Mitchell v. Warden, FCI-Greenville
| Decision Date | 08 November 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19-cv-0539-RJD |
| Parties | MICHAEL LEE MITCHELL, #21266-045, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, FCI-GREENVILLE, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Petitioner Michael Lee Mitchell, an inmate in the Bureau of Prisons, filed his First Amended Petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on July 7, 2019.2 (Doc. 15). In 2009, Mitchell was sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). United States v. Mitchell, No. 09-cr-3012-RK-1, Doc. 21 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 9, 2009); (Doc. 19-5 herein). His sentence was enhanced to a 15-year mandatory minimum pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (the "ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(e)(1) and 924(e)(2)(B)(ii),3 based in part on three prior Missouri felony convictions: namely, 1990 and 2000 convictions for second-degree burglary pursuant to MO. REV. STAT. § 569.170 (1979), and a 2000 conviction for first-degree burglary pursuant to MO. REV. STAT. § 569.160 (1979). Without the ACCA enhancement, Mitchell would have faced astatutory maximum penalty of 10 years for his felon-in-possession conviction.4 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).
Mitchell now invokes Mathis v. United States, - U.S. -, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) to challenge his sentence enhancement based on these prior convictions and argues that he is entitled to be resentenced without said enhancement. Specifically, Mitchell argues that the Missouri statutes of his prior convictions are broader than the federal definition of burglary because they define "inhabitable structures" to include ships, trailers, sleeping cars, airplanes, or other vehicles or structures where people assemble for business, government, education, religion, entertainment or public transportation, which criminalizes the burglary of vehicles (such as buses or subways) not designed for overnight use. (Doc. 15, pp. 17-22). This, Mitchell argues, criminalizes more conduct than the "generic" definition of burglary as defined by the Supreme Court. (Id.).
Mitchell also asserts that his underlying conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) was defective because the government neither alleged nor proved that he had knowledge that he was a convicted felon at the time he possessed a firearm, relying on the recent opinion in Rehaif v. United States, - U.S. -, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), in support of this argument. (Doc. 15, pp. 23-24).
Respondent opposes issuance of the Writ on several grounds. First, in an argument he acknowledges is inconsistent with the current law of the Seventh Circuit, Respondent contendsthat inmates who have previously sought post-conviction relief under § 2255 may not rely upon § 2255(e)'s savings clause to challenge their sentences via a § 2241 petition. (Doc. 19, pp. 15-23). Respondent also argues that (1) Mitchell knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to collateral review of his sentence, foreclosing his Mathis claim (id. at pp. 23-27); (2) Mitchell cannot properly bring his § 2241 claim via § 2255(e)'s savings clause because his Mathis theory does not rely on a new rule of statutory interpretation that applies retroactively on collateral review, (id. at pp. 27-31); (3) Mitchell's Mathis claim fails on its merits because Missouri's first- and second-degree burglary statutes are properly considered violent felonies within the meaning of the ACCA, (id. at pp. 32-42); and (4) Mitchell's Rehaif claim fails on its merits because Mitchell was not convicted of "a crime of which he was innocent," and demonstrably possessed the knowledge that he was a convicted felon to support his felon-in-possession conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Doc. 19, pp. 42-50).
Mitchell replied to Respondent's Response. (Doc. 21). This matter is now ripe for resolution. For the reasons discussed below, Mitchell's First Amended Habeas Petition (Doc. 15) will be GRANTED IN PART to the extent that it relies on Mathis v. United States, - U.S. -, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).
On May 13, 2009, Mitchell pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). United States v. Mitchell, No. 09-cr-3012-RK-1, Doc. 15 (W.D. Mo. May 13, 2009); (Doc. 19-3 herein). Mitchell entered into a written Plea Agreement in which he agreed that he was properly considered an Armed Career Criminal based on his criminal history, which explicitly included his prior Missouri first- and second-degreeburglary convictions, and also agreed that the minimum penalty for his conviction was fifteen (15) years imprisonment. Id. at ¶¶ 2-5. Mitchell also agreed that he:
expressly waives his right to appeal his sentence, directly or collaterally, on any ground except a sentence imposed in excess of the statutory maximum or an illegal sentence, that is, sentencing error more serious than a misapplication of the Sentencing Guidelines, an abuse of discretion, or the imposition of an unreasonable sentence.
The indictment charged that Mitchell had "been convicted of crimes punishable by imprisonment for terms exceeding one year" and thereafter "knowingly possess[ed] a firearm" in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), and 924(e)(1), but did not specifically and separately allege that Mitchell had knowledge of his convicted-felon status when he possessed a firearm. Mitchell, No. 09-cr-3012-RK-1, Doc. 1, p. 1 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 24, 2009); (Doc. 19-2 herein). However, in the Plea Agreement, Mitchell did affirmatively agree that he "knowingly committed [the] offense [charged in the indictment], and is in fact guilty of [said] offense," as well as agreeing that he "ha[d] previously been convicted of" several "felony offenses" prior to his possession of the firearm in question. Doc. 19-2, pp. 1-3.
Mitchell's Presentence Report ("PSR") determined that his prior criminal history, including his three Missouri burglary convictions, qualified him for the ACCA enhancement and set his minimum term of imprisonment at 15 years (180 months) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). (Doc. 18-1, pp. 3, 6, 9-13, 22). In an addendum to the PSR, Mitchell lodged several objections to some of the information contained therein to preserve certain objections under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution—however, Mitchell did not object to the PSR's inclusion of "information expressly contained in the charging documents of conviction, written plea agreements, judgments and transcripts of the change of pleaor sentencing hearings" as to his criminal history and prior convictions referenced in the PSR. Id. at pp. 25-26.
The PSR determined Mitchell's Sentencing Guideline range to be 168 to 210 months' imprisonment based on a total offense level of 30 and a criminal history category of VI, but his status as an armed career criminal resulted in an effective Guideline range of 180 to 210 months' imprisonment. (Doc. 18-1, p. 22, ¶ 65). Mitchell was ultimately sentenced to 180 months imprisonment, five years supervised release, and a $100 special assessment. Mitchell, No. 09-cr-3012-RK-1, Doc. 21 (Sept. 9, 2009); (Doc. 19-5 herein).
Mitchell did not file a direct appeal. After being sentenced, Mitchell filed his first motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in which he argued that the statute of his conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), violated the Second Amendment, rendering his incarceration a violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights and his guilty plea involuntary. Mitchell, No. 09-cr-3012-RK-1, Doc. 25, p. 1. This motion was summarily denied by the sentencing court, and Mitchell did not appeal that decision. Id. at p. 2.
Mitchell filed an application for authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion following the Supreme Court's decision in Samuel Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. -, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and the Eighth Circuit granted his application on May 17, 2016. Mitchell v. United States, No. 15-3295 (8th Cir. 2016). Mitchell proceeded with the § 2255 motion in the district court, arguing that Johnson's invalidation of the ACCA's residual clause rendered his ACCA enhancement void because his prior convictions qualified as predicate offenses only under the now-unconstitutional residual clause. Mitchell v. United States, No. 16-cv-3194-RK, Doc. 1 (W.D. Mo. May 19, 2016). During the pendency of this motion, the Supreme Court decided Mathisv. United States, - U.S. -, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), and Mitchell incorporated additional arguments based on Mathis into his reply briefing. Id. at Doc. 7, pp. 3-10.
The district court initially granted this § 2255 motion, citing both Johnson and Mathis in support of re-sentencing Mitchell without the ACCA enhancement. Id. at Doc. 9. However, in a subsequent Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment, the government successfully argued that Mitchell's claims were based wholly on Mathis, a statutory interpretation case, and completely unrelated to Johnson, a constitutional law case, therefore taking Mitchell's motion outside the permissible scope of a § 2255 motion. Id. at Doc. 26 (). The Eighth Circuit later affirmed the denial of a certificate of appealability, and dismissed Mitchell's appeal. Mitchell v. United States, No. 18-3249 (8th Cir. May 21, 2019). Mitchell then filed the instant habeas action in May 2019. (Doc. 3).
Generally, petitions for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 may not be used to raise claims of legal error in conviction or sentencing, but are instead limited to challenges regarding the execution of a sentence. See Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998).
Aside from the direct appeal process, a prisoner who has been convicted in federal court is...
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