Mitchell v. Dabney, 22794.

Decision Date08 May 1934
Docket NumberNo. 22794.,22794.
Citation71 S.W.2d 165
PartiesMITCHELL v. DABNEY et al.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

L. Amasa Knox, of Kansas City, and Jesse L. England, of Kirkwood, for plaintiffs in error.

Crittenden E. Clark, of St. Louis, for defendant in error.

McCULLEN, Judge.

This cause has been brought to this court upon a writ of error which was originally issued out of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, finding that it did not have jurisdiction of the cause, transferred it to this court. See Mitchell v. Dabney et al., 58 S.W.(2d) 731. The opinion of the Supreme Court sets forth the facts appearing of record, showing the nature of the case and the various proceedings, as follows:

"The suit is by injunction to restrain the defendant officers of and the Grand Lodge itself from doing certain acts affecting the membership of the plaintiff therein and the paying out of funds of the Masonic Order. The corporate defendant is designated as the Most Worshipful Grand Lodge of Ancient Free and Accepted Masons for the State of Missouri and is alleged to be a fraternal beneficiary association under the laws of this state. The individual defendants are officers of such lodge. This appears to be the Negro Masonic Order, and its membership is limited to males of the Negro race.

"Plaintiff's petition alleges that he is a member in good standing of a subordinate lodge, an integral part of the Grand Lodge, and that he and all members of the subordinate lodges pay certain dues and assessments for the support of the Grand Lodge and its various benevolent activities, including a relief and burial department, from which the beneficiaries of each member in good standing, on the death of such member, are entitled to receive $200 death benefits, and $100 funeral benefits. It is further alleged that under the constitution and by-laws of the Order the Grand Master is entitled to receive no salary except certain fees paid by the subordinate lodges and members for certain designated services, but that the defendant Dabney, on being elected Grand Master in August, 1926, unlawfully and contrary to the Constitution of the Order, has had his salary fixed at, and is being paid, $350 per month, and that he, with the aid and assistance of the other Grand officers, is unlawfully using the benevolent funds of the lodge to pay such salary. It is then alleged that because of plaintiff's criticism of, and opposition to, the alleged illegal use of the lodge funds in this way, such criticism and opposition being voiced in a newspaper published by plaintiff, the said Grand Lodge, acting through its Grand officers, was taking steps and threatening to suspend or expel plaintiff as a member of the Masonic Order in an unlawful manner and by unlawful procedure in violation of the constitution and by-laws of the Order. As the case finally ended in a default judgment, which the trial court refused to set aside, and in view of the disposition which we must make of the case, it will not be necessary to set out at length the charges and countercharges of the pleadings. The original petition was against the individual officers of the Grand Lodge only, Fred W. Dabney, Grand Master, G. B. Key, Grand Treasurer, and George W. Lewis, Deputy Grand Master, but the amended petition, differing little, if any, from the original petition, made or at least attempted to make the Grand Lodge in its corporate capacity a defendant. The prayer for relief is in substance that the court permanently enjoin and restrain the defendants and each of them from suspending or expelling plaintiff from membership in the Order; to prohibit Dabney from collecting or attempting to collect the said $4,200 per year as salary of Grand Master, and to compel the said Dabney to return all moneys so collected to the defendant Grand Lodge; and to prohibit defendants from proceeding with the hearing of any charge against plaintiff until this cause may be heard on its merits; and that a temporary restraining order issue returnable to some day set by this court.

"The original petition was filed August 8, 1927, during the June term of court, returnable to the October term, but the court at once issued a temporary restraining order and set the matter for hearing on August 11, 1927, issuing an order to show cause on that day why an injunction should not be granted as prayed. It should be stated here that the petition alleges that defendant Dabney `is now threatening to either expel or suspend your petitioner from the Order, and that in violation of the laws of the Order has issued a summons for your petitioner to appear before him at Cape Girardeau, Missouri, on the 10th day of August, 1927, and show cause why he should not be suspended or expelled; that the summons to appear before the said defendant at Cape Girardeau, Missouri, was served on your petitioner on August 6, 1927, not in compliance with any law of the Order, but for the mere purpose of humiliating your petitioner and depriving your petitioner of his lawful rights and his standing in his lodge.' The personal defendants voluntarily appeared on August 11, 1927, and filed a return to the order to show cause why the injunction should not be granted, and a hearing and trial of such issues was thereupon had by the court on August 11 and 12, 1927. By their return to the order to show cause, the defendants contended, among other things, that the Grand Lodge, at its annual `communication' or meeting in Kansas City in August, 1926, at which time defendant Dabney was chosen or elected Grand Master, lawfully adopted a resolution fixing his salary at $350 per month in lieu of fees as theretofore, and that he was lawfully receiving same; that the annual communication of the Grand Lodge was composed of certain present and past officers and three delegates from each of the 150 subordinate lodges of the state, was lawfully constituted, and acted lawfully in fixing the salary of the Grand Master. It was further alleged that the annual meeting or communication of the Grand Lodge was then (August 11, 1927) regularly in session at Cape Girardeau, Mo., and that it was true that charges had been preferred against plaintiff, a notice and copy of which had been served on him in due and legal form on August 6, 1927, and same was properly for hearing at such annual communication of the Grand Lodge, where plaintiff might appear and have a fair hearing as provided by the laws of the Order. The return also stated at length the nature of the charges preferred against plaintiff for hearing in the Grand Lodge, consisting largely of articles published by plaintiff in his newspaper highly derogatory of the action of the Grand Lodge and its officers in fixing and paying the Grand Master $350 per month salary. This is but a meager outline of the return or answer which prays that the temporary restraining order be dissolved and the Grand Lodge and defendants as its officers be allowed to proceed without interference, and that the petition of the plaintiff herein be held for naught and dismissed.

"Thereupon on such hearing the court on August 12, 1927 (June term) entered the following judgment:

"`Now, at this day, come again the parties hereto by their respective attorneys; thereupon the further hearing on the order to show cause why a temporary injunction should not be granted progressed before the Court and being terminated the same is submitted to the Court upon the plaintiff's bill, the defendants' return thereto as well as the evidence adduced in support thereof; and the Court having heard and duly considered the same and being sufficiently advised thereof doth find in favor of the defendants on the issues herein joined.

"`Wherefore, it is considered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that plaintiff take nothing by his suit in this behalf, that plaintiff's prayer for a temporary injunction be and the same is hereby denied, that the temporary restraining order heretofore made and issued herein on the 8th day of August, 1927, be and the same is hereby dissolved, that the defendants be discharged, go hence without day and recover of plaintiff the costs of this suit and have therefor execution.'

"Thereupon, at said June term of court, the defendants filed a motion to assess damages on the injunction bond which plaintiff had given on filing his petition. No action seems to have been taken on this motion at any time. The June term adjourned.

"At the next or October term, 1927, without the court setting aside or in any way modifying the judgment final in form at least and discharging defendants without day, the plaintiff was permitted by leave of court on November 18, 1927, to file an amended petition. This amended petition, on which at a still later term judgment by default for want of any answer being filed was entered as we shall see, was practically a copy of the original petition, except making the Grand Lodge a party defendant and having a summons issued for it to Jackson county. Whether a valid service was had on the Grand Lodge is one of the mooted questions. The personal defendants, though discharged by the judgment at the previous term of court, entered their appearance to the amended petition, which might be regarded as a new action, by asking and obtaining leave to plead thereto at a later date. This amended petition, however, still contained only the allegations that defendants were threatening and about to expel plaintiff from the Order on charges set for hearing on August 10, 1927, at the annual communication of the Grand Lodge at Cape Girardeau. ...

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4 cases
  • Thompson v. Hodge
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 14 Junio 1961
    ...the trial court to change, amend, or modify after the expiration of thirty days (Rozell v. Rozell, Mo.App., 229 S.W.2d 700; Mitchell v. Dabney, Mo.App., 71 S.W.2d 165; State ex rel. Maple v. Mulloy, 322 Mo. 281, 15 S.W.2d 809; Rosbrugh v. Motley, Mo.App., 216 S.W.2d 165; State ex rel. Caplo......
  • Bryan v. Bryan, 8913
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 23 Febrero 1970
    ...Inc. v. Randall, Mo., 423 S.W.2d 765, 769(5); Irwin v. Burgan, 325 Mo. 309, 317--318, 28 S.W.2d 1017, 1021(7, 8); Mitchell v. Dabney, Mo.App., 71 S.W.2d 165, 169--170. In our view, upon this particular record, the order of March 6 allowing attorney's fees is a superfluity which is of no The......
  • Wells v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Boston, Mass.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 8 Noviembre 1938
    ... ... authorizes the amendment "in affirmance" of the ... judgment appealed from (Mitchell v. Dabney (Mo ... App.), 71 S.W.2d 165, 169), and not, as in the case at ... bar, where the ... ...
  • Wells v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 8 Noviembre 1938
    ...however, that such section, by its terms, only authorizes the amendment "in affirmance" of the judgment appealed from (Mitchell v. Dabney, Mo. App., 71 S.W.2d 165, 169), and not, as in the case at bar, where the judgment is to be reversed for error other than that sought to be corrected by ......

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