Mitchell v. United States
| Citation | 43 F.4th 608 |
| Decision Date | 05 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-6031 |
| Parties | Christopher Alan MITCHELL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit) |
ARGUED: Erin P. Rust, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN TENNESSEE, INC., Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellant. Luke A. McLaurin, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Erin P. Rust, FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES OF EASTERN TENNESSEE, INC., Chattanooga, Tennessee, for Appellant. Luke A. McLaurin, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
Before: McKEAGUE, GRIFFIN, and READLER, Circuit Judges.
Almost a decade ago, inmate Christopher Alan Mitchell moved to vacate his sentence on the ground that he had been erroneously designated as a career offender under the Armed Career Criminal Act. At first, Mitchell's efforts bore fruit. Relying on then-existing law, the district court granted Mitchell's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, vacated his sentence, and set the case for resentencing. The resentencing process began but, before it was completed, developments in other cases revealed that Mitchell was a career offender after all. So the court vacated the order granting relief, denied Mitchell's § 2255 motion, and reinstated the original sentence.
Notwithstanding the denial of his § 2255 motion, Mitchell claims that the district court enjoyed the discretion to resentence him de novo. We disagree. After finding Mitchell ineligible for § 2255 relief, the court was required to reinstate his original sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment. We also decline Mitchell's request to expand his certificate of appealability.
This case involves two mainstays of our docket: postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and the Armed Career Criminal Act. Beginning with the latter, the Armed Career Criminal Act imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence where a defendant possesses a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and has at least three prior convictions "for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The phrase "violent felony" includes "any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that ... is burglary." § 924(e)(2)(B).
Over a decade ago, Mitchell pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of § 922(g). He also had three prior convictions relevant here: two for Tennessee aggravated burglary in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-403 and one for Class D Tennessee burglary in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402. Under then-controlling Sixth Circuit precedent, Tennessee aggravated burglary was a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act. See United States v. Nance , 481 F.3d 882, 888 (6th Cir. 2007) ; see also United States v. Ferguson , 868 F.3d 514, 515 (6th Cir. 2017) (). In view of this criminal history, the district court sentenced Mitchell to § 924(e) ’s 15-year mandatory minimum. Mitchell did not appeal.
Several years later, Mitchell moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He argued that his prior convictions for Tennessee aggravated burglary did not constitute violent felonies given recent developments in Armed Career Criminal Act jurisprudence. Indeed, as Mitchell's motion was pending before the district court, our en banc Court held that Tennessee aggravated burglary is not a violent felony under § 924(e). See United States v. Stitt (Stitt I) , 860 F.3d 854, 856 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (overruling Nance ), rev'd , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 399, 202 L.Ed.2d 364 (2018). Based on Stitt I , the parties agreed that Mitchell was not subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act's 15-year mandatory minimum, as two of his three qualifying offenses were for Tennessee aggravated burglary. So the district court granted Mitchell's § 2255 motion, vacated his sentence, and set the case for resentencing.
After Mitchell's resentencing began but before it was completed, the district court stayed the proceedings to await the Supreme Court's decision in the Stitt I appeal. Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed Stitt I , holding that "[t]he relevant language of the Tennessee [aggravated burglary] ... statute[ ] falls within the scope of generic burglary's definition" for purposes of § 924(e). United States v. Stitt (Stitt II) , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 399, 406, 202 L.Ed.2d 364 (2018). On the heels of Stitt II , we foreclosed further challenges to Tennessee aggravated burglary's status as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act in Brumbach v. United States . See 929 F.3d 791, 794 (6th Cir. 2019) ().
These decisions notwithstanding, Mitchell maintained before the district court that neither Tennessee aggravated burglary nor Tennessee burglary constitutes a violent felony. He also claimed that the district court improperly relied on facts from state court records to determine that he committed his burglaries "on occasions different from one another." § 924(e)(1). Concluding that our precedent foreclosed Mitchell's arguments, the district court vacated the order granting Mitchell's § 2255 motion, denied the motion, and reinstated the original sentence.
Mitchell moved for reconsideration. In his motion, Mitchell asked the district court to "finish the resentencing hearing" and order his sentence to run concurrently with a Tennessee state sentence he was then serving. The district court denied Mitchell's motion and, in addition, declined to issue a certificate of appealability. We later granted Mitchell a certificate of appealability to challenge the district court's reinstatement of his original sentence. See Mitchell v. United States , No. 20-6031 (6th Cir. June 17, 2021) (order).
A. Mitchell's primary argument on appeal is that the district court enjoyed the discretion to resentence him even after denying his § 2255 motion. Why? Because, says Mitchell, the court had previously vacated his original sentence. And during resentencing, Mitchell adds, the court must entertain his request for concurrent sentences.
That takes us to the other mainstay of our docket, 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Section 2255 affords a federal prisoner a narrow opportunity to challenge his earlier criminal proceedings. The statute authorizes the prisoner to move the court to "vacate, set aside or correct the sentence" "upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." § 2255(a). In evaluating a § 2255 motion, the court "initially considers whether ... the petitioner is entitled to any § 2255 relief." Braden v. United States , 817 F.3d 926, 929 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). If so, the court must vacate the judgment and select an appropriate remedy, such as resentencing. § 2255(b) ; see also Ajan v. United States , 731 F.3d 629, 631 (6th Cir. 2013). Otherwise, the motion must be denied. See Snider v. United States , 908 F.3d 183, 189 (6th Cir. 2018) ().
But how should a court proceed in the unusual circumstance confronting the district court here, where the court, after previously granting Mitchell's § 2255 motion, later vacated that order before any remedy was awarded because he was not eligible for relief? The appropriate course is the one the district court followed: to reinstate the original sentence.
The reasoning is straightforward. A district court does not enjoy "inherent authority ... to modify an otherwise valid sentence." United States v. Washington , 584 F.3d 693, 700 (6th Cir. 2009) ; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (). So unless Mitchell could demonstrate some grounds for relief, the district court was not authorized to modify his sentence. Mitchell's asserted basis for relief was § 2255. But he failed to satisfy § 2255 ’s demanding requirements. The district court correctly observed that our case law forecloses "[a]ny reasonable possibility" that Mitchell might successfully challenge his career offender status and thus denied his § 2255 motion. See Brumbach , 929 F.3d at 794 ; Ferguson , 868 F.3d at 515. In view of that denial, Mitchell was not "entitled to any § 2255 relief." Braden , 817 F.3d at 929 (citation omitted). And as Mitchell identified no other grounds for relief, the district court lacked the authority to adjust Mitchell's sentence. See United States v. Pettiford , 612 F.3d 270, 277 (4th Cir. 2010) . In other words, a prisoner who (like Mitchell) seeks relief under § 2255 but lacks a basis for relief under that statute must end those proceedings with his original sentence intact. See Washington , 584 F.3d at 700 ; § 3582(c). And the only way to ensure that no change occurred here was to reinstate Mitchell's original sentence.
This approach squares with our practice following vacatur of a district court's order granting postconviction relief under § 2255. In that setting, we consistently "direct the district court to enter the original sentence, rather than issue a general remand." United States v. Tigue , 811 F. App'x 970, 975 (6th Cir. 2020). It is thus no surprise that in cases where Stitt II eliminated the basis for § 2255 relief, we have consistently ordered prisoners’ original sentences reinstated—not resentencing. See,...
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