Mitchell v. S. Scrap Recycling, L.L.C.

• Decision Date: 08 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2011 CA 2201.,2011 CA 2201.
• Citation: 93 So.3d 754
• Parties: Charles MITCHELL, James Mitchell and Barbara Mitchell v. SOUTHERN SCRAP RECYCLING, L.L.C.; Southern Scrap Material Co., L.L.C.; Southern Scrap Recycling Morgan City, L.L.C. and ABC Insurance Company.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

93 So.3d 754

Charles MITCHELL, James Mitchell and Barbara Mitchell

v.SOUTHERN SCRAP RECYCLING, L.L.C.; Southern Scrap Material Co., L.L.C.; Southern Scrap Recycling Morgan City, L.L.C. and ABC Insurance Company.

No. 2011 CA 2201.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

June 8, 2012.

Timothy R. Richardson, Freeman R. Matthews, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiffs/Appellants, Charles Mitchell, James Mitchell, and Barbara Mitchell.

Jefferson R. Tillery, Elizabeth S. Healy, C. Barrett Rice, New Orleans, LA, for Defendants/Appellees, Southern Scrap Recycling, LLC; Southern Scrap Material Co., LLC; and Southern Scrap Recycling Morgan City, LLC.

Michael P. Corry, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant/Appellee Gemini Insurance Company.

Paul J. Politz, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellee IPC Contractors.

Alistair M. Ward, New Orleans, LA, for Defendants/Appellees Lexington Insurance Company and Chartis Specialty Insurance Company.

Richard L. Olivier, Metairie, LA, for Defendants/Appellees Louisiana Container Co. and Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America.

Margaret Tooke, Baton Rouge, LA, for Third–Party Defendant/Appellee Travelers Indemnity of Connecticut.

Paul Palermo, Metairie, LA, for Defendant/Appellee Travelers Property Casualty Company.

Before WHIPPLE, KUHN, and GUIDRY, JJ.

WHIPPLE, J.

[1 Cir. 3]The issue presented herein is whether a truck driver, injured in a work accident, and his parents are barred from bringing a tort claim against the scrap metal company at whose yard the truck driver was assigned by his direct employer to haul and deliver scrap metal, on the basis that the scrap metal company was his statutory employer pursuant to the provisions of the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act. The trial court granted the scrap metal company's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against it, and the plaintiffs appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Charles Mitchell was employed by IPC Contractors, LLC, as a truck driver. IPC Contractors had contracted with Southern Scrap Recycling Morgan City, LLC (“Southern Scrap Morgan City”), whereby IPC Contractors provided trucking services to Southern Scrap Morgan City. In fulfilling this contract, IPC Contractors assigned Charles to work at Southern Scrap Morgan City's Houma yard. Pursuant to this arrangement, Charles drove a truck carrying large metal containers owned by Southern Scrap Morgan City to various facilities with which Southern Scrap Morgan City contracted to deliver and pick up scrap material placed in those large metal containers.

On August 9, 2008, Charles was injured while delivering a load of scrap at the Houma facility. When Charles attempted to open the “gate,” or door, of the container, the gate, which weighed in excess of 700 pounds, became detached from the container and fell on Charles. Charles, who was twenty-one years old at the time of the accident, was seriously injured.

[1 Cir. 4]Thereafter, Charles and his parents, James and Barbara Mitchell, filed a suit for damages against Southern Scrap Material Company, LLC; Southern Scrap Recycling, LLC; and Southern Scrap Recycling Morgan City, LLC (“the Southern Scrap defendants”), among others, contending that the Southern Scrap defendants were liable to them for failing to provide a safe container free from vices and for various alleged acts of negligence.¹

On June 21, 2010, Southern Scrap Morgan City moved for summary judgment, contending that it was immune from tort liability as Charles's statutory employer pursuant to LSA–R.S. 23:1061. Southern Scrap Morgan City contended that it was entitled to statutory employer status because it contracted with Charles's immediate employer, IPC Contractors, through a Master Service Contract dated July 28, 2006, in which the parties agreed that Southern Scrap Morgan City shall be considered the “special employer” or “statutory employer,” as defined in LSA–R.S. 23:1031 and 23:1061. Thus, Southern Scrap Morgan City averred that because the exclusive remedy available to plaintiffs was workers' compensation, plaintiffs were precluded from bringing a tort claim against it.

Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that the Master Service Contract did not unambiguously recognize Charles as a statutory employee in that there were two conflicting provisions in the contract addressing this issue and that questions of fact remain as to whether trucking is an integral part of Southern Scrap Morgan City's business.

Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court granted Southern Scrap Morgan City's motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs' claims against it with prejudice. From this judgment, plaintiffs [1 Cir. 5]appeal, contending that: (1) the trial court committed legal error in utilizing the law of statutory construction when considering the conflicting paragraphs of the Master Service Contract, instead of construing the ambiguity against the drafter; (2) the trial court committed legal error in failing to apply Prejean v. Maintenance Enterprises, Inc., 2008–0364 (La.App. 4th Cir.3/25/09), 8 So.3d 766,writ denied,2009–0892 (La.6/26/09), 11 So.3d 496; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to determine that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether trucking is an integral part of Southern Scrap Morgan City's business.

BURDEN OF PROOF AND STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A motion for summary judgment is properly granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA–C.C.P. art. 966(B). The summary judgment procedure is expressly favored in the law and is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determinationof non-domestic civil actions. LSA–C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2).

The mover bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to summary judgment. LSA–C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2). However, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the subject matter of the motion, he need only demonstrate the absence of factual support for one or more essential elements of his opponent's claim, action, or defense. LSA–C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2). If the moving party points out that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, then the nonmoving party must produce factual support sufficient to satisfy his evidentiary burden at trial. [1 Cir. 6]LSA–C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2). If the mover has put forth supporting proof through affidavits or otherwise, the adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or otherwise, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. LSA–C.C.P. art. 967(B).

If, on the other hand, the mover will bear the burden of proof at trial, that party must support his motion with credible evidence that would entitle him to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial. Hines v. Garrett, 2004–0806 (La.6/25/04), 876 So.2d 764, 766. Such an affirmative showing will then shift the burden of production to the party opposing the motion, requiring the opposing party either to produce evidentiary materials that demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial or to submit an affidavit requesting additional time for discovery. Hines, 876 So.2d at 766–767.

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, appellate courts review evidence de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. East Tangipahoa Development Company, LLC v. Bedico Junction, LLC, 2008–1262 (La.App. 1st Cir.12/23/08), 5 So.3d 238, 243–244,writ denied,2009–0166 (La.3/27/09), 5 So.3d 146.

DISCUSSION

Under the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act (“the Act”), an employer is liable for compensation benefits to an employee who is injured as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. LSA–R.S. 23:1031. Generally, the rights and remedies under the Act provide an employee's exclusive remedy against the employer for such injury. LSA–R.S. 23:1032. Moreover, the Act applies both to a direct [1 Cir. 7]employer/employee relationship, as well as to a statutory employer/employee relationship. Labranche v. Fatty's, LLC, 2010–0475 (La.App. 1st Cir.10/29/10), 48 So.3d 1270, 1272.

Specifically, LSA–R.S. 23:1061(A)(1) provides that when a “principal” undertakes to execute any work, “which is a part of his trade, business, or occupation” and contracts with a “contractor” for the execution of “the whole or any part of the work undertaken by the principal,” the principal, as a “statutory employer,” shall be liable to pay to any employee employed in the execution of the work “any compensation” under the Act and “shall be granted the exclusive remedy protections of R.S. 23:1032....” Thus, a “statutory employer” is liable to pay any employee employed in the execution of the work any compensation due under the Act and, in turn, is entitled to statutory immunity. LSA–R.S. 23:1061(A)(1).

The doctrine of “statutory employer” codified in LSA–R.S. 23:1061 was amended in 1997 to provide that, except in the two-contract situation set forth in LSA–R.S. 23:1061(A)(2), a statutory employer relationship “shall not exist ... unless there is a written contract between the principal and a contractor ... which recognizes the principal as a statutory employer.” LSA–R.S. 23:1061(A)(3). When there is such written contractual recognition of the relationship, there shall be a rebuttable presumption of a statutory employer relationship between the principal and the contractor's employees that may be overcome only by showing the work performed is not an integral part of or essential to the ability of the principal to generate that principal's goods, products, or services....