Mitchell v. Steffen, C3-92-239

• Decision Date: 06 August 1993
• Docket Number: No. C3-92-239,C3-92-239
• Parties: Charles MITCHELL, et al., v. Natalie Haas STEFFEN, in her official capacity as Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Human Services, petitioner.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 198

504 N.W.2d 198

62 USLW 2111

Charles MITCHELL, et al., v. Natalie Haas STEFFEN, in her official capacity as

Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Human

Services, petitioner.

No. C3-92-239.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 6, 1993.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Minn.Stat. Sec. 256D.065 (1992), prescribing a durational residency requirement for full general assistance-work readiness benefits, burdens the fundamental right to travel and violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., Jacelyn F. Olson, Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for appellant.

Ann Cofell, Mid-Minnesota Legal Asst., St. Cloud, Paul Onkka, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Service, Inc., Prior Lake, William C. Daniels, Jr., Mid-Minnesota Legal Assistance, Minneapolis, for respondents.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

SIMONETT, Justice.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted plaintiff-respondents in a class action suit. Both the trial court and the court of appeals ruled that Minn.Stat. Sec. 256D.065 (1992), which imposes a durational residency requirement for full general assistance-work readiness benefits, was unconstitutional. See Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896 (Minn.App.1992). We granted the petition for further review of the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services, and we now affirm.

Faced with a budget crisis for the 1992-93 biennium, the legislature enacted Minn.Stat. Sec. 256D.065, effective July 1, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the "1991 amendment"), which reduces general assistance grants available to certain welfare recipients during their first 6 months of residency in this state. The amendment reads:

Notwithstanding any other provisions of sections 256D.01 to 256D.21, otherwise eligible applicants without minor children, who have been residing in the state less than six months, shall be granted general assistance and work readiness payments in an amount that * * * equal[s] 60 percent of the amount that the applicant would be eligible to receive under section 256D.06, subdivision 1. A person may receive benefits in excess of this amount, equal to the lesser of the benefits actually received in the last state of residence or the maximum benefits allowable under section 256D.06, subdivision 1.

(Emphasis added.)

Plaintiff-respondents are unmarried adults without children who had resided in Minnesota less than 6 months and had applied for general assistance benefits after July 1, 1991. They received the reduced benefits and filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleging that Minn.Stat. Sec. 256D.065 violates their right to travel, as well as the equal protection clause of both the federal and state constitutions and the privileges and immunities clause of the federal constitution. The district court certified the action as a class action.

Welfare recipients who have resided in Minnesota for at least 6 months receive general assistance benefits of $203 a month for a single person and $260 per month for a married couple. Minn.Stat. Secs. 256D.05, subd. 1a and 256D.06, subd. 1 (1990 & Supp.1991). ¹ Under the 1991 amendment, recipients who have resided in this state less than 6 months receive only 60 percent of these amounts.

In other words, eligible adults without minor children who have resided in Minnesota for less than 6 months receive $122 per month (instead of $203) if a single person and $156 per month (instead of $260) if a married couple; however, if the applicant provides verification, that person receives either the amount received in the previous state or the $203 or $260 per month granted Minnesota residents, whichever is lesser. Thus Minnesota will match the welfare benefits granted in the recipient's prior state but only up to the maximum Minnesota grant. Many states, however, provide no general assistance-work readiness benefits to their indigent residents.

The trial court ruled that the 1991 amendment violated the respondents' fundamental right to travel and to equal protection of the laws under the United States Constitution, but did not reach the question of whether the Minnesota equal protection clause was violated. The trial court concluded that the primary purpose of the 1991 amendment was to deter indigents from coming to Minnesota, and that the law "burdens plaintiffs' right to travel because it uses a classification which penalizes the exercise of that right." The court enjoined further enforcement of the law but denied retroactive benefits.

The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that the 1991 amendment was unconstitutional. Because the right to travel was implicated by the 6-month residency requirement, the appeals court held the classification thereby created was subject to strict scrutiny; and because the law failed this heightened standard, it was unconstitutional. In addition, the court of appeals went on to hold that the law also violated our state's equal protection clause. Finally the court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of retroactive benefits and remanded to the trial court to fashion a remedy for members of the class.

We granted the commissioner's petition for further review, which raises only the constitutional issues of equal protection and right to travel. (Issues relating to the privileges and immunities clause and to retroactive benefits are not raised here.)

The first two issues, as set out in the appellant commissioner's brief, are (1) whether the 1991 amendment violates the constitutional right to travel, and (2) whether the amendment violates the federal equal protection clause. It seems to us the question is not so much whether the right to travel has been "violated," but whether the right to travel has been so burdened by the durational residency requirement of the 1991 amendment that the statute's classification requires strict scrutiny rather than minimal rational basis analysis. "In reality, right to travel analysis refers to little more than a particular application of equal protection analysis." Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 2309, 2313 n. 6, 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1981).

The right to travel is inherent in the concept of our country as a federal union; hence the right to travel is a fundamental constitutional right under the federal constitution. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758-60, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1178-79, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966). This right to travel, which includes the right to migrate, is delineated in a series of United States Supreme Court decisions, particularly Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974); and Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 90 L.Ed.2d 899 (1986). The right to travel is implicated when a statute actually deters such travel, when impeding travel is its primary objective, or when it uses any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 903, 106 S.Ct. at 2320.

In this case, there is no evidence that the 1991 amendment actually deters migration or seeks to impede travel. Indigent newcomers to Minnesota are no worse off (and maybe better off) for welfare benefits in this state than they were in the state of their prior residency, so that the level of benefits under the 1991 amendment is not a deterrent to leaving the prior state. And while the purpose of the legislation was to conserve funds, it is clear from the statute itself that it was intended to save money without placing a deterrence on an indigent's decision to travel.

This lawsuit, then, is to be judged under the third type of situation, under those right-to-travel cases that have dealt "with state laws that, by classifying residents according to the time they established residence, resulted in the unequal distribution of rights and benefits among otherwise qualified bona fide residents." Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 903, 106 S.Ct. at 2321.

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), is particularly pertinent. There a state statute denied welfare assistance to residents who had not resided in the state for at least 1 year. The statute created two classes of needy persons, one composed of residents residing in the state for over a year and the other of residents residing in the state for less than a year. "Since the classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state interest." Id. at 638, 89 S.Ct. at 1333. The Court then held that the 1-year waiting period, which would cause indigents to hesitate to migrate to the state, failed to meet equal protection standards. While a state has a legitimate interest in preserving its fiscal integrity, the saving of welfare costs, said the Court, does not justify discriminating against newcomers.

A few years later, the United States Supreme Court decided Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974). There an Arizona statute required a year's residence in a county as a condition for receiving nonemergency medical care at county expense. It was understood this statute covered interstate movement. The Court reasoned that medical care is as much a basic necessity of life to an indigent as welfare benefits; and, therefore, following Shapiro, the Court declared the statute unconstitutional. The Court held that the 1-year durational residency requirement for nonemergency free medical care created an "invidious classification" that impinged on the right to travel by denying newcomers the basic necessities of life and for which there was no compelling state interest. Id. at 269, 94 S.Ct. at 1088.

In several cases the United States Supreme Court has struck down state statutes with fixed point residency...