United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc

• Decision Date: 20 June 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-416,87-416
• Parties: UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, et al., Petitioners, v. ABORTION RIGHTS MOBILIZATION, INC., et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

487 U.S. 72

108 S.Ct. 2268

101 L.Ed.2d 69

UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, et al., Petitioners,

v ABORTION RIGHTS MOBILIZATION, INC., et al.

No. 87-416.

Argued April 18, 1988.

Decided June 20, 1988.

Syllabus

Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., and others (ARM) filed suit against Government officials and petitioners, the United States Catholic Conference and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, to revoke the Roman Catholic Church's tax-exempt status on the ground that the Church had violated the antielectioneering provision of 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988 ed.). After petitioners were dismissed as parties, they refused to comply with ARM's subpoenas seeking extensive documentary evidence, and were held in contempt. The Court of Appeals affirmed the contempt citation, ruling that a nonparty witness' jurisdictional challenge is limited to a claim that the district court lacks even colorable jurisdiction, a standard not met here.

Held: A nonparty witness may defend against a civil contempt adjudication by challenging the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction, and is not limited to the contention that the court lacked even colorable jurisdiction to hear the suit. Since a court's subpoena power cannot be more extensive than its jurisdiction, the subpoenas it issues in aid of determining the merits are void if the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying suit. Moreover, a nonparty witness has an unquestionable right to appeal a contempt adjudication, notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment in the underlying action. The contention that permitting a nonparty to challenge the court's jurisdiction would invite collusion, allowing parties to avoid restrictions on interlocutory appeals and to test jurisdiction by proxy, is not persuasive. Ample protections against collusive appeals exist in the courts of appeals' power to decline to treat the witness as a nonparty for purposes of the jurisdictional question, and in the usual provisions for sanctioning frivolous appeals or abuse of court processes. The rule followed in this case does not apply in criminal contempt proceedings, and does not affect a district court's inherent and legitimate authority to issue binding orders, including discovery orders, to nonparty witnesses, as necessary for the court to determine and rule upon its own jurisdiction, including subject-matter jurisdiction. Here, however, the District Court's order was not issued to aid a jurisdictional inquiry, since the subpoenas were meant to obtain discovery on the merits, and before the contempt order the District Court twice ruled that it had subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, on remand, the Court of Appeals must determine whether the District Court had such jurisdiction in the underlying action. If not, the subpoenas are void, and the contempt citation must be reversed. Pp. 76-80.

824 F.2d 156, reversed and remanded.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 80.

Kevin T. Baine, Washington, D.C., for petitioners.

Alan I. Horowitz, Washington, D.C., for the respondents supporting petitioners, by special leave of Court.

Marshall Beil, New York City, for respondents.

Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioners are the United States Catholic Conference and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Both organizations were held in civil contempt for failure to comply with subpoenas duces tecum issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The Conferences objected to issuance of the process, arguing, inter alia, that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in the underlying suit. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected this argument, ruling that a nonparty witness' jurisdictional challenge is limited to a claim that the District Court lacks even colorable jurisdiction, a standard not met here. We granted certiorari to resolve whether a nonparty witness may defend against a civil contempt adjudication by challenging the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district court. 484 U.S. 975, 108 S.Ct. 484, 98 L.Ed.2d 482 (1987). We hold the nonparty witness may raise such a claim, and now reverse.

I

In the underlying action, Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., and others (ARM) sued to revoke the tax-exempt status of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States. ARM alleged that the Conferences had violated the rules governing their tax-exempt status by participating in political activities.^* Specifically, ARM claimed that "the Roman Catholic Church in the United States . . ., in violation of the clear language and intent of the anti-electioneering provision of 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), has engaged in a persistent and regular pattern of intervening in elections nationwide in favor of candidates who support the Church's position on abortion and in opposition to candidates with opposing views." Brief for Respondents 7-8. The Conferences were originally named as parties to this suit, but were later dismissed, leaving the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue as the sole defendants.

ARM served subpoenas on the Conferences in 1983, seeking extensive documentary evidence to support its claims. A series of court orders to produce, intertwined with other procedural motions, were followed by objections and refusals. These matters were extensively reported by the District Court. See Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F.Supp. 471 (1982) (ARM I); Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 552 F.Supp. 364 (1982) ( ARM II); Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 603 F.Supp. 970 (1985) (ARM III); Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Baker, 110 F.R.D. 337 (1986) (ARM IV). After the Conferences informed the court that they could not "in conscience, comply with the subpoenas in question," the court, which had made detailed orders including orders limiting discovery at the behest of the Conferences, found the Conferences in civil contempt. ARM IV, supra, at 337. The court assessed fines of $50,000 against each Conference for each day of further noncompliance. The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that "the witnesses have standing to question only whether the District Court has a colorable basis for exercising subject matter jurisdiction. . . ." In re United States Catholic Conference, 824 F.2d 156, 158 (1987). The order was stayed pending appeal, and the stay remains in effect.

II

We hold that a nonparty witness can challenge the court's lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in defense of a civil contempt citation, notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment in the underlying action. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 grants a district court the power to issue subpoenas as to witnesses and documents, but the subpoena power of a court cannot be more extensive than its jurisdiction. It follows that if a district court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying action, and the process was not issued in aid of determining that jurisdiction, then the process is void and an order of civil contempt based on refusal to honor it must be reversed. As we observed in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642, 70 S.Ct. 357, 363, 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950), "[t]he judicial subpoena power not only is subject to specific constitutional limitations, . . . but also is subject to those limitations inherent in the body that issues them because of the provisions of the Judiciary Article of the Constitution." Therefore, a nonparty witness may attack a civil contempt citation by asserting that the issuing court lacks jurisdiction over the case.

The right of a nonparty to appeal an adjudication of contempt cannot be questioned. The order finding a nonparty witness in contempt is appealable notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment in the underlying action. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532, 91 S.Ct. 1580, 1581, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 328, 60 S.Ct. 540, 542, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940). Once the right to appeal a civil contempt order is acknowledged, arguments in its legitimate support should not be so confined that the power of the issuing court remains untested. We are not confronted here with a nonparty witness attempting to challenge its civil contempt by raising matters in which it has no legitimate interest, for instance the District Court's lack of personal jurisdiction over the parties or a limitations statute that would compel dismissal of the action. As to such matters, even if it were ultimately determined that the court should not have allowed the suit to proceed, the order or process it issued in the conduct of the litigation would still be valid.

The challenge in this case goes to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court and hence its power to issue the order. The distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction and waivable defenses is not a mere nicety of legal metaphysics. It rests instead on the central principle of a free society that courts have finite bounds of authority, some of constitutional origin, which exist to protect citizens from the very wrong asserted here, the excessive use of judicial power. The courts, no less than the political branches of the government, must respect the limits of their authority.

The Court of Appeals found that our decision in Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 39 S.Ct. 468, 63 L.Ed. 979 (1919), controlled its decision, but we think not. Blair involved defiant witnesses in a grand jury investigation. The witnesses refused to testify, contending the grand jury lacked jurisdiction because the statute that prohibited the conduct under investigation was unconstitutional. Id., at 277-279, 39 S.Ct. at 469-470. We affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief to the witnesses and...