Mitchell v. Mitchell
Decision Date | 09 April 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 12A02-0210-CV-815.,12A02-0210-CV-815. |
Citation | 785 N.E.2d 1194 |
Parties | Phyliss MITCHELL, Appellant-Respondent, v. Jack H. MITCHELL, Appellee-Petitioner. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Peter L. Obremskey, Parr Richey Obremskey & Morton, Lebanon, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Richard D. Martin, Miller Martin & Stuard Frankfort, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
Phyllis J. Mitchell's ("Phyllis") and Jack H. Mitchell's ("Jack") marriage was dissolved in Clinton Circuit Court. Pursuant to the terms of their Dissolution Settlement Agreement, a $100,000 life insurance policy on Phyllis's life was to be gifted to their daughter, Jessica. Phyllis was found in contempt because she apparently surrendered the policy and received its cash value, a total of $15,274.41. For this reason, the trial court ordered Phyllis incarcerated, but stayed the incarceration if Phyllis met the following conditions: 1) transfer to Jessica of a remainder interest in a forty-acre tract of real estate awarded to Phyllis in the dissolution decree, and 2) transfer to Jessica of ownership of a $70,000 life insurance policy on Jack's life awarded to Phyllis in the dissolution decree. Phyllis has filed this interlocutory appeal arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of contempt, and that the sanctions imposed are unreasonable and punitive in nature.
Finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of contempt, but that the sanctions imposed are punitive in nature, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On February 6, 2001, Phyllis's and Jack's marriage was dissolved, and the trial court incorporated their Dissolution Settlement Agreement into its dissolution decree. That agreement provided in pertinent part:
Appellant's App. pp. 17-19 (emphasis added). The parties agreed that when the $100,000 policy was transferred to Jessica, she would become responsible for paying the premiums.
On or about November 15, 2001, Phyllis surrendered a life insurance policy she owned, which was purchased from Harvest Life Insurance Company ("Harvest Life") in 1992, and received the cash value totaling $15,274.41. In that policy, Harvest Life had insured Phyllis's life for $100,616. Appellant's App. p. 96. Thereafter, on December 26, 2001, Jack filed a Motion for Rule to Show Cause alleging that Phyllis violated the terms of the dissolution settlement agreement by surrendering the $100,000 policy on Phyllis's life, rather than transferring it to Jessica. Appellant's App. pp. 37-38.
On February 22, 2002, the trial court held a hearing on the motion at which Phyllis argued that the dissolution settlement agreement did not sufficiently identify the insurance policy at issue and was therefore ambiguous. The trial court determined that the policy was sufficiently identified in the agreement, and Phyllis's "conduct constitutes a blatant, willful violation of the Decree of Dissolution for which she should be held in contempt of this Court." Appellant's App. p. 40. Therefore, the court ordered:
The parties could not reach an agreement, and therefore both Phyllis and Jack submitted proposals for sanctions to the court, and a hearing was held on sanctions on July 17, 2002. At the time of the hearing, Phyllis had obtained two $50,000 life insurance policies insuring her life, which named Jessica as the beneficiary. Phyllis proposed that she would pay the premiums on those policies until the sum of $15,274.41 had been paid and transfer the policies to Jessica, at which time Jessica would then be required to pay the premiums. After the hearing, proposed orders were submitted and on September 9, 2002, the trial court adopted verbatim the proposed order submitted by Jack, which provides:
Appellant's App. pp. 44-45. Phyllis was also ordered to pay Jack's attorney fees for the contempt proceedings. Phyllis now appeals.
Phyllis argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it found her in contempt because there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that she willfully violated the terms of the dissolution settlement agreement. "Whether a person is in contempt of a court order is a matter left to the trial court's discretion." Evans v. Evans, 766 N.E.2d 1240, 1243 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) ( ) We will reverse the trial court's finding of contempt only where an abuse of discretion has been shown, which occurs only when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. When we review a contempt order, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. MacIntosh v. MacIntosh, 749 N.E.2d 626, 629 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied.
"Willful disobedience of any lawfully entered court order of which the offender had notice is indirect contempt." Francies v. Francies, 759 N.E.2d 1106, 1118 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied (citing Meyer, 707 N.E.2d at 1031). "Uncontradicted evidence that a party is aware of a court order and willfully disobeys it is sufficient to support a finding of contempt." Evans, 766 N.E.2d at 1243 (citing Crowl v. Berryhill, 678 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind.Ct.App.1997)). However, the court's order must be clear and certain such that there is no question regarding what a person may or may not do and no question regarding when the order is being violated. Francies, 759 N.E.2d at 1119 (citing Gordon v. Gordon, 733 N.E.2d 468, 472 (Ind. Ct.App.2000)). "A party may not be held in contempt for failing to comply with an ambiguous or indefinite order." Id. (citing Rendon v. Rendon, 692 N.E.2d 889, 896 (Ind.Ct.App.1998)).
Phyllis argues that the trial court's order is ambiguous because it states that she should transfer to Jessica a policy owned by Jack, which insured Phyllis's life in the amount of $100,000; however, Phyllis owned the policy she surrendered, which insured her life in the amount of $100,616. At the hearing held on the motion to show cause, Phyllis testified that she was only aware of six insurance policies that she and Jack had purchased during their marriage, and that she paid the premiums on those policies. Tr. pp. 15, 23-24. Jack testified that he believed he was the...
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