Mitchell v. Mason
| Decision Date | 15 May 1918 |
| Citation | 75 Fla. 679,79 So. 163 |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
| Parties | MITCHELL v. MASON. |
Rehearing Denied June 17, 1918.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Duval County; Daniel A. Simmons, Judge.
Bill for foreclosure by Harry Mason against David F. Mitchell. Decree for complainant, and land sold and sale made and confirmed, and defendant's motion to set aside the sale was stricken and the motion dismissed, and movant appeals. Motion to dismiss appeal denied.
See also, 63 Fla. 538, 57 So. 604.
Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff
Syllabus by the Court
A court of chancery has jurisdiction to hear and determine a motion to vacate a sale of property made under the court's order of foreclosure after confirmation of the sale.
In such case the chancellor has a large discretion which will be interfered with by an appellate court only in a clear case of injustice and when it clearly appears that his decision was erroneous.
Upon a motion to vacate a sale of property made long after the confirmation of the sale and upon the ground of inadequacy of price realized at the sale as a result of ministerial errors the interest of the movant, the circumstances constituting the alleged irregularity, the inadequacy of price, and the existence of persons who at the time of the sale were ready willing, and able to purchase the property at a higher price than that for which it sold should be established by proof of a high degree of clearness and certainty.
COUNSEL Stanton Walker, of Jacksonville, and Fred. T Myers, of Tallahassee, for appellant.
Alex. St. Clair-Abrams, of Jacksonville, for appellee.
The litigation in which this appeal involves one phase has several times been before this court.
The question now presented is whether the sale of the property known as 'Villa Alexandria' and certain described personal property located near the city of Jacksonville, of January 1, 1912, was made in conformity to the decree of the court in the case of Harry Mason v. Cogswell et al., entered on December 1, 1911, in the circuit court for Duval county.
A motion was made by David F. Mitchell, one of the defendants in the above suit on January 22, 1916, to set aside the sale made on January 1, 1912, upon grounds which, briefly stated, are as follows: That on the morning the sale was to take place counsel for David Mitchell informed the special Master, who under the decree was directed to make the sale at public auction in compliance with law for the purpose of satisfying and discharging the amounts found in such decree to be due, that a supersedeas staying the execution of the decree had been obtained from the judge of the Eighth judicial circuit of Florida, and that the bond duly approved had been placed on file in the office of the clerk of the circuit court for Duval county; that the special master then informed Mitchell's counsel, so the latter understood, that the sale would not be made; that the sale was nevertheless made by the special master at the time and place directed by the decree, and George Mason, the son and attorney in fact of the complainant, Harry Mason, became the purchaser at the 'grossly inadequate price of $31,000'; that George Mason was the only person present at the sale to bid, and that the property was worth 'at least $250,000'; that the movant Mitchell had 'made arrangements to have the property bid in at the sale if the same should be held,' and there were divers other persons who were ready, willing, and able to purchase the property at a much larger price than the same brought at the sale, but all of them, including Mitchell, were misled by the special master's statement that he did not intend to sell the property on that day, and who were therefore not present to bid on the same; that since the sale was made the movant had obtained quitclaim deeds to the property from all the other defendants in the case of Mason v. Cogswell et al.; that after the sale was made to George Mason he conveyed the property by quitclaim deed to his father, Harry Mason.
It is in effect recited in the motion to vacate the sale that the special master announced that the sale would not take place because he supposed the supersedeas order was valid, but, having discovered later that it was invalid, decided to proceed with the sale of the property and attempted to notify the movant and his attorney, but failed, and that he also failed to notify the persons whom it is alleged were ready, willing, and able to purchase the property for a sum greater than that for which it was sold.
The conclusion arrived at by the special master that the supersedeas order was void was correct. In an appeal by Mitchell from an order on his application to annul the proceedings taken under the foreclosure decree alleged to have been in violation of the supersedeas order, this court held the order to be void, so the application was denied. See Mitchell v. Mason, 63 Fla. 538, 57 So. 604.
But the point presented here is: Granting the supersedeas order to have been void, was the property sold for an inadequate price to the advantage of the complainant and to the disadvantage of the defendants, because of the impression created upon the movant and his attorney and others who were ready, willing, and able to purchase at a much greater price by the announcement of the special master to them that he would not sell, and his subsequent change of mind without notice to such parties, who by reason of the first announcement were not present at the sale and therefore could not bid upon the property?
Inadequacy of price, in connection with other circumstances having a tendency to cause such inadequacy resulting in injury, is considered sufficient grounds to set aside the sale especially if the circumstances result from the mistake of one whose duty it is under the decree to make sale of the property; yet the chancellor has a large discretion which will only be interfered with by the appellate court in a clear case of injustice. See Sowards v. Pritchett, 37 Ill. 517; Glenn v. Clapp, 11 Gill & J. (Md.) 1; Pattison v. Josselyn, 43 Miss. 373; Eberhart v. Gilchrist...
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Eristavi-Tchitcherine v. Miami Beach Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n
...be set aside. See Ruff v. Guaranty Title & Trust Co., 99 Fla. 197, 126 So. 383, 384. In that case it was said: 'This court, in Mitchell v. Mason, 75 Fla. 679, text 684, 79 163, held that an order confirming a sale under a foreclosure decree is equivalent to an adjudication that the sale was......
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Mccann v. City of St. Petersburg
...Court in the case of Ruff v. Guaranty Title & Trust Co., 99 Fla. 197, 126 So. 383, 384, when this Court said: 'This court, in Mitchell v. Mason, 75 Fla. 679, text 79 So. 163, held that an order confirming a sale under a foreclosure decree is equivalent to an adjudication that the sale was o......
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Crichlow v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S.
...it is probable that this appeal would be unnecessary. This court considered the question raised here in the case of Mitchell v. Mason, 75 Fla. 679, 680, text page 79 So. 163, 164, when it said: 'Inadequacy of price, in connection with other circumstances having a tendency to cause such inad......
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Ohio Realty Inv. Corp. v. Southern Bank of West Palm Beach
...court did not err in denying petitioner's motion to vacate and set aside the sale, relying on this Court's decision in Mitchell v. Mason, 75 Fla. 679, 79 So. 163 (1918), as controlling. In Mitchell, as in the case Sub judice, the sale occurred subsequent to a statement by the individual con......