Mitchell v. A.F. Evans Company, Inc.
| Decision Date | 23 February 2009 |
| Docket Number | 60259-4-I |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | HENRY BEN MITCHELL, Appellant, v. A.F. EVANS COMPANY, INC. (d/b/a A.F. EVANS MANAGEMENT GROUP), SOUTHEAST EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT (a/k/a and= christina= |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Henry Ben Mitchell appeals the trial court's summary judgment order dismissing his claims for disability and racial discrimination under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), chapter 49.60 RCW, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring and supervision intentional interference with economic advantage, and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because Mitchell neither shows that he was treated differently from tenants outside of his protected class who engaged in similar misconduct nor provides a medical nexus between his disability and need for accommodation, he fails to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Mitchell's other claims also lack merit because evidence in the record shows that all of the actions taken against Mitchell were based on his violation of the lease agreement and protection order. We, therefore, affirm.
Mitchell is an African American who has a disability under the Fair Housing Act (FHA).[1] In September 2000 he moved into the Lake Washington Apartments managed by A.F. Evans Company. Evans, a California corporation, and Southeast Effective Development (SEED), a Washington nonprofit corporation, are members of a limited liability company that owns the apartments. As a tenant, Mitchell signed a lease agreement listing rules governing the apartments. The agreement included specific rules prohibiting harassment by residents and requiring residents to reasonably cooperate with security personnel.
In May 2004 Evans hired Christina King as the community manager of the apartments.[2] Soon afterwards, Mitchell complained to King about finding urine in a clothes dryer. Mitchell claimed that King seemed "indifferent" to his complaint while King asserted that Mitchell called her a racist when she refused to follow him to the laundry room. Similar events followed, although none led to actions taken against Mitchell until July 28, 2004. On that day, Mitchell visited and phoned the management and security office to complain about new security personnel. In these interactions, Mitchell verbally abused and threatened the staff. Security officers escorted Mitchell from the management office, and the Seattle Police Department was contacted for assistance. Due to this incident, King issued a 10-day notice to comply with rental agreement or quit premises.
After this 10-day notice was issued, there was an increase in both the frequency and threatening nature of Mitchell's contacts with the management and staff. As a result, on August 2, 2004, King issued a 20-day notice to terminate tenancy. This 20-day notice stated that Mitchell's tenancy ended on August 31, 2004.
Following the advice of the police department, King petitioned the King County Superior Court for a temporary order of protection on the next day. The court granted King's petition, and, on August 17, 2004, it issued an order of protection valid for one year. The protection order required Mitchell to stay at least 50 feet away from King, her residence, and the management office. The order further directed Mitchell to communicate with the office only in writing or through an attorney.
About the same time the one-year protection order was entered Mitchell's counsel, Charles Hamilton, mailed a letter dated August 3, 2004, to Evans' corporate office in Oakland, California. King later received this letter by facsimile. In the letter, Hamilton requested a written explanation for the 10-day notice. He also asserted that Mitchell "is a handicapped individual who is protected by Washington's Law Against Discrimination." Hamilton stated:
I would agree that Mr. Mitchell is loud . . . and repetitive at times. These are manifestations, in part, of his disability. On the other hand, your employees certainly should have been around Mr. Mitchell long enough to know that what they find objectionable is his personality and is not the kind of threatening verbal behavior which warrants their threats to him of eviction or contacting the police.
According to King, this letter was the first time she was notified about Mitchell's disability.
On August 20, 2004, Mitchell filed charges of disability and racial discrimination with the Seattle Office for Civil Rights (SOCR). In the SOCR complaint, Mitchell alleged that King harassed him, falsely accused him of illegal activities and issued the 20-day notice to vacate based on his race. Mitchell also claimed that the management staff treated African American residents differently in violation of the FHA, with evictions targeting African Americans since King's tenure. Finally, Mitchell claimed that King's refusal to respond to Hamilton's letter, which served as notice of his disability, constituted a failure to accommodate under the FHA.
One month later, on September 22, 2004, King called the Seattle police to report that Mitchell was violating the order. After calling the police twice that day, around 6:30 p.m., King flagged down a police car and told Officer Christopher Johnson that Mitchell had violated the order by phoning her. Mitchell explained to Johnson that he had a friend call to complain about a broken heater. But Johnson reported, "At the time of the arrest, I saw no evidence of a broken heater and Mr. Mitchell's apartment did not seem cold." Believing that there was probable cause, Johnson arrested Mitchell.
On the same day as Mitchell's arrest, a three-day notice to terminate tenancy was posted and mailed to Mitchell. The notice stated that Mitchell had failed to comply with the 10-day notice and had violated the protection order on "several occasions, including but not limited to August 23, August 25, September 4, September 8 and September 16." When Mitchell did not vacate as required by the three-day notice, Evans initiated an unlawful detainer action, with the summons and complaint served on Mitchell on October 10, 2004. Mitchell never responded to the summons, and a default judgment was entered on October 21, 2004.
Mitchell was arrested a second time for violating the protection order on October 28, 2004, around 1:50 p.m. On that day, Mitchell followed King from the laundry room to the maintenance office and demanded to have his carpet cleaned. King repeatedly told Mitchell to leave the office. When King threatened to call the police, Mitchell left the maintenance office and walked back to the laundry room where he remained for about 30 minutes, staring at her. King called security to escort her back to the main office. Security Officer Mark Fields walked King back to her office, with Mitchell following them and calling out to them. Mitchell then called the office about six times that afternoon.
King phoned the police, and Officer David Ellithorpe arrived. King furnished Ellithorpe with a copy of the protection order and a written statement.
King's supervisor, Lindy Harvey, and Fields also reported that Mitchell had been violating the protection order. Before going to Mitchell's apartment, Ellithorpe received a report that Mitchell had also called 911, stating that he was having a verbal dispute with King and that he wanted an officer to come to the complex. But when Ellithorpe, accompanied by two other officers, knocked on Mitchell's door, Mitchell refused to answer. The officers were turning to leave when they learned that Mitchell had called the precinct wanting to know why three officers were at his door. The officers returned and arrested Mitchell. Mitchell was charged with violating the protection order, and the court found probable cause for his detention. Mitchell was able to secure bail and moved from the Lake Washington Apartments to another Section 8 apartment building on October 30, 2004.
On February 25, 2005, the SOCR completed its investigation into Mitchell's claims and concluded that "no reasonable cause exists to believe that an unfair practice has occurred with respect to your charge of discrimination." Mitchell was informed that he had 30 days to appeal the findings to the Seattle Human Rights Commission. The record contains no evidence that Mitchell appealed this decision.
On June 30, 2005, Mitchell was tried before a jury for violating the protection order and acquitted. Over a year later, on August 24, 2006, Mitchell filed a complaint against King, Evans, and SEED, alleging disability and racial discrimination under the WLAD, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring and supervision, intentional interference with economic advantage, and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment on April 20, 2007, supported by eleven declarations.[3] On June 8, 2007, the court granted the summary judgment motion but denied Evans' motion for attorney fees and costs under CR 11 and RCW 4.84.185.
We review an order of summary judgment de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court.[4] Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.[5] The party opposing the motion must produce specific facts that establish an issue of material fact.[6] Summary judgment is proper if, based on all the evidence, the court is satisfied that reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion.[7]
The trial court's denial of fees under RCW 4.84.185 and sanctions under CR 11 is reviewed for abuse of...
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