Mitchell v. State
| Citation | 317 S.W.2d 1,229 Ark. 469 |
| Decision Date | 13 October 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. 4907,4907 |
| Parties | Esaw MITCHELL, Petitioner, v. STATE of Arkansas, Respondent. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Gordon H. Sullivan, Little Rock, for petitioner.
Bruce Bennett, Atty. Gen., and Thorp Thomas, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
This case involves the provisions of Act 419, of the General Assembly of 1957, known as the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Petitioner, Esaw Mitchell, was charged, by Information, on March 20, 1957 with the crime of first degree murder, it being alleged that he, with malice aforethought and after premeditation and deliberation, murdered George Beyerlein, Sr. On October 22, 1957, the cause came on for trial, at which time petitioner's attorneys and the prosecuting attorney entered into an agreement that if Mitchell would plead guilty to the charge, the State would not request the death penalty, and would agree to a sentence of life imprisonment. 1 The plea was entered and a jury impaneled to hear the evidence. The State then put on sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case, consisting of the evidence of Officer O. A. Allen, who testified as to the oral confession made to him by petitioner, and the introduction of trousers, shoes, and other articles owned by petitioner, containing blood stains. The court then instructed the jury as follows:
'Ladies and gentlemen, you have one function in this case. You heard the State waive the death penalty and agree to accept life imprisonment in this case. In a case of murder in the first degree, nobody but the jury can assess the punishment and of course, any other verdict that you might bring back except life imprisonment I would set aside. You have no choice and your verdict will be: 'We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree and fix his punishment at life imprisonment in the State Penitentiary.''
The jury retired, and shortly returned with their verdict, finding petitioner guilty of murder in the first degree. Petitioner was then committed to the state penitentiary.
On December 17, 1957, Mitchell, while in the state penitentiary, filed a petition pro se asking for a new trial, and requesting that an attorney be appointed for him. Present counsel was appointed by the court, and filed an amended petition under Act 419 of the 1957 General Assembly of the State of Arkansas, challenging the legality of Mitchell's incarceration. A hearing was held on the petition, at which time petitioner and his sister testified that they did not understand that a plea of guilty to first degree murder was being entered on the day of the trial, and petitioner stated he did not know that a judgment of life imprisonment was rendered, nor did he make any agreement with his attorneys to accept life imprisonment. Petitioner's two attorneys (at the time of the trial) testified that they entered the plea of guilty to first degree murder after thoroughly discussing the matter with both petitioner and his sister. One of the attorneys testified that he told the sister that if Mitchell could get a life sentence, it should be accepted. This attorney testified that he talked with petitioner at the county jail on several occasions, and Mitchell agreed that he would like to get off with a life sentence. 'He thought he could stand that, but he couldn't stand that chair.' The attorneys testified that he told the sister that explained to both petitioner and his sister, and that they appeared satisfied at the time. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the petition, and this appeal follows.
For reversal, petitioner urges four points.
That the petitioner was denied due process under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article II, Sections 7 and 8 of the Constitution of Arkansas.
That the Court failed to permit the jury to find the degree of the crime of murder in violation of Arkansas Statutes (1947), Section 43-2152.
That the State failed to make a prima facie case of murder in the first degree.
That the Court directed a verdict of guilty in a felony case where the punishment for said crime was confinement in the State Penitentiary.
For purposes of discussion, these points will be, more or less, grouped together.
Petitioner was charged with Information filed by the prosecuting attorney, and was represented by competent and experienced counsel, retained for his benefit and of his own choosing. On August 5, 1957, petitioner, through such counsel, filed a motion to quash the information, alleging that the oral confession was obtained after Mitchell had been held in custody for a long period of time, that petitioner had been threatened, physically abused, and subjected to psychological coercion; that he had been denied constitutional and statutory rights in that the arresting officers failed to take him forthwith before a magistrate, and that he had not been allowed to see or speak to any friend, close relative or attorney while being held in confinement; that the purported confession having been obtained under those circumstances, same was not competent evidence; that since the information had been issued solely upon the basis of this incompetent evidence, such information should be quashed. A hearing was held on this petition on August 12th, at which time Mitchell testified that he had been held in jail ten or eleven days before the statement was made, that he had been beatch and threatened by officers, and coerced into making a statement, though admitting that no one told him what to say, and that the statement was given in his own words. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court rendered its ruling as follows: 'The Court thinks it is premature, and I am overruling the motion to quash, holding that the information is good.'
On October 22nd, the case came on for trial, and after consultation between the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel, the plea of guilty was entered, and a jury selected and impaneled to hear the evidence. This plea of guilty was entered by petitioner's counsel, according to their testimony, only after the proposed plea had been thoroughly discussed with petitioner on several occasions, and Mitchell and family were in the front of the court room when the plea was entered. To enter a plea of guilty in a first degree murder case is not unusual, and numerous cases in this state have been handled in exactly the same manner. It would appear that up to this point, there was nothing in the proceeding of October 22nd which did not fully conform to the requirements of the federal constitution, the state constitution, and our statutory law. It seems clear that both Mitchell, his family, and counsel, felt that his interest was best being served by entering the plea.
It is argued that the State failed to make a prima facie case of murder in the first degree, but we do not agree. A study of the transcript reveals ample evidence to sustain a first degree murder conviction. No point would be served in detailing such evidence, since we do not consider petitioner's argument in this respect pertinent, in reaching our determination.
Section 43-2152 of Arkansas Statutes (1947) provides as follows:
'The jury shall, in all cases of murder, on conviction of the accused, find by their verdict whether he be guilty of murder in the first or second degree; but if the accused confess his guilt, the court shall impanel a jury and examine testimony, and the degree of crime shall be found by such jury.'
Accordingly, we agree that the court was beyond its rights in directing the jury to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder. It was the duty of the jury, rather than the court, to find the degree of the crime. In Wells v. State, 193 Ark. 1092, 104 S.W.2d 451, a plea of guilty was entered by the defendant to first degree murder, and the court instructed the jury as follows
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...in the habeas corpus petition could have been raised under our postconviction rule, Criminal Procedure Rule 37. See Mitchell v. State, 229 Ark. 469, 317 S.W.2d 1 (1958). However, appellant failed to raise these issues at the time he filed his Rule 37 petition despite the fact that the case ......
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