

3. Dischargeability of Costs Associated with State Court Disciplinary Proceedings

On September 30, 2013, the debtor commenced an adversary proceeding against the Supreme Court of Ohio seeking a determination that the costs associated with disciplinary proceedings against her were dischargeable. (Adv. Proc. No. 13–1227). On November 18, 2013, attorney MacDonald entered an appearance on behalf of the debtor and filed an amended complaint. The Court heard the matter based on joint stipulations of fact. On March 17, 2014, the Court held that the costs assessed against the debtor by the Ohio Supreme Court in 2008 were nondischargeable. (Docket No. 16 in Adv. Proc. No. 13–1227). On April 6, 2015, U.S. District Judge Christopher A. Boyko affirmed the decision of this Court. Mitchell v. Supreme Court of Ohio, No. 1:14CV924, 2015 WL 1530626 (N.D.Ohio Apr. 6, 2015).

B. The Current Adversary Proceeding (No. 15–1006)

On January 12, 2015, the debtor filed the current adversary proceeding against Wilfred Anderson seeking damages and attorney's fees under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)for alleged violations of the automatic stay. Although the pro se complaint does not specifically address violations of the discharge injunction, the Court has construed the complaint as also seeking to recover under a civil contempt theory for violations of the discharge injunction. See Pertuso v. Ford, 233 F.3d 417 (6th Cir.2000); Badovick v. Greenspan (In re Greenspan), No. 10–8019, 464 B.R. 61, 2011 WL 310703 (6th Cir. BAP Feb. 2, 2011)(unpublished table decision).

This adversary proceeding is but one part of the debtor's efforts to end "a long-standing, acrimonious dispute" with Anderson. Anderson v. Mitchell, No. 1:14 CV 276, 2014 WL 3749316, *1 (N.D.Ohio July 29, 2014). Since 2010, Anderson has repeatedly and unsuccessfully alleged—before law enforcement agencies, prosecutors' offices, and courts—that the debtor stole the cremated remains of a deceased woman whom Anderson claims was his wife. See id.; Anderson v. Mitchell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99876, 2014-Ohio-1058, 2014 WL 1327763 (2014).

On March 18, 2015, Anderson answered the complaint by claiming that: (1) the debtor did not list him as a creditor until January 7, 2015; (2) the debtor has been inconsistent regarding the ownership of property that she listed as exempt in her bankruptcy; (3) the debtor failed to advise state courts of her bankruptcy case in a timely manner because she wanted to pursue counterclaims in certain cases; (4) the debtor omitted her state court counterclaims against him from her bankruptcy schedules; (5) the debtor failed to report income in her bankruptcy case; and (6) omissions in the debtor's bankruptcy petition and schedules constituted "deceit, fraud, and perjury."

On August 14, 2015, the Court issued an amended briefing and scheduling order which scheduled trial for October 28, 2015, and outlined special trial procedures to avoid contravening an existing state court protection order prohibiting direct contact between Anderson and the debtor (Docket No. 47). The Court arranged for Anderson and the debtor to appear from separate, remote locations, with live three-way video between the courtroom and the two remote locations. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9017; Fed. R. Civ. P. 43; Parkhurst v. Belt, 567 F.3d 995, 1002 (8th Cir.2009)(affirming trial court's use of contemporaneous transmission in civil case under Civil Rule 43). The Court sent a copy of the trial order to the state court judge who issued the protection order to ensure that the procedure did not contravene the existing protection order and gave both Anderson and the debtor ample time to seek modification of the protection order if either party was concerned that the trial procedures would contravene the protection order.

On October 28, 2015, Anderson declined to attend the trial and instead asked that the Court take judicial notice of the state court protection order (Docket No. 102). The Court denied Anderson's motion because specific procedures had already been arranged to ensure that the trial did not contravene the state court protection order and Anderson had more than two months to seek clarification or modification of the protection order from the state court (Docket No. 103). Furthermore, the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment does not apply to civil or bankruptcy cases. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 440 n. 16, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960)("[The Sixth Amendment] is specifically limited to 'criminal prosecutions.' "); Denh Nhiet Chu v. Lara (In re Denh Nhiet Chu), Adv. No. 06–01031, 2008 WL 8444805, *10–11 (9th Cir. BAP Mar. 18, 2008)(adversary proceeding brought under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9)is a civil proceeding and the Confrontation Clause applies only to criminal cases). Had he chosen to appear, Anderson would have had the opportunity to cross examine the debtor, albeit without physically being in the same room. This proceeding is civil, not criminal, and is unlike the state criminal contempt proceeding held on October 29, 2015, where Anderson had appointed counsel and a Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses.

The October 28, 2015, trial proceeded in Anderson's absence with the debtor testifying from a remote location. The Court admitted plaintiff's Exhibits A through T without objection but asked the debtor to submit additional evidence to document and corroborate certain expenses claimed on plaintiff's Exhibit P. Fed. R. Evid. 1006; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9017. On November 30, 2015, the debtor filed a supplement to her Exhibit P (Docket No. 108) [hereinafter "debtor's supplement"]. This memorandum constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The findings of fact contained in this memorandum of opinion reflect the Court's weighing of the...