Mitchell v. Sheldon

• Decision Date: 29 June 2018
• Docket Number: No. 1:13-cv-01324-DAD-EPG,1:13-cv-01324-DAD-EPG
• Parties: COREY MITCHELL, Plaintiff, v. CHAVEZ and SHELDON, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

COREY MITCHELL, Plaintiff, v. CHAVEZ and SHELDON, Defendants.

No. 1:13-cv-01324-DAD-EPG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

June 29, 2018

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES

(Doc. No. 194)

Before the court in this civil rights action is plaintiff's motion for an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The motion was heard by the court on March 6, 2018, with attorney Micah Nilsson appearing on behalf of plaintiff, attorney Edgar Nield appearing on behalf of defendant Chavez, and attorney Michael Terhorst appearing on behalf of defendant Sheldon. For the reasons set forth below, the court will grant plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, initially proceeded pro se in this § 1983 action alleging defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm he suffered when he was housed with a cellmate who stabbed plaintiff shortly after being moved into plaintiff's cell. The court appointed counsel from its pro bono panel to represent plaintiff in this matter on January 3, 2017. (Doc. No. 73.) On August 18, 2017, following a four-day trial, a jury found in plaintiff's favor, concluding defendants were deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of serious harm that plaintiff faced. (Doc. No. 160.) The jury awarded him $100,000 in damages. (Id.) Additionally, the jury concluded that defendants had acted with malice, oppression, and/or reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights, thereby establishing the possibility that defendants were liable for punitive damages. (Id.) The court directed that the second phase of the trial, concerning the amount of punitive damages, if any, to be awarded would commence on the afternoon of August 23, 2017. (Doc. No. 158.) The parties requested that a settlement conference be held on the morning of August 23, 2017. (Doc. No. 161.) At the settlement conference, the parties reached a settlement agreement concerning the total amount to be paid to plaintiff in return for his agreement that the jury verdict be vacated and foregoing the punitive damages phase of the trial, but with no agreement as to the award of attorneys' fees.

On December 21, 2017, the court set a briefing schedule for resolving the parties' dispute concerning the payment of attorneys' fees, and plaintiff's motion was filed on January 9, 2018. (Doc. Nos. 189, 194.) Defendants filed an opposition on February 16, 2018. (Doc. No. 204.) Plaintiff filed a reply on February 27, 2018. (Doc. No. 205.)

LEGAL STANDARD

In an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The Supreme Court has explained the historical underpinnings and purpose of § 1988(b) as follows:

In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), this Court reaffirmed the "American Rule" that each party in a lawsuit ordinarily shall bear its own attorney's fees unless there is express statutory authorization to the contrary. In response Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, authorizing the district courts to award a reasonable attorney's fee to prevailing parties in civil rights litigation. The purpose of § 1988 is to ensure "effective access to the judicial process" for persons with civil rights grievances. H.R.Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 1 (1976). Accordingly, a prevailing plaintiff "'should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.'" S.Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 4 (1976), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1976, p. 5912 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (parallel citations omitted); see also Barnard v.Theobald, 721 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2013) ("'[A] court's discretion to deny fees under § 1988 is very narrow and . . . fee awards should be the rule rather than the exception.'"); Mendez v. County of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1124 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding a prevailing plaintiff is "ordinarily entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee"), overruled on other grounds, Arizona v. ASARCO LLC, 773 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2014); Sable Commc'ns v. Pac. Tel. & Tel., 890 F.2d 184, 193 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Plaintiffs prevailing in a civil rights action should ordinarily receive attorney's fees unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.").

A prevailing party is one who succeeds on any significant issue in the litigation, resulting in a "material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties." Texas State Teacher's Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989). Although there was initially some indication otherwise, the parties here do not ultimately contest whether plaintiff was the prevailing party in this case. Rather, it is the amount of the fee award to which plaintiffs' counsel are entitled that is disputed by defendants.

"[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437; see also Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) ("The prevailing party has the burden of submitting billing records to establish that the number of hours it has requested are reasonable."); Carson v. Billings Police Dep't, 470 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 2006) (same). "The Supreme Court has stated that the lodestar is the 'guiding light' of its fee-shifting jurisprudence, a standard that is the fundamental starting point in determining a reasonable attorney's fee." Van Skike v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 557 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992)); see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (describing the lodestar as the "most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee"). Accordingly, a district court is required "to calculate an award of attorneys' fees by first calculating the 'lodestar' before departing from it." Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co. Inc., 224 F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000)). "The 'lodestar' is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by areasonable hourly rate." Camacho, 523 F.3d at 978 (quoting Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008) ("The number of hours to be compensated is calculated by considering whether, in light of the circumstances, the time could reasonably have been billed to a private client."). Applying these standards, "a district court should exclude from the lodestar amount hours that are not reasonably expended because they are 'excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.'" Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mutual Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434).

As noted, the lodestar figure is presumptively reasonable. See Dague, 505 U.S. at 562 ("We have established a 'strong presumption' that the lodestar represents the 'reasonable' fee[.]"); Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1202 ("The product of this computation—'the lodestar figure'—is a 'presumptively reasonable' fee under 42 U.S.C. § 1988."). However, "in rare cases, a district court may make upward or downward adjustments to the presumptively reasonable lodestar on the basis of those factors set out in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1975), that have not been subsumed in the lodestar calculation." Camacho, 523 F.3d at 982. Those factors to be considered in making any adjustment to the presumptively reasonable lodestar include:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the 'undesirability' of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases.

Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70; see also Mendez, 540 F.3d at 1129; Ballen, 466 F.3d at 746 ("After making that computation, courts then assess whether it is necessary to adjust the presumptively reasonable lodestar figure on the basis of twelve factors."). "The Supreme Court teaches that the degree of success obtained is 'the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee

/////award.'" Bravo v. City of Santa Maria, 810 F.3d 659, 666 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992)) (internal quotations omitted).

Finally, in applying these legal standards the court is cognizant of the following overarching guidance provided by the Ninth Circuit:

Lawyers must eat, so they generally won't take cases without a reasonable prospect of getting paid. Congress thus recognized that private enforcement of civil rights legislation relies on the availability of fee awards: "If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation['s] fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in court." S.Rep. No. 94-1011, at 2 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910. [fn. omitted] At the same time, fee awards are not negotiated at arm's length, so there is a risk of overcompensation. A district court thus awards only the fee that it deems reasonable. See Hensley v. Eckerhart,

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