Mitchell v. Iowa Protection and Advocacy Services

• Decision Date: 15 April 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-2198.,02-2198.
• Citation: 325 F.3d 1011
• Parties: Candice E. MITCHELL, Appellant, v. IOWA PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SERVICES, INC.; Sylvia Piper, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

325 F.3d 1011

Candice E. MITCHELL, Appellant, v. IOWA PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SERVICES, INC.; Sylvia Piper, Appellees.

No. 02-2198.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: January 13, 2003.

Filed: April 15, 2003.

Jennifer Jaskolka-Brown, argued, Des Moines, IA, for appellant.

Heather Lee Palmer, argued, Des Moines, IA, for appellee.

Before LOKEN^*, FAGG, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Candice Mitchell brought an action claiming that her termination by Iowa Protection and Advocacy Services, Inc. (Iowa P & A) violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990(ADA), see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965 (ICRA), see Iowa Code Ann. §§ 216.1-216.20, and Iowa public policy. When the district court¹ granted summary judgment in favor of Iowa P & A on all claims, Ms. Mitchell appealed. Because we find that Ms. Mitchell did not make out a submissible case on an essential element of her claims, we affirm.

I.

Iowa P & A is a nonprofit corporation that provides advocacy services for individuals with developmental and mental health disabilities. At the time that this dispute arose, Iowa P & A operated several programs, one of which was the Partners in Policymaking Program. This program was funded with federal dollars through a state-awarded grant; in contrast, most of Iowa P & A's other programs were funded directly from federal appropriations. The goal of the Partners Program was to teach individuals with developmental disabilities, or those caring for them, to be effective advocates for their rights. Each year, approximately thirty participants were selected to participate in the six-month program.

Iowa P & A hired Ms. Mitchell to be the grant coordinator for the Partners Program. Her direct supervisor was Sylvia Piper. As part of her duties as grant coordinator, Ms. Mitchell was responsible for reviewing applications to the Partners Program and determining the type of accommodations, if any, that each applicant would need if selected. The applications were then forwarded to the planning committee, which reviewed and ultimately selected the participants for the following year. Because Ms. Mitchell and Ms. Piper were not members of the planning committee, they did not participate in the selection process.

Ms. Mitchell received five applications from persons in Woodward State Hospital's Apple Program. Woodward residents were placed in the Apple Program if, in addition to having a developmental disability, they had either been charged with sexual offenses or engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior. On the day that the planning committee was to make its Partners Program selections, Ms. Mitchell and Ms. Piper engaged in a discussion regarding applicants from the Apple Program. According to Ms. Mitchell's testimony, Ms Piper stated that she did not want the committee to consider applicants from the Apple Program because of the liability that might arise from any improper behavior that those applicants might engage in. In response to this direction, Ms. Mitchell apparently told Ms. Piper that she would not exclude Apple Program participants from the application pool because she believed that doing so would be a violation of anti-discrimination laws.

Following her conversation with Ms. Piper, Ms. Mitchell discussed the matter with Iowa P & A employees Lisa Heddens and Mark Kelderman. Then, shortly before the planning committee met, Mr. Kelderman approached Ms. Piper and told her that he agreed with Ms. Mitchell that excluding Apple Program participants would be illegal. Mr. Kelderman reiterated his feelings at the planning committee meeting and threatened to take legal action if Apple Program participants were excluded from the applicant pool. The planning committee decided to consider the five applicants from the Apple Program, and two were selected.

Five days later, Mervin Roth, Iowa P & A's executive director, notified Ms. Mitchell that she was being terminated. Mr. Roth gave her a memo that explained that the termination was due to budgetary reasons and that her duties would be assumed by other staff within the agency. Ms. Mitchell's duties were in fact taken over by Ms. Heddens. Ms. Mitchell argues that she was terminated because she refused to engage in discriminatory behavior.

II.

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Rademeyer v. Farris, 284 F.3d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 2002). "Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Clark v. Kellogg Co., 205 F.3d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir.2000); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Ms. Mitchell's primary claim is grounded in the ADA, which prohibits retaliation against an individual because that individual "opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [it]." 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). We evaluate these claims under the burden-shifting framework announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), as refined by Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), and St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 505-512, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). See Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1025 (8th Cir.1999). Under this framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742. The employer must then rebut the presumption of retaliation by articulating a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. See id. at 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742. If the employer does so, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer's proffered reason is pretextual. See id. at 507-08, 113 S.Ct. 2742.

To make out a prima facie case under § 12203(a), Ms. Mitchell was required to show that she engaged in protected conduct, that she suffered an adverse employment action, and that the adverse action was causally linked to the protected conduct. See Amir, 184 F.3d at 1025; Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir.1999) (en banc). The district court found that even if Ms. Mitchell could show the first two elements necessary for a prima facie case, she failed to establish that her termination was linked to the purportedly protected conduct. We agree.

Iowa P & A presented substantial evidence to support their assertion that Ms. Mitchell was terminated for budgetary reasons. Three days before Ms. Mitchell's termination, Les Bascom, Iowa P & A's accountant, sent a draft budget for fiscal year 2000 to Mr. Roth. Mr. Bascom projected that Iowa P & A would be over its budget in several programs if immediate steps were not taken to cut costs. Mr. Bascom then offered several possible solutions to the budget shortfall, one of which was...