Mitchell v. Hood
| Decision Date | 02 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-5875 SECTION "L" (2) |
| Parties | KIANA AARON MITCHELL v. BRETT HOOD |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Before the Court are four Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by subpoenaed non-parties to the case at bar. R. Docs. 118, 121, 125, and 128. The Court has reviewed the briefs and the applicable law, and now issues this Order & Reasons.
This case involves a run-off election between Plaintiff Kiana Aaron Mitchell and Judge Ernestine Teena Anderson-Trahan for Second City Court Judge for the City of New Orleans, which took place Saturday, December 8, 2012. Specifically, this case pertains to a negative campaign postcard mailed to Algiers residents before the run-off election, which accused the Plaintiff of assaulting a pregnant woman. The campaign postcard indicated that it was "[p]aid for by B. Hood," and listed a Washington, D.C., address as the return address. An investigation revealed that the named individual, Brett Hood, resided at the address referenced in the postcard.
On September 19, 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant Brett Hood ("Hood") seeking damages for "falsely attacking [Plaintiff's] fitness for public service and revealing personal information about [Plaintiff] in a manner that was injurious to [her] personal, professional and political reputation . . ." R. Doc. 1. Mitchell also avows that she is entitled to damages for invasion of privacy generally. R. Doc. 1 at 11. Hood filed an answer denying the allegations and subsequently moved to amend his answer to add a third party complaint, naming Kelvin P. McClinton ("McClinton") and Judge Trahan, Plaintiff's opponent in the Second City Court judicial race, as third party defendants to the suit. In the third party complaint, Hood asserts claims against McClinton and Judge Trahan of fraud, misrepresentation, abuse of right, identity theft, and injuries to his personal and professional reputation for placing his name on the mailer without his permission. In turn, on March 17, 2014 Plaintiff amended her complaint naming McClinton as an additional defendant. R. Doc. 30.
On March 24, 2014, Judge Trahan filed a motion to strike Plaintiff's complaint in accordance with Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 971 and award attorney's fees because Plaintiff did not meet her burden of establishing a probability of success on the merits. The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 971.2 provides that a cause of action relating to the exercise of an individual's right of free speech "in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established a probability of success on the claim." Judge Trahan argued that this Court should strike the Plaintiff's complaint because Plaintiff failed to establish that a contractual or fiduciary relationship exists with respect to her abuse of right claims. Alternatively, Judge Trahan argued that this Court treat Plaintiff's causes of action as defamation claims. As such, she argued that this Court should strike the complaint because the information contained in the political postcard was true.
The Court did not rule on the merits of the motion but found that more discovery was necessary to resolve the motion. R. Doc. 60. The Court therefore ordered the parties to conduct additional discovery on the issue of who made the statements on the postcard and who authorized the postcard. R. Doc. 60 at 6. Judge Trahan filed a motion for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which the Court granted on May 2, 2014. The Fifth Circuitissued a per curiam opinion on June 4, 2015, finding that Judge Trahan could not be properly impleaded into the case under Federal Rule of Procedure 14. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit held that Hood's claims against Judge Trahan are not contingent upon Mitchell's claims against Hood because whether Mitchell proves that Hood made defamatory statements in the postcard does not govern Hood's claims against Judge Trahan. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case back to this Court and ordered the Court to dismiss Judge Trahan.
Over the course of the litigation, Mitchell has made statements regarding Hood's potential liability on the merits. Mitchell included a declaration by Hood as an exhibit in Mitchell's response to Judge Trahan's 971 motion. R. Doc. 53-1. Mitchell then made statements regarding Hood's position that Hood did not author any of the statements contained in the postcard. See, e.g., R. Doc. 53 at 10 (). Notably, Mitchell has argued before this Court that "Hood Did Not Commit An Act in Furtherance of His Right to Free Speech." R. Doc. 53 at 9.
Upon remand, this Court dismissed the defendant's impleader and proceeded with the case. R. Doc. 90. The Plaintiff noticed depositions of various non-litigant witnesses and had subpoenas issued for their attendance.
There are four separate motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction filed in this case. R. Docs. 118, 121, 125, 128. Each of the motions is filed by one of the parties currently subject to a subpoena: Jacques Morial, Ernestine Anderson-Trahan, Tamara Griffin-Major, and Lillian Dunn. The movants' arguments are largely in accord. Each movant contends that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because there is no real case orcontroversy between Mitchell and Hood. To support this position, movants argue that: 1) parties subject to a subpoena have standing to attack subject matter jurisdiction; 2) Mitchell extinguished any case or controversy when she judicially adopted Hood's defenses; and 3) Mitchell cannot meet the sufficient amount in controversy for diversity jurisdiction.
Movants argue that they are entitled to attack this Court's subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that a court without jurisdiction cannot issue a valid subpoena. See, e.g., R. Doc. 118-1 at 5. Movants cite Supreme Court and district court case law, both of which suggest that "the subpoena power of a court cannot be more extensive than its jurisdiction." United States Catholic Conf. v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76 (1988); Billings v. Aeropres Corp., 522 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1130 (E.D. Ark. 2007) (). Movants also contend that a subpoenaed non-party has standing to assert a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. R. Doc. 118-1 at 5.
Turning to this Court's jurisdiction, movants rest their motions to dismiss on Article III's case or controversy requirement for a federal court proceeding. R. Doc. 118-1 at 6-7 (citing Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987). Movants argue that Plaintiff Mitchell judicially admitted in proceedings before this Court and the Fifth Circuit that Hood is not liable to her in. R. Doc. 118-1 at 6-7. Movants reference the five-prong test for a judicial admission, and cite specific pleadings by Mitchell that allegedly qualify as judicial admissions. R. Doc. 118-1 at 6-7.
Movants quote Mitchell's pleadings and suggest that Mitchell conceded that Hood was not responsible for the campaign postcard. Movants further argue that Hood engaged in nospeech. R. Doc. 118-1 at 6. Movants then contend that if this Court finds that Mitchell judicially admitted that Hood committed no injury to Mitchell, this Court must void its subpoenas and dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. R. Doc. 118-1 at 7-9.
The motions of Major and Dunn largely repeat and adopt the preceding arguments. Movant Trahan, however, presents one additional argument—Trahan contends that Mitchell cannot present evidence that she meets the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum. R. Doc. 121-2 at 7. Trahan notes that the loss of political office has never been recognized as a compensable property right. R. Doc. 121-2 at 8. Trahan then asserts that Mitchell's claims for "injury to professional reputation," "injury to personal reputation," and "injury to political reputation" cannot reach the $75,000 limit. Trahan claims that no precedent exists for the award of reputational damages under the "abuse of rights" cause of action. Trahan does not address Hood's claims for invasion of privacy pursuant to the "abuse of rights" cause of action.
Mitchell timely responds. R. Doc. 140. Mitchell contests movants' argument that the statements at issue are judicial admissions. Mitchell notes that all of the statements cited by movants were given in regards to Trahan's Article 971 motion. R. Doc. 140 at 2-8. Mitchell cites briefs provided by both parties, noting in particular that the Fifth Circuit was presented with this argument. R. Doc. 140 at 3-5. Mitchell then characterizes her citations to Hood's theory of the case as evidentiary admissions, and argues that evidentiary admissions do not have the same preclusive effect as judicial admissions. R. Doc. 140 at 6-8.
Mitchell denies movants' assertion that no live case or controversy exists. Mitchell contends that Hood "played a role," in the attack on Mitchell, and that this position is sufficient to create an adversarial conflict for purposes of Article III's case or controversy requirement. R.Doc. 140 at 8. Mitchell also argues that many of the movants' cited examples of collusion are truly adversarial in nature. R. Doc. 140 at 9-11.
Lastly, Mitchell asserts that the case at bar meets the $75,000 amount in controversy requirement for subject matter jurisdiction. Mitchell cites defamation cases with verdicts in excess of $75,000, and argues that they are analogous to the case at bar. R. Doc. 140 at 11-12. Lastly, he argues that in essence this is a tort...
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