Edwards v. Valero Refining-Meraux, LLC
| Decision Date | 28 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION No. 3:14-00772-JWD-EWD |
| Parties | JOHN EDWARDS and VERONICA EDWARDS, Plaintiffs, v. VALERO REFINING-MERAUX, LLC; STARCON INTERNATIONAL, INC.; and BURNS AND MCDONNELL ENGINEERING, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment ("MSJ"), (Doc. 20), filed by Valero Refining-Meraux, LLC ("Valero" or "Defendant"),1 which seeks dismissal of every claim advanced by Mr. John Edwards, also known as Johnny Edwards ("John" or "Johnny"), and Mrs. Veronica Edwards, also known as Learonica Cole ("Veronica" or "Learonica") (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), in their first, second, and third complaints, (Docs. 1, 4, 28).2 Plaintiffs havecountered Defendant's MSJ with their "Memorandum in Opposition [to] Valero['s] Motion for Summary Judgment" ("Opposition"), (Doc. 24), to which Defendant filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ("Reply"), (Doc. 25). In light of prevailing law, which endorses the existence of the kind of dualistic contracts which bind Plaintiffs and Defendant here, Plaintiffs simply have not presented more than conclusory assertions and a scintilla of evidence. As a matter of rule and precedent, neither is sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56,3 the precise relief that Defendant now requests. Accordingly, as more fully explained below, the Court GRANTS Valero's Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing with prejudice the claims advanced by Plaintiffs against Valero.
Husband of Learonica, Johnny, was working for Car-Ber Holdings, Inc. ("Car-Ber"), at a Valero-owned facility located in Meraux, Louisiana, on or about September 4, 2014. (Doc. 1 at 3; see also, e.g., Doc. 15 at 1; Doc. 20-1 at 4.) On that fall date, "he was struck by a plug, which was blown out of a pressurized piping system"; he was "impaled" and knocked "violently into co-workers and other objects." (Doc. 1 at 3; see also Doc. 20-1 at 4 n.14.) As a result, he suffered "serious injuries" to his stomach, arms, shoulders, legs, head, neck, and spine, among others, all "requiring extensive medical care and treatment." (Doc. 1 at 3-4; see also, e.g., Doc.15 at 1; Doc. 20-1 at 4 & nn. 14-15) Based upon these and other injuries, some to be proven at trial, Johnny sued Valero. (Doc. 1 at 4; see also Doc. 20-1 at 4.) With John so injured, Learonica endured her own separate and cognizable injury: "loss of consortium, services and society, thus entitling her to recover such damages as are fair and reasonable under the circumstances." (Id.; see also Doc. 20-1 at 4 n.16.)
On January 1, 2006, Car-Ber and Valero entered into a so-called "Multi-State Work Agreement," one bearing the number CORP06MS3167-00 ("Agreement"). (Doc. 20-1 at 1-2; see also Doc. 20-2 at 2, 3.) As a preliminary matter, "Work" is defined in the Agreement's fourth section and Exhibit A. (Doc. 20-2 at 12, 39, 40.) In effect at the time of Johnny's accidentt, (Id. at 2), the lengthy and repeatedly amended Agreement includes five crucial provisions. Exhibit L states the terms and conditions specific to facilities within Louisiana's borders and covered by the Agreement:
Only and strictly with regard to claims, demands, suits and other liabilities by employees of Contractor or any of Contractor's subcontractors against Owner[, Valero], in connection with Work performed in the State of Louisiana, the parties acknowledge that performance of any Work by Contractor constitutes their recognition and agreement that a statutory employer relationship as envisioned by La. R.S. § 23:1061(A), as amended by Act 315 of 1997, exists between the Contractor and Valero.
("Exhibit L"). (Doc. 20-2 at 78-79.) This section stresses—"Such statutory employer relationship applies to Contractor's direct, borrowed, special or statutory employees"—and ends: "Further, the parties acknowledge that the Work to be performed under this Agreement is an integral part of, or essential to, the ability of Valero to generate its own goods, products, or services." (Id. at 79.) In other respects, Paragraph 13 of the Agreement defines "Contractor" narrowly: "In the performance of Work under this Agreement, Contractor shall at all times be an independent contractor, and the relationship of the Parties hereunder shall in no event beconstrued as constituting any other relationship," ("Paragraph 13"). (Id. at 17; see also Doc. 24 at 2 (quoting id.).) Appendix 1 clarifies the relationship between the terms in the Agreement's main body and its exhibits: "In the event of a conflict between the terms and provisions of the main body of this Agreement and the terms and provisions of any Appendices, Exhibits, Annexes, Addenda hereto or any other material forming a part hereof, the terms and provisions of the main body of this Agreement shall govern and control," ("Appendix 1"). (Doc. 20-2 at 27; see also Doc. 24 at 3 (quoting id.).)
Beyond these three parts, the Agreement contains two other particularly relevant paragraphs. First, per Paragraph 47, "[a]ll . . . terms and conditions [set forth in Exhibit L] shall be binding upon the Parties as fully set forth in the main body of the Agreement." (Doc. 20-2 at 32.) It further qualifies the breadth of Appendix 1 by declaring: "In the event of any conflict between any of the express provisions of Exhibit L and any other express provisions of this Agreements, the provisions of Exhibit L shall govern and control." (Id. (emphasis in original).) Second, a savings clause ("Savings Clause") appears in a later subparagraph:
In the event any provision herein shall be judicially interpreted or held to be void or otherwise unenforceable as written, it shall be deemed to be revised and modified to the extent necessary to make it legally enforceable, and the remaining terms of this Agreement shall not be affected thereby."
Car-Ber, Johnny's employer at the time, has never contested the validity of the Agreement.
The first complaint was filed on December 12, 2014, (Doc. 1), and was first amended on December 16, 2014, (Doc. 4). One defendant, Starcon International Inc. ("Starcon"), answered on January 28, 2015, (Doc. 8), Valero on February 2, 2015, (Doc. 9), and Burns and McDonnellEngineering, Inc. ("Burns"), submitted its own on February 9, 2015, (Doc. 13). Two closely related cases—Bruce Jacob Fontenot v. Valero Refining-Meraux, LLC, et al, No. 3:14-cv-00773-JWD-EWD, and Bruce Kirk Fontenot v. Valero Refining-Meraux, LLC, et al., No. 14-cv-00774-JWD-EWD4—were reassigned to this Court on March 18, 2015, (Doc. 18), but no consolidation pursuant to Rule 42(a) has taken place, (Doc. 19). Defendant docketed the MSJ on May 15, 2015. (Doc. 20.) The Opposition arrived on June 5, 2015, (Doc. 24), and was followed by the Reply on June 19, 2015, (Doc. 25). As permitted by Court order, (Doc. 27), the Plaintiffs filed the second amended complaint on July 1, 2015, (Doc. 28), their substantive claims left untouched. Answers from Burns and Valero were docketed on July 2, 2015, and July 9, 2015, respectively. (Docs. 29-30.) Oral argument on the motion was heard on January 20, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. (Docs. 32, 35.)
The Parties' arguments can be quickly summarized. In the MSJ and the Reply, Valero relies entirely on Exhibit L, which effectively classifies Valero as a statutory employer for purposes of the Louisiana Worker's Compensation Act ("Act"), encoded in Louisiana Revised Statutes § 23:1021 et seq.,5 if sued by any contractor's employee, including Johnny. (Doc. 20-1 at 2, 6-7.) In its words, via Exhibit L, "the Agreement explicitly recognizes the statutory employer relationship between Valero and Car-Ber, which applies to Car-Ber's direct employees, such as the plaintiff." (Id. at 7.) Therefore entitled to the presumption that it is astatutory employer as a matter of Louisiana statutory and contract law, Valero was and is immune from tort liability, and as Plaintiffs have never overturned this presumption, § 23:1021 must be their "exclusive remedy." (Id. at 6-8.) To further support the existence of such a relationship, Valero makes two more points. First, Car-Ber's work was "an integral part of, or essential to," its ability "to generate goods and services," as the Agreement itself states and as case law demands. (Id. at 8-9.) Second, when proffered similar agreements, Louisiana federal and state courts have found contractual clauses like those in Exhibit L, when construed in light of facts strongly evidencing a contractor's pivotal role, facts identical to the ones alleged by Valero, to establish the statutory employer relationship necessary to trigger application of § 23:1021. (Id. at 10-12.) Thus, Valero is immune from tort liability, and the first, second, and third complaints must fall. (Id. at 12.)
Conversely, Plaintiffs discern ambiguity in the Agreement that forecloses summary judgment. (Doc. 24.) Relying partly on the longstanding rule that tort immunity statutes like the Act should be narrowly construed and a single dissent by a state appellate judge, Plaintiffs insist that Exhibit L conflicts with Paragraph 13, the latter of which states that "[i]n the performance of Work under this Agreement, Contractor shall at all times be an independent contractor," (Doc. 20-2 at 17). (Doc. 24 at 4-5 ). In their view, such an apparent discrepancy should compel application of Appendix 1's priority system, resulting in Paragraph 13's narrow definition of contractor overriding Exhibit L's classification schematic. (Id. at 5-6.) So characterized, the Agreement can...
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