Mitchell v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PICKENS CTY. SCH. DIST. A, Civ. A. No. 73-634.
| Decision Date | 30 October 1973 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 73-634. |
| Citation | 380 F. Supp. 197 |
| Parties | Ann MITCHELL, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PICKENS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT A and Dr. Curtis A. Sidden, Superintendent of Pickens County School District A, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Bruce E. Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbia, S. C., for defendants.
This matter is before the Court upon motion to dismiss based upon res judicata.
The plaintiff was formerly employed by the Pickens County School District as a Spanish teacher at Easley High School, and this action is brought on behalf of the plaintiff and all others similarly situated seeking to have the maternity leave policies of the school district declared violative of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and (2). She also seeks back pay in the amount of the salary she could have earned during the year 1972-73 and asks a preliminary and permanent injunction against the defendants to prevent them from continuing the alleged discriminatory policies with regard to pregnancy.
In April 1972 the plaintiff learned that she was pregnant and informed the principal of her condition. She advised that she would deliver the child about November 6, 1972. She requested that she be re-employed for the 1972-73 school year and that she be given an excused absence from November 1, 1972 until the reconvening of school following Christmas holidays on January 2, 1973. The plaintiff advised that she would arrange with a Mrs. Carter to serve as her substitute during the period of her planned absence, and although Mrs. Carter was not qualified for certification to teach Spanish, the plaintiff would prepare lesson plans, tapes and other instructional aids and coach Mrs. Carter as to how to conduct the classes.
Thereafter the defendant Dr. Curtis A. Sidden objected to plaintiff's proposal and plaintiff and defendant Sidden held a conference at which time the plaintiff advised Dr. Sidden that his decision not to renew her contract for the 1972-73 school year was predicated upon the maternity leave provisions printed in the "Manual for Teachers", which provides as follows:
Dr. Sidden advised the plaintiff that the above quoted section set forth a procedure for fixing the termination date of pregnant teachers under contract, who were scheduled to deliver a child during the course of the school year, and was not relevant to her case, since she was not then under contract for the 1972-73 year. He further explained that he could not recommend the renewal of her contract because it was then foreseeable that she would be absent for approximately two months after beginning of the school year and he wished to minimize and hopefully avoid any teacher activity interruption, particularly where there would be two interruptions, such as the plaintiff leaving on November 1, a substitute coming in for two months and then the return of the plaintiff after the Christmas vacation.
In May 1972 the Board of Trustees adopted the recommendation of the Superintendent that Mrs. Mitchell's contract not be renewed for the school year 1972-73 pursuant to the district's established policy of not hiring or rehiring any one who, for any reason, foreseeably would be unable to complete the school year without extended absence.
The plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against the defendants with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on August 22, 1972. The EEOC issued a determination on January 19, 1973 that the defendants were guilty of a violation of the Equal Opportunity Employment Act by the refusal to renew plaintiff's employment contract because of her pregnancy. Plaintiff alleges that defendants have declined to enter into any conciliation agreement recognizing the EEOC decision. Plaintiff further alleges that on or about March 12, 1973 she was notified by the Justice Department that it would not file suit. She thereupon instituted her present action within 90 days of such notice as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5(f)(1).
The plaintiff brought a prior suit based upon the identical facts, with the exception of the matters involving the EEOC. In the former action she alleged that the defendants' pregnancy policy was unconstitutional and violative of her rights, privileges and immunities under the Fourteenth Amendment and under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. In an order of this Court dated April 3, 1973, a summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendants on the basis of Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973). Cohen held that there was no violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment based upon similar circumstances.
Defendants contend that this Court's decision in the prior suit bars the plaintiff's present action, while plaintiff asserts that the present action is one created by statute and is separate and distinct from the former action brought to remedy alleged unconstitutional discrimination.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the requirements for the application of the doctrine of res judicata are: (1) the former judgment must have been valid and final; (2) the cause of action asserted in the subsequent litigation must be the same cause of action as was asserted in the former litigation; (3) the former judgment must have been rendered on the merits; and (4) the parties to the former judgment must stand in such relationship to the parties in the subsequent action as to entitle the latter to the benefits and subject them to the burdens of the prior litigation. Thomas v. Consolidation Coal Co. 380 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1967). The question before this court is whether the cause of action asserted in this litigation is the same as that in the prior suit.
In Norman v. Missouri Pacific Railroad 414 F.2d 73 (8th Cir. 1969) the Court held that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar a suit brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act where the plaintiffs have previously had judgment rendered against them in suits brought under the Railroad Labor Act. The Norman plaintiffs were black train porters who charged that only blacks were hired as porters and that they were denied employment opportunities which were afforded to whites.
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...54 L.Ed.2d 190 (1977); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(b) & Comments; but see Mitchell v. Board of Trustees of Pickens County Sch. Dist. A, 380 F.Supp. 197, 200 (D.S.C.1973) ("Civil Rights Act creates a cause of action which is separate and distinct from [prior] cause of act......
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