Mitran v. Williamson

Decision Date15 March 1960
PartiesSheila MITRAN v. Gordon WILLIAMSON.
CourtNew York Supreme Court

Brennan & Landers, Elmhurst, for plaintiff.

Harry Gittleson, Brooklyn, for defendant.

WALTER R. HART, Justice.

On the argument of this motion it was agreed that it was to be deemed a motion to dismiss the complaint for insufficiency.

The complaint alleges that on April 6, 1958 the plaintiff received a letter from defendant stating he desired to make her acquaintance and requesting her to meet him at a time and place designated therein. Plaintiff ignored this letter. On April 8, 1958 he phoned her and requested that she meet him for immoral purposes. She thereupon contacted the police. On April 13, 1958 he mailed to her photographs of himself with his private parts exposed and thereafter phoned her again, suggesting she meet him for immoral purposes. During the same week he again phoned her and on the advice of the police she agreed to meet him on April 18, 1958 in the lobby of the St. George Hotel, where she in fact did meet him, at which time he was taken into custody by the police. As a result of these events defendant was tried in the Court of Special Sessions for violating section 1141 of the Penal Law and pleaded guilty to the charge of attempting to show obscene prints. He was fined $100 and given a three months' suspended sentence in the Workhouse.

Plaintiff further alleges that she did not solicit or encourage defendant to 'perpetrate the unlawful, wilful or malicious trespass of her person, character and reputation,' that as a result of defendant's act she was brought to public disgrace, her reputation damaged and she was caused to suffer humiliation, mental, nervous and bodily distress, as a result of which she was forced to abstain herself from her usual vocation.

Defendant, to sustain his claim that the complaint is insufficient, cites the case of Prince v. Ridge, 32 Misc. 666, 66 N.Y.S. 454, where the court held that the illicit solicitation of sexual intercourse was not actionable on the theory that damages from mental suffering, unaccompanied by physical injuries, were not compensable. The holding in that case conforms with those in some other jurisdictions. Prosser in his Law of Torts states ([2d ed.], p. 45): 'Thus far it has been held that no action will lie for the insult involved in inviting a woman to illicit intercourse.' (citing cases) and then, quoting from 49 Harvard Law Review 1033, 1055, 'the view being, apparently that there is no harm in asking.' There are, however, authorities to the contrary. See cases collated 1936 Report of the Law Revision Commission, page 437.

Here, however, there is more alleged than the mere solicitation of illicit intercourse--which was not a single isolated incident. There is alleged in the complaint the sending to plaintiff of a photograph of defendant with his private parts exposed. A jury under all of the circumstances in this case could find defendant's conduct so shocking that plaintiff, as alleged, suffered severe emotional disturbance and resulting physical injuries for which defendnat would be liable. The applicable rule is set forth in section 46 of the 1948 supplement to the Restatement of the Law of Torts, as follows:

'One who, without a privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is liable

'(a) for such emotional distress, and

'(b) for bodily harm resulting from it.'

Applicable to the facts alleged in this action is the statement in comment g of the rule:

'In short, the rule stated in this section imposes liability for intentionally causing severe emotional distress in those situations in which the actor's conduct has gone beyond all reasonable bounds of decency. The prohibited conduct is conduct which in the eyes of decent men and women in a civilized community is considered outrageous and intolerable. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor and lead him to exclaim 'Outrageous!"

(See also 37 Mich.Law Review 874.)

It will accordingly be for the trier of the facts to determine whether the conduct of defendant was 'outrageous' and whether in fact it was the proximate cause of the mental disturbance and physical injuries claimed by her.

The basic concept of the Prince case (32 Misc. 666, 66 N.Y.S. 454, supra), cited by defendant, is faulty. The immunity from liability for damages caused by emotional disturbance unassociated with physical injuries, as illustrated by Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354, 34 L.R.A. 781, has been strictly limited to negligence actions and does not apply to cases of willful tort. This rule of law is brought sharply into focus by the opinion of Mr. Justice Kapper in Beck v. Libraro, 220 App.Div. 547, 548-549, 221 N.Y.S. 737, 738:

'Ignoring the allegation of assault, the other acts charged in the complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action, in my...

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16 cases
  • Galella v. Onassis
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • 5 July 1972
    ...from inflicting it." Halio v. Lurie, 15 A.D.2d 62, 66, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759, 763 (2d Dep't 1961); accord, Mitran v. Williamson, 21 Misc.2d 106, 108, 197 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691 (S.Ct.1960). All that is required in the way of intent is that emotional distress be reasonably foreseeable to the actor. As......
  • Wahlstrom v. Metro-North Commuter R. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • 6 April 2000
    ...v. Onassis, 353 F.Supp. 196, 230 (S.D.N.Y.1972), aff'd in relevant part, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir.1973); Mitran v. Williamson, 21 Misc.2d 106, 197 N.Y.S.2d 689, 692 (Sup.Ct.1960). Plaintiff is only required to allege facts "giv[ing] rise to a clear inference they were intended to cause severe e......
  • Thoreson v. Penthouse Intern., Ltd.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • 23 October 1990
    ... ... 4 The statute removes sexual advances or solicitation by an employer from the traditional rule that "there is no harm in asking." Mitran v. Williamson, 21 Misc.2d 106, 107, 197 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Sup.Ct., Kings County, 1960), quoting 49 Harv.L.Rev. 1033, 1055. Between strangers, it may be ... ...
  • Knierim v. Izzo
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 29 March 1961
    ...244 Iowa 683, 57 N.W.2d 915; LaSalle Extension University v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424, 91 A.L.R. 1491; Mitran v. Williamson, 21 Misc.2d 106, 197 N.Y.S.2d 689. In view of the many conflicting precedents, it is not feasible to review the cases individually, and we will only evaluat......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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