Mitchell v. House, 00-10

• Decision Date: 06 September 2000
• Docket Number: 00-10
• Citation: 26 S.W.3d 586
• Parties: Danny MITCHELL v. Kenneth HOUSE and Rhonda House CA 00-10 ___ S.W.3d ___ Opinion delivered
• Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals

Danny MITCHELL v Kenneth HOUSE and Rhonda House

CA 00-10 ___ S.W.3d ___

Opinion delivered September 6, 2000

Court of Appeals of Arkansas

Division IV

Appeal from Randolph Chancery Court; Thomas L. Hilburn, Chancellor; affirmed.

1. Constitutional law -- right to jury trial -- does not extend to equity case. -- The Arkansas Constitution provides that the right of a trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law, without regard to the amount in controversy [Ark. Const. art. 2, § 7]; however, the constitutional right to a jury trial does not extend to an equity case. See Riggin v. Dierdorff, 302 Ark. 517, 790 S.W.2d 897 (1990).

2. Specific performance -- equitable remedy. -- Specific performance is an equitable remedy, cognizable only in equity.

3. Equity -- clean-up doctrine -- operation of. -- Once equity acquired jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the specific-performance issue, the clean-up doctrine allowed it to retain all claims in the action and to grant all relief, legal or equitable, to which the parties were entitled; the supreme court has held that application of the clean-up doctrine does not violate Ark. Const. art. 2, § 7, of the Constitution.

4. Equity -- chancery court had jurisdiction -- argument concerning right to jury trial without merit. -- Where the chancery court had jurisdiction, appellant's argument concerning his right to a jury trial was without merit.

5. Appeal & error -- chancery cases -- appellate review. -- Chancery cases are reviewed de novo on appeal; the appellate court will not disturb a chancellor's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.

6. Specific performance -- courts of equity allowed latitude -- question of fact for chancellor. -- Specific performance is an equitable remedy that compels performance of a contract on the precise terms agreed upon by the parties; because it is an equitable remedy, courts of equity are allowed some latitude in granting or withholding that relief, depending upon the equities of a particular case; whether or not specific performance should be awarded in a particular case is a question of fact for the chancellor.

7. Appeal & error -- chancery cases -- deference to chancellor's position to assess credibility. -- The appellate court defers to the chancellor's superior position to assess credibility.

8. Appeal & error -- chancery cases -- chancellor's decision not clearly erroneous where evidence was in conflict. -- The appellate court could not say that the chancellor's decision was clearly erroneous where the evidence was in conflict; the appellate court has recognized that the chancellor may exercise his prerogative as trier of fact to resolve conflicts in testimony in favor of one party. [wbj]

John C. Throesch, for appellant.

Castleman Law Firm, by: Bob Castleman, for appellees.

John Mauzy Pittman, Judge.

This case involves an agreement between appellant and appellees concerning certain real property in Randolph County. Appellees, as owners of the property, claim that they entered into a month-to-month lease with appellant in September or October of 1997. When appellant refused to pay rent or vacate the property in April 1999, they filed a unlawful detainer action against him in circuit court. Appellant answered that his agreement with appellees was in fact a lease with a five-year option to purchase, and he counterclaimed for specific performance. Upon his pleading that equitable doctrine, the circuit judge transferred the case to chancery court. Following a hearing, the chancellor awarded appellees $6,000 in damages for unlawful detainer, plus costs and attorney fees. He denied appellant's prayer for specific performance. On appeal, appellant contends that the chancellor's ruling was erroneous and that he was wrongfully deprived of a jury trial. We find no error and affirm.

We first address appellant's argument that he was improperly denied a jury trial on appellees' unlawful detainer action, which is cognizable in circuit court. See Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-306 (1987). The Arkansas Constitution provides that the right of a trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law, without regard to the amount in controversy. Ark. Const. art. 2, § 7. However, the constitutional right to a jury trial does not extend to an equity case. See Riggin v. Dierdorff, 302 Ark. 517, 790S.W.2d 897 (1990). When appellant interposed a claim for specific performance, the circuit court properly transferred the case to equity. It is undisputed that specific performance is an equitable remedy, cognizable only in equity. Hardy Constr. Co. v. Arkansas State Hwy. & Transp. Dep't, 324 Ark. 496, 922 S.W.2d 705 (1996). Once equity acquired jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the specific-performance issue, the clean-up doctrine allowed it to retain all claims in the action and to grant all relief, legal or equitable, to which the parties were entitled. See Fox v. Fox, 68 Ark. App. 281, 7 S.W.3d 339 (1999). Our supreme court has held that application of the clean-up doctrine does not violate Article 2, Section 7, of the Constitution. See Colclasure v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 290 Ark. 585, 720 S.W.2d 916 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987). Thus, the chancery court had jurisdiction, and appellant's argument concerning his right to a jury trial is without merit. See Priddy v. Mayer Aviation, Inc., 260 Ark. 3, 537 S.W.2d 370 (1976).¹

Appellant's other argument is that the trial court erred in finding that no lease-with-an-option-to-purchase contract existed between him and appellees, thus denying him the remedy of specific performance. Chancery cases are reviewed de novo on...