Mitchell v. Newryder, Civ.02-107-B-S.

• Decision Date: 05 February 2003
• Docket Number: No. Civ.02-107-B-S.,Civ.02-107-B-S.
• Citation: 245 F.Supp.2d 200
• Parties: Daniel MITCHELL, Plaintiff v. Aaron NEWRYDER, Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

245 F.Supp.2d 200

Daniel MITCHELL, Plaintiff v. Aaron NEWRYDER, Defendant

No. Civ.02-107-B-S.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

February 5, 2003

Daniel J. Mitchell, Bangor, ME, for plaintiff.

Michael J. Schmidt, Wheeler & Arey, P.A., Waterville, ME, for defendant.

ORDER ACCEPTING THE RECOMMENDED DECISION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

SINGAL, District Judge.

No objections having been filed to the Magistrate Judge's Recommended Decision filed January 10, 2003 the Recommended Decision is accepted. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim is DENIED.

RECOMMENDED DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS 42 U.S.C. § 1983 COMPLAINT

KRAVCHUK, United States Magistrate Judge.

Daniel Mitchell was transported to the Aroostook County Jail on June 3, 2002, and placed in a toilet-less cell. In this civil rights action against Aaron Neureuther,¹ a jail employee, Mitchell alleges that over the course of the evening Mitchell's requests to use the bathroom were denied, he had a bowel movement in his pants, informed Neureuther of his need to clean up, but was made to sit in his feces for five hours. Neureuther has filed a motion to dismiss (Docket No. 12) to which Mitchell has replied (Docket No. 16). I now recommend that the Court DENY the motion to dismiss.

Standard for Motions to Dismiss

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), pursuant to which Neureuther moves, provides that a complaint can be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In addressing the motion to dismiss I must take as true the well-pleaded facts as they appear in the complaint, and give Mitchell the benefit of every reasonable inference in his favor. Medina-Claudio v. Rodriguez-Mateo, 292 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir.2002). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Accord Medina-Claudio, 292 F.3d at 34. I further note that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires no more from a complaint than a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). See also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 513, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) ("Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions.").

Since Mitchell is proceeding pro se I measure his submissions by the "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). Also in view of Mitchell's pro se status, I consider his other pleadings to understand the nature and basis of his claims. Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1115 (D.C.Cir.2002) (citing the holding of Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C.Cir.1999) that District Court abused its discretion when it failed to consider the pro se plaintiffs complaint in light of his reply to the motion to dismiss).

Discussion

A. The Complaint Allegations

Mitchell's rendition of the facts is uncomplicated. He was brought to the Aroostook County Jail at about 5:00 p.m. on June 3, 2002. He was placed in a cell without a toilet, mattress, or blanket. He was not being punished for anything he did but was purposefully being isolated from the rest of the inmates. He was not intoxicated. He was not acting disrespectfully. Before being locked in Mitchell asked a correctional officer if he could use the bathroom and this request was refused.

At approximately 8:30 p.m. that evening, Mitchell "needed to take a bowel movement." He started calling to the guards to let him out to use the bathroom, indicating it was an emergency. He was being continuously ignored by the officer in the control room. At about 9:30 p.m. he called to the guard in the control room that he really needed to use the bathroom and was again ignored by control room staff. Mitchell tried very hard to control his bowels but was unsuccessful. He had a bowel movement in his pants.

Mitchell started knocking at the door. The defendant, Neureuther finally came out of the control room and said, "I'm sick of listening to you." Mitchell explained to Neureuther that he needed to use the bathroom and get cleaned up. Mitchell showed Neureuther that he had feces all over himself. With a look of hatred toward Mitchell Neureuther said, "You're gonna have to sit in it and suffer, you ugly fuckface." Neureuther then left. Mitchell had to sit in his feces for five hours. Neither Neureuther nor any other guard took any corrective action with respect to this problem.

With respect to relief, Mitchell claims he was permanently traumatized by this incident. He wants a declaratory judgment that Neureuther violated his rights under the United States Constitution; an injunction ordering Neureuther to respect his rights, and physical and mental health; an order directing the Aroostook County Jail to initiate written policies and implement diversity training for all staff; a grant of $30,000 compensatory damages; and a $10,000 punitive damage award.

B. The Basis for the Motion to Dismiss

Mitchell frames his claim under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.² Neureuther challenges the complaint on three fronts. I take them in turn.

1. Failure to State a Claim

The forefront of Neureuther's attack on Mitchell's pleading is that these allegations fail to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment because "the best he can argue is that he was exposed to some discomfort or inconvenience as a result of the alleged actions taken by the Defendant." (Mot. Dismiss, at 4.)

The Eighth Amendment makes it unconstitutional to inflict "cruel and unusual punishment." U.S. Const, amend. VIII.³ In a pivotal cruel and unusual punishment case pertaining to prison conditions the United States Supreme Court stated that, the Constitution "does not mandate comfortable prisons," Rhodes v. Chapman 452 U.S. 337, 349, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), but neither does it permit inhumane ones, and it is now settled that "the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment," Helling [v. McKinney], 509 U.S. [25,] 31, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 [ (1993) ].

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). "The Amendment," the Court explained, "imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must `take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.'" Id. at 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984)).

In Farmer the Court clarified that the Eighth Amendment has an objective and a subjective component. See id. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970. "First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, `sufficiently serious,'" id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991),) that is, "a prison official's act or omission must result in the denial of `the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,'" id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)). Second, the prison official must have a "`sufficiently culpable state of mind,'" id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297, 111 S.Ct. 2321), and in prison-conditions cases as is Mitchell's "that state of mind is one of `deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety," id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03, 111 S.Ct. 2321).

Neureuther asserts that the allegations do not support a claim under the Eighth Amendment because he does not allege that he was at "any risk of harm, let alone a substantial risk of serious harm." (Id. at 4-5.) Furthermore, Neureuther contends, Mitchell has not alleged facts that would support a conclusion that Neureuther had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to Mitchell because there was no such risk.

Neureuther's argument ignores that there are different sub-classifications of deliberate indifference claims under the Eighth Amendment. While its two-prong test is applicable to all deliberate indifference claims, Farmer addressed a claim by an inmate that prison staff failed to protect him from foreseeable violence by other inmates. Neureuther's legal argument is premised on the Farmer observation that, "[f]or a claim (like the one here) based on a failure to prevent harm, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (emphasis added). However Mitchell's is not a "failure to protect" deliberate indifference claim.

Mitchell is claiming that he was purposefully subjected to dehumanizing prison conditions. The facts as alleged meet the objective component of Farmer in that, if proven, Neureuther's refusal to allow Mitchell to use the facilities to clean himself up for a five hour period (not to mention any involvement he may have had in denying Mitchell access to the bathroom) was an omission that resulted in the denial of a minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. Furthermore, Mitchell has alleged that Neureuther displayed hostility towards Mitchell during his denial, using insulting and offensive language and expressions. This sufficiently satisfies the pleading requirement for the second Farmer requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate that the defendant had a culpable state of mind.

I reach this conclusion after examining cases in which other courts have addressed cases alleging deprivations of basic human needs. See, e.g., Hill v. McKinley, 311 F.3d 899, 903 (8th Cir.2002) (Fourth Amendment violation when plaintiff was secured to...