Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp.

• Decision Date: 11 August 1992
• Docket Number: No. 1604,D,1604
• Parties: 59 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 887, 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,663, 61 USLW 2101 Lucille Qualls WOODS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DUNLOP TIRE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. ocket 92-7198.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 36

972 F.2d 36

59 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 887,

59 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,663, 61 USLW 2101

Lucille Qualls WOODS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DUNLOP TIRE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1604, Docket 92-7198.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued May 28, 1992.

Decided Aug. 11, 1992.

James P. Davis, Buffalo, N.Y., for plaintiff-appellant.

Stanford G. Wilson, Atlanta, Ga. (S. Melissa Andrews, Elarbee, Thompson & Trapnell), for defendant-appellee.

Samuel A. Marcosson, Atty., Donald R. Livingston, Gen. Counsel, Gwendolyn Young Reams, Associate Gen. Counsel, Vincent J. Blackwood, Asst. Gen. Counsel, E.E.O.C., Office of Gen. Counsel, Washington, D.C., submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae E.E.O.C.

Before MINER, WALKER, and RONEY ^*, Circuit Judges.

MINER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-appellant Lucille Qualls Woods appeals from a summary judgment entered on January 23, 1992 in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Elfvin, J.) in favor of defendant-appellee Dunlop Tire Corporation ("Dunlop"). In her complaint, Woods alleged that Dunlop, her former employer, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) and (k), by terminating her employment on the basis of race and gender. Prior to the filing of the complaint, the New York State Division of Human Rights ("DHR") had determined that there was probable cause to believe that Woods was the victim of discrimination and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") had issued a Notice of Right to Sue.

The district court concluded that Woods' Title VII claim was barred by res judicata because she failed to raise the claim in a previous action she had commenced prior to the DHR and EEOC determinations. Woods was unsuccessful in the previous action, in which she alleged that Dunlop's termination of her employment violated the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185. Woods now contends that the district court erred in applying res judicata because the LMRA action implicated a claim separate and distinct from Woods' Title VII claim. She asserts also that the application of res judicata is contrary to the Title VII scheme, since she was awaiting the outcome of administrative proceedings during litigation of the LMRA claim. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

BACKGROUND

Lucille Qualls Woods was employed by Dunlop from March 1976 until July 1985. Eight months prior to the time that Woods' pension was to vest, Dunlop fired her. Dunlop asserted that it terminated Woods' employment because she was physically unable to perform all of the functions required of her as a "Utility Person," and that she was not qualified for any other available position within the company. Woods, on the other hand, believed she was fired because she was black and female.

Woods subsequently filed a grievance with her union, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, Local No. 135 ("the Union"). In the grievance, Woods challenged the dismissal and demanded to be rehired. On June 15, 1985, Dunlop denied the grievance, and on July 23, 1985, an arbitrator also denied the grievance.

On July 31, 1985, Woods filed charges against Dunlop with the EEOC and the DHR, alleging that her employment was terminated because of her race and/or sex.

On December 4, 1985, while the administrative proceedings were still pending, Woods filed a complaint against Dunlop and the Union in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York ("Woods I"). In her complaint, Woods alleged that Dunlop violated section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185, by firing her in violation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. That action was commenced shortly before the six-month statute of limitations period for LMRA claims was to expire. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2294, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (borrowing six-month limitations period from section 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)). In Woods I, Woods also asserted that the Union had breached its duty of fair representation during the arbitration. Dunlop and the Union moved for summary judgment, asserting that Woods' termination did not violate the LMRA. By Memorandum and Order dated June 22, 1988, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Dunlop and the Union and dismissed Woods' complaint.

On August 3, 1988, the DHR found that there was probable cause to believe that Woods had been the victim of discrimination.

Two years later, on November 21, 1990, the EEOC concluded its administrative process with respect to the charges and issued a Notice of Right to Sue.

After the issuance of the EEOC right to sue letter, Woods commenced the present action ("Woods II") in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. In her complaint, dated February 18, 1991, Woods alleged that Dunlop violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., by wrongfully discharging her from employment with the company on the basis of her race and gender. Thereafter, Dunlop moved for summary judgment on the ground of res judicata, because Woods "could have raised the race and sex discrimination claims she is asserting in Woods II during the pendency of Woods I." By Memorandum and Order dated January 13, 1992, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Dunlop. In doing so, the district court "conclude[d] that the plaintiff could have raised her Title VII claim in Woods I and that all prerequisites to the application of res judicata have been met."

It is from this grant of summary judgment that Woods now appeals. Woods argues that the doctrine of res judicata "is inapplicable in this case" because the causes of action in Woods I and Woods II were separate and distinct, and because a Title VII plaintiff has the right to full administrative review prior to instituting a lawsuit, which in this case could not be completed in time to join the Title VII claim with the LMRA claim.

DISCUSSION

[A] judgment upon the merits in one suit is res judicata in another where the parties and subject-matter are the same, not only as respects matters actually presented to sustain or defeat the right asserted, but also as respects any other available matter which might have been presented to that end.

Grubb v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Ohio, 281 U.S. 470, 479, 50 S.Ct. 374, 378, 74 L.Ed. 972 (1930); see also Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597, 68 S.Ct. 715, 719, 92 L.Ed. 898 (1948) ("the parties to the suit and their privies are thereafter bound 'not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose' ") (quoting Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1877)); Harborside Refrigerated Servs., Inc. v. Vogel, 959 F.2d 368, 372 (2d Cir.1992); Saud v. Bank of New York, 929 F.2d 916, 919-20 (2d Cir.1991). Thus, res judicata or claim preclusion "prevents a party from litigating any issue or defense that could have been raised or decided in a previous suit, even if the issue or defense was not actually raised or decided." Clarke v. Frank, 960 F.2d 1146, 1150 (2d Cir.1992); see also Greenberg v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 968 F.2d 164, 168 (2d Cir.1992); compare Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n. 1, 104 S.Ct. 892, 894 n. 1, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984) (collateral estoppel or "[i]ssue preclusion refers to the effect of a judgment in foreclosing relitigation of a matter that has been litigated and decided."). "Whether or not the first judgment will have preclusive effect depends in part on whether the same transaction or connected series of transactions is at issue, whether the same evidence is needed to support both claims, and whether the facts essential to the second were present in the first." NLRB v. United Technologies, 706 F.2d 1254, 1260 (2d Cir.1983).

Woods first claims that the district court erred in applying res judicata because the causes of action in Woods I and Woods II were separate and distinct. She asserts that "[i]t is abundantly clear that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act ... creates a separate and distinct cause of action from that of the LMRA." This argument fails.

The district court correctly determined that the present action involves the same transaction, and therefore the same cause of action, for res judicata purposes. The factual predicates of the employment termination challenged in Woods I and Woods II were the same. Essentially the same It is this identity of facts surrounding the occurrence which constitutes the cause of action, not the legal theory upon which Woods chose to frame her complaint. See Berlitz Sch. of Languages of Am., Inc. v. Everest House, 619 F.2d 211, 215 (2d Cir.1980) ("[W]hatever legal theory is advanced, when the factual predicate upon which claims are based are substantially identical, the claims are deemed to be duplicative for purposes of res judicata."); Expert Electric, Inc. v. Levine, 554 F.2d 1227, 1234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903, 98 S.Ct. 300, 54 L.Ed.2d 190 (1977); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(b) & Comments; but see Mitchell v. Board of Trustees of Pickens County Sch. Dist. A, 380 F.Supp. 197, 200 (D.S.C.1973) ("Civil Rights Act creates a cause of action which is separate and distinct from [prior] cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause", although "this Court will probably require plaintiffs to raise both [claims] in the same complaint" in future cases). Thus, it is abundantly clear that the two actions involved the same cause of action for res judicata purposes.

                underlying occurrence was relevant to both the LMRA and Title VII claims.   Both actions centered around Dunlop's firing of

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