Mitchell v. Mitchell

• Decision Date: 01 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2014–CA–00554–COA.,2014–CA–00554–COA.
• Citation: 180 So.3d 810
• Parties: Lauren Paige Woodard MITCHELL, Appellant v. Adam Stephenson MITCHELL, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

180 So.3d 810

Lauren Paige Woodard MITCHELL, Appellant

v.Adam Stephenson MITCHELL, Appellee.

No. 2014–CA–00554–COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

Dec. 1, 2015.

Amanda Jane Proctor, William R. Wright, Ridgeland, attorneys for appellant.

Robert D. Jones, Meridian, Anthony Rhett Wise, attorneys for appellee.

Before IRVING, P.J., ISHEE, and FAIR, JJ.

ISHEE, J., for the Court:

¶ 1. Adam Mitchell and Paige Mitchell are the parents of a son, Mann. After they separated, the issue of child custody was brought before the Lee County Chancery Court. Following a trial on the matter, the chancery court awarded physical custody of Mann to Adam and visitation to Paige. Aggrieved, Paige appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2. Adam and Paige were married on January 10, 2009. They lived in Tupelo, Mississippi, where Adam began working as the president of a newly acquired beer distributorship for his father's company. Paige did not work outside of the home, and the plan was for the couple to live in Tupelo for several years before returning to Meridian, Mississippi, where Adam would work for his family's business. Mann was born on August 1, 2011, and the couple purchased a home in Meridian in January 2012. Prior to moving into the home, however, the couple separated.

¶ 3. On March 1, 2012, Paige filed a complaint for divorce and a motion for temporary relief against Adam. On March 8, 2012, Adam filed his answer and counter-complaint for divorce. Both parties requested custody of their son. On April 30, 2012, and again on May 10, 2012, temporary hearings were held regarding the custody of Mann. On May 30, 2012, the chancery court entered a temporary order in which the parties were granted temporary joint legal custody, and Paige was granted temporary physical custody. On November 7, 2012, an agreed order of modification of the temporary order was entered. The court entered an order on November 9, 2012, setting the matter for trial on several dates in January 2013 and March 2013.

¶ 4. On February 21, 2013, Adam filed a motion for leave to withdraw fault grounds for divorce. The trial was continued from March until May 6, 2013. However, on the morning of May 6, 2013, Paige moved the court to dismiss her grounds for divorce against Adam. On May 7, 2013, the court entered an order granting both parties' motions to withdraw fault grounds for divorce subject to certain terms and conditions related to the custody, visitation, and support of the minor child.

¶ 5. Adam filed his complaint for a determination of child custody on May 9, 2013, and Paige filed a complaint for separate maintenance, child custody, and other relief the next day. The trial in this matter was held on September 16 through September 19, 2013, and October 3, 2013. Following numerous witnesses with lengthy testimonies, the chancery court entered a memorandum opinion and judgment two months later. In the opinion, Adam was awarded physical custody of Mann, with Paige being awarded visitation rights. Paige filed a motion to alter or amend the opinion and judgment on January 6, 2014. The next month, the chancery court entered an agreed supplemental judgment addressing the issues of child support and the custody-exchange location. On April 10, 2014, the chancery court entered an order overruling Paige's motion to alter or amend the opinion and judgment. Paige timely filed her appeal asserting the following issues: (1) whether the chancery court abused its discretion in limiting the testimony of two witnesses; (2) whether the chancery court erred in its Albright¹ analysis and resulting decision to award physical custody to Adam; (3) whether the chancery court erred in awarding Adam legal custody; and (4) whether the chancery court abused its discretion in its award of visitation.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6. This Court will only reverse a chancery court's decision "if it was manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, or if the chancellor applied an erroneous legal standard." Smith v. Smith, 97 So.3d 43, 46 (¶ 7) (Miss.2012) (citation omitted). While we will defer to a chancery court's findings of fact, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Irving v. Irving, 67 So.3d 776, 778 (¶ 11) (Miss.2011) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Whether the chancery court abused its discretion in limiting the testimony of Lizzette Van Osteen and Kim Leathers.

¶ 7. At trial, Paige attempted to call Lizzette Van Osteen to testify. Adam objected because Paige had failed to disclose her name on the witness list. The chancery court allowed Van Osteen to testify. However, her testimony was limited to that contained in a written statement she had prepared that had been produced prior to the trial. Similarly, Adam objected when Paige attempted to call Kim Leathers to testify for the same reason. Again, the chancery court allowed Leathers to testify, but limited her testimony to that which had not previously been covered by other witnesses.

¶ 8. Upon review of the transcript, we do not find that the chancery court abused its discretion. Paige does not dispute that she had failed to disclose the names of the witnesses, yet the chancery court still allowed them to testify. This issue is without merit.

II. Whether the chancery court erred in its Albright analysis and its decision to award physical custody to Adam.

¶ 9. In all child-custody cases, the primary consideration is the best interest and welfare of the child. Albright, 437 So.2d at 1005. When conducting an Albright analysis, the following factors are taken into consideration:

(1) age, health, and sex of the child; (2) a determination of the parent that has had the continuity of care prior to the separation; (3) which has the best parenting skills and which has the willingness and capacity to provide primary child care; (4) the employment of the parent and responsibilities of that employment; (5) physical and mental health and age of the parents; (6) emotional ties of parent and child; (7) moral fitness of the parents; (8) the home, school and community record of the child; (9) the preference of the child at the age sufficient to express a preference by law; (10) stability of home environment and employment of each parent[;] and [11] other factors relevant to the parent-child relationship.

O'Briant v. O'Briant, 99 So.3d 802, 806 (¶ 17) (Miss.Ct.App.2012).

¶ 10. "An Albright analysis is not a mathematical equation." Hall v. Hall, 134 So.3d 822, 827 (¶ 19) (Miss.Ct.App.2014) (citing Lee v. Lee, 798 So.2d 1284, 1288 (¶ 15) (Miss.2001) ). When reviewing the chancery court's application of the Albright factors, the appellate court "review[s] the evidence and testimony presented at trial under each factor to ensure [the chancery court's] ruling was supported by record." Hollon v. Hollon, 784 So.2d 943, 947 (¶ 13) (Miss.2001). "[T]his Court cannot reweigh the evidence and must defer to the [chancery court's] findings of the facts, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence." Hall, 134 So.3d at 828 (¶ 21).

a. Age, Health, and Sex of the Child

¶ 11. Adam and Paige's son, Mann, was born on August 1, 2011. The testimony at trial revealed him to be a happy, healthy child. While he struggled with acid reflux as an infant, this issue has been resolved. Due to a history of ear infections, he underwent a procedure to have tubes placed in his ears. There was concern expressed that Paige possibly overmedicated Mann. However, by all accounts, he has very few health issues.

¶ 12. Paige argues that the chancery court erred in failing to utilize the presumption that she, as the mother, is Mann's best guardian. Mississippi law "has significantly weakened the once strong presumption that a mother is generally best suited to raise a young child." Mayfield v. Mayfield, 956 So.2d 337, 342 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2007). As the chancery court aptly noted: "Mann has been cared for by several people including his parents, grandparents, paid caregivers and pre-school staff. The fact that he is well-adjusted and happy indicates that he is old enough for people other than his mother to provide for his care." The chancellor, having seen and heard the evidence firsthand, was in the best position to determine which parent this factor favored. Mississippi law does not support Paige's argument that a child's mother, as opposed to the father, is the best caregiver by default. Accordingly, we find no manifest error in the chancellor's decision.

b. Continuity of Care

¶ 13. Paige argues that "[t]he most understated fact in this case is that Paige cared for Mann more than Adam." Although it is true that Paige was a stay-at-home mother, the chancery court found that "[t]he parties' marriage seem[ed] to reflect the trend toward greater expectations of the father's involvement in routine care of [the] child." The chancery court found that witness testimony demonstrated that Paige "expected others to relieve her of the responsibility of caring for her child whenever possible." Paige hired a housekeeper/nanny who worked at the house five days per week; Paige did not cook or prepare meals; Adam took responsibility for Mann when he came home from work; and Paige relied heavily on friends, family, and babysitters to help with Mann.

¶ 14. After hearing the witness testimony, the chancery court did not find that this factor favored one parent over another, and we do not see any manifest error with this determination. The chancery court is in the best position "to listen to the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and determine the credibility of the witnesses and what weight ought to be ascribed to the evidence given by those witnesses." Carter v. Carter, 735 So.2d 1109, 1114 (¶ 19) (Miss.Ct.App.1999).

¶ 15. In the instant case, although Paige was a stay-at-home mother, the testimony indicates that many other people shared significantly in the everyday care of Mann—so much so that Paige did not shoulder the majority of Mann's caregiving duties. We will not reverse a chancery court's findings if supported by...