Mitchum v. City of Indianapolis
| Decision Date | 12 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:19-cv-02277-DLP-JPH,1:19-cv-02277-DLP-JPH |
| Parties | GORDON MITCHUM, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANAPOLIS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT (IMPD), BRYAN ROACH, MOLLY GROCE, DOES 1-50, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
This matter comes before the Court on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. [78]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' motion.
On May 31, 2018, Plaintiff Gordon Mitchum ("Mr. Mitchum") was sitting with his wife on their back porch located at 3231 N. Gladstone Avenue in Indianapolis, Indiana. (Pl. Compl., Dkt. 1 at 3; Mitchum Dep. 16:4-8, 21-24, Dkt. 88-1 at 3). Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department ("IMPD") officers were in Mr. Mitchum's neighborhood searching for two carjacking suspects. (CAD Audio, Dkt. 84-5). A canine officer was requested, and K9 Officer Molly Groce responded to the call with her police dog, Obi. (CAD Audio, Dkt. 84-5). By the time Officer Groce arrived on scene, several IMPD officers had already apprehended the first carjacking suspect and had him sitting handcuffed in the yard of 3229 N. Gladstone Avenue. (CAD Audio, Dkt. 84-5; Mitchum Dep. 13:14-14:6, Dkt. 88-1 at 3).
Officer Groce consulted with several IMPD Officers on the scene, and Officer Robinson informed her that it did not appear that either suspect was carrying a firearm or weapon of any kind. (Blue Team Report - Groce, Dkt. 79-9 at 7). Officer Groce confirmed that three verified witnesses had not observed a weapon on either suspect. (Id.). Officer Groce asked three IMPD Officers to back up her intended track with K9 Obi, and informed them that K9 Obi was not social and needed space while tracking. (Id.). Officer Groce drove over to 3200 N. Colorado Avenue to begin the track, at which point she gave verbal announcements of her intention to use a police K9. (Blue Team Report - Groce, Dkt. 79-9 at 7; Groce Dep. 34:10-19, Dkt. 79-2 at 10). Officer Groce, K9 Obi, and the three backup Officers searched the backyard, woodline, and brush of 3223, 3225, and 3229 N. Gladstone, at which point K9 Obi began backtracking to the site where the first suspect was handcuffed in the grass of 3229 N. Gladstone. (Blue Team Report - Groce, Dkt. 79-9 at 7-8). K9 Obi began pulling toward the first suspect and barking at him. (Id. at 8). Officer Groce then switched K9 Obi from a tracking command to an area search by giving him the command "Zuch1." (Blue Team Report - Groce, Dkt. 79-9 at 8; Groce Dep. 37:16-23, Dkt. 79-2 at 10).
Officer Groce had K9 Obi on a 6-foot lead and allowed him to walk ahead of her as they entered the side yard of Plaintiff's residence at 3231 N. Gladstone. (Blue Team Report - Groce, Dkt. 79-9 at 7-8). It is disputed whether Officer Groce gave a verbal announcement of her and the K9's presence before entering Mr. Mitchum's backyard. (Dkt. 89 at 25 n.11, 30). Her contemporaneous account in the Blue Team Report does not reflect any announcement, (Blue Team Report - Groce, Dkt. 79-9 at 8), but Officer Groce's deposition testimony states that an announcement was made. (Groce Dep. 40:1-6, Dkt. 79-2 at 11). K9 Obi then began to turn the corner onto Mr. Mitchum's back patio, at which point he engaged Mr. Mitchum and bit his left calf and right foot. (Mitchum Dep. 18:7-20; Dkt. 88-1 at 4).
It is disputed how K9 Obi came to release Mr. Mitchum's leg. Officer Groce testified in her deposition that she gave a verbal command and used the electronic collar to release K9 Obi, (Groce Dep. 43:10-44:14; Dkt. 79-2 at 12), while in her Blue Team Report she stated that she put both hands on K9 Obi's choke collar while giving a verbal command. (Blue Team Report - Groce, Dkt. 79-9 at 8). Mr. Mitchum, however, testified that Officer Groce gave no verbal command and had to pull K9 Obi off of his leg, the force of which was strong enough to pull him out of the chair in which he was sitting. (Mitchum Dep. 20:19-21:4, 21:14-20; Dkt. 88-1 at 4-5). Officer Robinson also testified that he saw Officer Groce pull K9 Obi "off strong," meaning to lift Obi by his collar. (Robinson Dep. 9:14-17; Dkt. 79-7 at 3). Once Obi released Mr. Mitchum's left calf, he immediately reengaged and bit Mr. Mitchum's right foot. (Mitchum Dep. 18:7-20; Dkt. 88-1 at 4). Mr. Mitchum suffered bitewounds that required several months of treatment. (Mitchum Dep. 21:10-13, 32:1-10; Dkt. 88-1 at 5, 7).
IMPD Officer Borgeman, one of the first officers on scene, had been aware of Mr. Mitchum's presence prior to the biting incident because he had spoken with Mr. Mitchum after apprehending the first suspect. (Blue Team Report - Hedden, Dkt. 79-9 at 10-11). Officer Borgeman did not tell the K9 search team that there were people on the back porch of 3231 N. Gladstone. (Id.). Sergeant Patton testified that if IMPD officers see any civilians in a potential K9 search area, they will warn the civilians to go inside the house or go somewhere outside of the search area to ensure their safety. (Patton 2019 Dep. 17:13-25; Dkt. 79-3 at 17). Sergeant Hedden concluded that this bite was preventable, due to Officer Groce's failure to shorten K9 Obi's leash before rounding an unknown corner or having her back-up Officers clear the corner. (Blue Team Report - Hedden, Dkt. 79-9 at 11). Additionally, Sergeant Hedden concluded that lack of communication between Officer Borgeman and the K9 search team was a contributing factor to the preventable bite. (Id.). Sergeant Patton concluded that this bite was preventable because Officer Groce failed to visually observe the corner she was negotiating. (Blue Team Report - Patton, Dkt. 79-9 at 12). Sergeant Patton also found that officer safety was not an issue here; instead, the issue was how the handler (Officer Groce) approached the unknown corner. (Id.).
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Lewis v. Wilkie, 909 F.3d 858, 866 (7th Cir. 2018). If the moving party carries its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party," summary judgment should be granted. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court reviews "the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "However, inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture will not defeat a summary judgment motion." Dorsey v. Morgan Stanley, 507 F.3d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, "[a] party who bears the burden of proof on a particular issue may not rest on its pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate, by specific factual allegations, that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial." Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). "The opposing party cannot meet this burden with conclusory statements or speculation but only with appropriate citations to relevant admissible evidence." Sink v. Knox County Hosp., 900 F. Supp. 1065, 1072 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (citations omitted).
The Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on November 16, 2020, arguing each claim asserted by the Plaintiff in his Complaint fails as a matter of law. (Dkt. 81). Specifically, Defendants contend that (1) Plaintiff was not seized under the Fourth Amendment; (2) the conduct at issue here does not satisfy the shock-the-conscience standard under the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) Officer Groce and Chief Roach2 are entitled to qualified immunity for claims asserted against them in their individual capacity; (4) Plaintiff's Monell claim fails for failure to demonstrate that any policy of the IMPD caused his injuries; and (5) Plaintiff's negligence claims fail because IMPD is immune from suit under the Indiana Tort Claims Act and Officer Groce is not the proper Defendant. (Id.). Plaintiff filed his response on December 14, 2020, asserting that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to each of Defendants' contentions that precludes this Court from granting summary judgment. (Dkt. 89 at 3.) The Defendants filed their reply on January 11, 2021. (Dkt. 97).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Mitchum must present facts sufficient to show that the Defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived him of a specific right or interest secured by the Constitution or laws of the UnitedStates. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003); Payne v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1039 (7th Cir. 1998). Section 1983 is not itself a source of any substantive rights, but instead provides the means by which rights conferred elsewhere may be enforced. See Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354, 356 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). Those specific rights in turn provide "'the appropriate analytical lens through which facts are to be viewed,'" directing the Court to the proper doctrinal framework in which to address the claims. Bublitz v. Cottey, 327 F.3d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Payne, 161 F.3d at 1039)). In this case, Mr. Mitchum has alleged that his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth...
To continue reading
Request your trial