Mitchell v. State
Decision Date | 19 April 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 76492,76492 |
Citation | 369 S.E.2d 487,187 Ga.App. 40 |
Parties | MITCHELL v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Carl Greenberg, Atlanta, J.M. Raffauf, for appellant.
Robert E. Wilson, Dist. Atty., Thomas S. Clegg, Nelly F. Withers, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee.
The appellant, Ed Hill Mitchell, was indicted and tried for aggravated assault with intent to murder his mother, two counts of aggravated assault upon his mother with a deadly weapon, and making terroristic threats to his sister, all charges stemming from an incident that took place on November 30, 1986. Mitchell entered a special plea of insanity. The jury found him guilty but mentally ill of aggravated assault with intent to murder, one count of aggravated assault, and making terroristic threats, and this appeal followed.
Mitchell lived with his mother and sister in a duplex. He had an extended history of mental illness and substance abuse. According to Mitchell's sister, he had been in and out of mental institutions as an adult. Diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic, he had been hospitalized at the Georgia Mental Health Institute for much of the time from August 1985 until July 1986. In October 1986, Mitchell was picked up for involuntary psychological evaluation, after he told his sister that she was fixing to die because an angel told him to beat her brains out with a baseball bat. Mitchell's sister also recounted that he would never take his medication for his schizophrenia, but would continually get "high" sniffing glue, or paint, or even bug spray.
The incident of November 30, 1986, apparently was precipitated by Mitchell's mother's insistence that his dog stay outside. Mitchell became upset, cursed his sister, and then remarked, He then picked up a lamp and approached his sister, but desisted momentarily when his mother interceded. However, he quickly became angry again, picked up the lamp, and began beating his mother over the head. Mitchell's sister ran out of the house to get help. Paul Jackson, who lived in the other half of the duplex, heard screaming and knocked on the Mitchells' door; Mitchell came to the door, holding a can opener in his bloody hand, and told him, "If you come in, I will kill you." Jackson then went back to his apartment and called the police.
Shortly thereafter, a police officer arrived and secured Mitchell in his patrol car. After rendering aid to Mitchell's mother, the officer returned to his patrol car, at which point Mitchell uttered that he "should have killed the whole fucking house because they were evil," and that he would not do time for what he had done.
At the station he made the following statement.
The following question and answer session was also recorded:
A psychiatrist, court-appointed to determine whether Mitchell was competent to stand trial and whether he was responsible for his behavior at the time of the incident, interviewed Mitchell twice before the trial. Other than when Mitchell claimed that he and the jail had formed a conspiracy to trap God in one of the jail cells, the psychiatrist generally found Mitchell to be in contact with reality. During the interviews, Mitchell had explained that he had beaten his mother because the Devil had instructed him to stop her from putting his dog out, else she might hurt the dog. The psychiatrist concluded that, although Mitchell was delusional at the time of the incident, he had not acted out of compulsion, because a compulsion required a perceived situation that if one failed to act, something catastrophic would happen. He also concluded that Mitchell probably knew the difference between right and wrong. The staff psychiatrist who had treated Mitchell during his hospitalization at Georgia Mental Health Institute also testified that Mitchell knew right from wrong, that he comprehended the necessity of continuing to take his medication for schizophrenia, and that Mitchell was capable of choosing to take those medications. Held:
1. Mitchell contends that the verdict of guilty but mentally ill cannot stand, because the evidence showed that at the time of the incident he was unable to distinguish right from wrong and was acting under a delusional compulsion. Under OCGA § 16-3-2, a person is not guilty of a crime if he lacked the mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong at the time of the incident in question; under OCGA § 16-3-3, a person is not guilty of a crime if, because of a mental illness, he acted under a delusional compulsion which overmastered his will to resist committing the crime. The only evidence concerning Mitchell's capacity to distinguish between right and wrong was the psychiatric opinion that he retained that capacity despite that mental illness. Concerning the issue of delusional compulsion, the uncontroverted evidence was that while Mitchell was delusional, he had not acted under a compulsion. Given this evidentiary posture, we concluded that "after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the crime." Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 66, 71-72, 295 S.E.2d 727 (1982).
Mitchell also contends that his conviction for making terroristic threats cannot stand because it was based upon "the uncorroborated testimony of the party to whom the threat is communicated." OCGA § 16-11-37. Only slight circumstances are needed to corroborate a victim's testimony, for purposes of OCGA § 16-11-37. Ellis v. State, 176 Ga.App. 384(3), 336 S.E.2d 281 (1985). In the instant case, the terroristic threat consisted of Mitchell's declaration to his sister that he would kill everything in the house, followed by his picking up a lamp and approaching his sister. The necessary corroboration of the occurrence of the terroristic threat was provided by (1) the victim's recounting Mitchell's previous threat against her which resulted in a brief involuntary hospitalization for psychological evaluation, (2) the fact that moments later Mitchell did use the lamp in a vicious assault upon his mother who had interceded on behalf of the sister, and (3) the arresting officer's testimony that Mitchell had uttered to him in the patrol car that he should have killed everyone in the house.
2. Under OCGA § 16-3-3, a defendant may not be guilty of a criminal act where he acted under a delusional compulsion, but the delusion must be as to a fact which, if true, would have justified the act. Stevens v. State, 256 Ga. 440, 350 S.E.2d 21 (1986). In charging the jury on delusional compulsion as a defense, the trial court further instructed the jury on when a person is justified in using force against another person, tracking the language of OCGA § 16-3-21(a) concerning use of force in defense of self or others. Mitchell contends that by so charging the jury, the trial court as a practical matter told the jury that keeping the dog from being put outside did not justify his attacking his mother. The trial court simply stated the correct law on justification; it was the jury that decided protection of the dog constituted no legal justification for Mitchell's assault on his mother.
Mitchell also contends that the jury instruction was incomplete, as it did not inform the jury that justification may also exist "[i]n all other instances which stand upon the same footing of reason and justice as those enumerated in this article." OCGA § 16-3-20(6). However, ensuring that one's dog gets to stay inside a house hardly stands upon the "same footing of reason and justice" as defending oneself or another against the imminent use of unlawful force by a third party, or any other situation enumerated in OCGA § 16-3-20 et seq.
3. Mitchell contends that the trial court erred in giving incomplete jury instructions on voluntary and involuntary intoxication. The trial court defined involuntary intoxication only to aid the jury's understanding of voluntary intoxication. The trial court did not instruct the jury on the legal excuse that involuntary intoxication may furnish under OCGA § 16-3-4(a), and...
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